SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Peddie Jenkins, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint and from its order denying his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and for leave to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Jenkins additionally argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court judge should have recused himself. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s judgment dismissing Jenkins’ complaint. A Rule 60(b) motion filed within twenty-eight days of the judgment tolls the thirty-day deadline to appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (4)(A)(vi). Jenkins, however, did not move for Rule 60(b) relief within the twenty-eight-day deadline and does not argue that he is entitled to an equitable exception or that the Appellees *104 waived their timeliness objection. See Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307, 311-13 (2d Cir. 2015). We acknowledge, as Jenkins explained, that after judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, he made efforts to locate an attorney to replace former counsel in this case. Such circumstances, however, are not recognized as an equitable exception that tolls the thirty-day deadline to appeal. We therefore conclude that Jenkins’ notice of appeal (which was filed outside of the applicable thirty-day deadline) was untimely, and that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s judgment.

Jenkins has likewise failed to show that the district court’s denial of his motion for Rule 60(b)(5) relief and for leave to amend his complaint was improper. We review denials of Rule 60(b) relief and leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012); Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010). “[A] final judgment or order has prospective application for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5) only where it is executory or involves the supervision of changing conduct or conditions.” Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Jenkins does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that he was ineligible for relief under the prospective clause in Rule 60(b)(5), and thus has abandoned the issue. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995). Jenkins is further ineligible for such relief because the judgment “was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward.” See Tapper, 833 F.3d at 171. The district court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying Jenkins’ motion for Rule 60(b)(5) relief and for leave to amend his complaint. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

Finally, there is no basis for the district court judge’s recusal. Jenkins did not raise this argument in the district court, and we generally will not entertain issues raised for the first time on appeal. Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, although Jenkins asserts that the district court judge “was born in th[e] area and was ... a former prosecutor,” this is insufficient to demonstrate that “an objective, disinterested observer” would not have “entertain[ed] significant doubt that justice would [have] be[en] done absent recusal.” See Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)).

Accordingly, we DISMISS Jenkins’s appeal from the underlying judgment and AFFIRM the order denying Rule 60(b) relief and leave to amend.