SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Isaac Montanez, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s determination that a prior settlement agreement barred his federal discrimination claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 *78 F.3d 61, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2015). A Title VII plaintiff may waive his claims, but a court should accept a waiver only if it was knowing and voluntary. See Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1998). To determine where a waiver was knowing and voluntary, a court considers the totality of the circumstances. Id. Relevant factors include the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of or- access to the agreement before signing it, the role of the plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement, the clarity of the agreement, and whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law. Id.

Upon review, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Montanez’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The New York State Division of Human Rights facilitated the settlement. Montanez had over a week to review the two-page agreement. The agreement was clear and included an unambiguous waiver provision. And Montanez received consideration in exchange for the waiver. Montanez’s contention that the release provision excluded his federal employment discrimination claim fails: he waived any “employment discrimination claims arising under local, state or federal statute.”

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Montanez oh appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the March 22, 2016 judgment of the District Court.