SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Richard Armstrong, proceeding pro se, seeks review of a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits. He appeals the District Court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to the Commissioner. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). When the judgment below upholds a benefits determination by the Commissioner, we conduct de novo review of the administrative record “to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The substantial evidence standard means that once- an [administrative law judge (‘ALJ’)] finds facts, we can reject those *103 facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

A review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Armstrong has not been disabled since prior to December 31, 1998, his date last insured. In particular, relying on Armstrong’s medical records and hearing testimony, the ALJ found that Armstrong’s impairments did not meet the criteria in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and that he had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). For substantially the same reasons as the District Court, we agree that those findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Armstrong also seeks a remand for consideration of additional medical records. We may order such a remand only when a claimant shows the additional evidence is material and that there was “good cause” for not incorporating it at the prior hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988). New evidence is material only if there is a “reasonable possibility” that it would have influenced the Commissioner to decide the claimant’s application differently. Id. Assuming Armstrong has good cause for his earlier failure to obtain and produce certain of his own medical records, this additional evidence is either irrelevant or cumulative of medical evidence already considered by the ALJ. Accordingly, the additional evidence is not material, and remand is not warranted.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Armstrong on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the February 29, 2016 judgment of the District Court.