SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Arles Vega moved to vacate a default judgment entered against him, which obligated him to pay plaintiff-appellee Fernán Jaramillo, his former employee, approximately $42,000 for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and state law. Adopting Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy’s Report and Recommendation, which reasoned that Vega’s default was willful, the District Court denied Vega’s motion. Vega appeals, arguing, inter alia, that his default was not willful because he believed that the numerous documents he had received from the court related to a separate workers’ compensation claim, for which Vega had counsel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). To determine whether to vacate a default judgment, a district court considers: “(1) the willfulness of default, (2) the existence of any meritorious defense, and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party.” Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 2013). A court need not consider all three criteria, however, because its determination that the default was willful is sufficient to support the denial of a motion to vacate. Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). A default is willful when the conduct is “ ‘more than merely negligent or careless,’ but is instead ‘egregious and not satisfactorily explained.’ ” Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension Fund v. Moulton Masonry & Const., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal alterations omitted). Athough more than mere negligence is required, “the degree of negligence in precipitating the default is a relevant factor to be considered.” Green, 420 F.3d at 108 (quoting Am. Alliance Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 59 *77 (2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gucci Am. Inc., v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (a finding of bad faith is not a necessary predicate for a finding of willfulness).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vega’s motion on the ground that his default was willful. Vega did not dispute that he had received and ignored numerous documents from the court, and his assumption that the documents were related to a pending workers’ compensation action was more than mere negligence. See Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 455 (holding a default “willful” where the defendant did not deny that he received the complaint, the court’s orders, or the notice of default judgment and did not contend that his noncompliance was due to circumstances beyond his control).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Vega’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the March 18, 2016 Order of the District Court.