SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant José Luis Cordero, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his claims against defendants-appellees, officials at the Cheshire Correctional Institution (“CCI”). Cordero brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Connecticut Constitution. 1 The District *45 Court dismissed the federal causes of action for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state causes of action. Cordero appeals only the District Court’s dismissal of his claims under Section 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the ADA, and abandons any challenges to the dismissal of the other claims. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP, 852 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pro se submissions are reviewed with “special solicitude,” and “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Upon such review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Corde-ro’s Section 1983 and Eighth Amendment conditions-of-conñnement claim based on his placement in a double cell. Double-celling is not per se unconstitutional, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (“We disagree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that there is some sort of ‘one man, one cell’ principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”), and Cordero failed to allege any consequences of double-celling such as “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “increase[d] violence among inmates” that might constitute the deprivation of a constitutional right, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Accordingly, Cordero did not establish a prima facie case under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment.

We likewise conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Cordero’s ADA claim. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016). Assuming arguendo that his HIV-status and mental disorders qualify as disabilities under the ADA, Cordero did not allege that his conditions prevented him from participating in any programs or activities, much less that reasonable accommodations were needed, requested, or refused. The District Court thus appropriately dismissed Cordero’s ADA claim.

Upon independent review of the record, and for the reasons principally set forth in the District Court’s orders and judgment, we find Cordero’s remaining arguments to be without merit.

*46 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the December 12, 2016 judgment of the' District Court.