*34 SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Abdoulaye Seek, proceeding pro se, sued his former employer, Information Management Network (“IMN”), its parent company Euromoney PLC, and four IMN and Euromoney employees, alleging discrimination and conspiracy to violate his civil rights, in violation of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3). Seek appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his amended complaint as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, its determination that neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel applied, and its determination that he did not state a claim under GINA. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal or its dismissal of an employment discrimination case as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-150 (2d Cir. 2001) (sua sponte) abrogated on other grounds by Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Brown v. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (statute of limitations). A cause of action for employment discrimination accrues from the moment of the discrete act constituting an unlawful employment practice, not from when the discriminatory motive is discovered. See Morse v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1992). “We review the district court’s decision to deny equitable tolling for abuse of discretion.” Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2003).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the majority of Seek’s claims as time-barred. Seek’s claims accrued, at the latest, in July 2007, when he was terminated, and he did not file his ■ complaint until 2015. And even though Seek alleged that he discovered the defendants’ alleged discriminatory intent in 2015, such discovery does not affect the accrual date of his cause of action. See Morse, 973 F.2d at 125 (noting that the Supreme Court has instructed that “the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.” quoting Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (emphasis omitted).

Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that no equitable exception applied. Equitable tolling did not apply because Seek did not act with reasonable diligence to discover the facts and protect his rights during the period he sought to have tolled. See Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996). Equitable estoppel did not apply because Seek did not allege facts showing that, while he was aware of his federal claims, the defendants prevented him from suing to assert them. See Bennett v. U.S. Lines Inc., 64 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1995).

Without addressing whether Seek’s GINA claim was timely, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the claim because Seek did not allege discrimination based on his genetic information. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l(a).

Because the district court properly dismissed Seek’s complaint as untimely, we need not consider whether his claims were meritorious. We have considered the remainder of Seek’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.