SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Nestle Waters North America, Inc. (“Nestle”) appeals the June 8, 2016 judgment of the district court, dismissing Nestle’s procedural and substantive due process claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim for unjust enrichment. On appeal, Nestle argues that the City of New York and the Department of Finance of the City of New York (“City”) maintained an unlawful and deliberate policy of issuing and enforcing jurisdictionally defective parking summonses in contravention of Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) § 238(2). 1 Nestle asserts that this policy violated its procedural and substantive due process rights and brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It also brings a state law claim of unjust enrichment. For the reasons set forth in the district court’s well-reasoned opinion, we find these arguments to be without merit. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying *88 facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

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We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct, 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff and all factual allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Chase Group Alliance LLC v. City of New York Dept. of Finance, 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010).

First, we hold that the district court properly dismissed Nestle’s procedural due process claim. The primary question is whether the form of review afforded through the Parking Violations Bureau (“PVB”) administrative processes and Article 78 proceedings in New York State is adequate for due process purposes. To determine what process is due, the courts must balance the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In the instant case, the PVB/Article 78 review procedures clearly satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. The most persuasive fact is that Nestle successfully overturned 38 summonses through the PVB/Article 78 review procedures. It now alleges that the very procedure that previously vindicated its rights is now constitutionally defective. Accordingly, we conclude the district court appropriately dismissed Nestle's procedural due process claim.

Second, we also reject Nestle’s substantive due process claim that the City’s policy of noting “IRB” on its parking summonses was so perverted as to rise to the level of a deprivation of constitutional rights. “Substantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.” Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999), Substantive due process does not entitle federal courts to examine every alleged violation of state law. See Cunney v. Board of Trustees of Village of Grand View, New York, 660 F.3d 612, 626 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Substantive due process protects against government action that is arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not against government action that is incorrect or ill-advised.”(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the City’s alleged policy of issuing deliberately juris-dictionally defective parking summonses was an ultra vires act that violated Nestle’s due process rights.

Finally, the district court was well within its discretion to decline to exercise supplementary jurisdiction over the state law claim of unjust enrichment. “Once a district court’s discretion is triggered under § 1367(c)(3), it balances the traditional values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.” Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We typically afford great deference to the district court’s decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and continue to apply that deference here.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of appellant’s claims on appeal and found them to be *89 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.