SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Nicole Corrado, Esq., proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. Corrado, a former principal attorney for the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York State Appellate Division, First Department (“DDC”) of the New York State Unified Court System (“UCS”), sued UCS, and several UCS employees, bringing claims for sexual harassment and retaliation under federal, state, and city law. In a February 17, 2016 opinion, the district court dismissed several of Corrado’s claims against the individual defendants as time-barred. On April 4, 2016, Corrado filed a letter to the district court “requesting] that [her] case be discontinued.” Pl.-Appellant App. 260. The district court construed Corrado’s request as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and dismissed the action with prejudice. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Corrado asserts that the district court erred by dismissing the action with prejudice. “[I]f the plaintiff either moves for dismissal without prejudice or fails to specify whether the request is for dismissal with or without prejudice, the matter is left to the [court’s] discretion .... The trial court may grant a Rule 41(a) dismissal without prejudice or may require that the dismissal be with prejudice.” 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2367, Voluntary Dismissal—Effect of Dismissal (3d ed. 2017). As we have observed, “[voluntary dismissal without prejudice is ... not a matter of right.” Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990).

Although Corrado was proceeding pro se at the time she filed the April 2016 letter, “pro se attorneys such as [Corrado] typically ‘cannot claim, the special consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties.’” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Harbulak v. Cty. of Suffolk, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981)). In her April 2016 letter, Corrado explained that “[m]ost importantly, this case has had dire consequences and effects on the emotional, personal and well-being of my daughter, and I cannot continue to allow this devastating situation to further adversely affect her life.” PL-Appellant App. 259 (emphasis added). Corrado, in the next sentence, declared that “I wish to discontinue this litigation.” Id. In addition to her statement that she “cannot continue” and the requests that she “wish[ed] to discontinue this ligation” and that her “ease be discontinued,” Corrado noted that she had “contacted numerous lawyers” and “tried to retain attorneys,” but her “diligent[ ]” efforts to find counsel were met “without success.” Id. at 259-60. In the letter (and throughout the proceedings below), Corra-do proclaimed “repeatedly and unequivocally” that she “would not and could not proceed pro se.” Id. at 259. Corrado refused to proceed without legal representation, notwithstanding the fact that “it is well-settled that, except when faced with the prospect of imprisonment, a litigant has no legal right to counsel in civil cases.” Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Indeed, during a conference five weeks prior to Corrado’s April 2016 letter, Corrado said to Magistrate Judge Go that “I think I’ve made it clear, Your Honor, I am not representing myself in this case.” Pl.-Appellant App. 245. Even when Magistrate Judge Go explained that Corrado “can’t unilaterally decide that,” Corrado insisted that “[n]o, that is my position. I can unilaterally decide that.” Id. (emphasis added). In an order issued the next day, Magistrate Judge Go informed Corrado that “if she fails to obtain new counsel, she will be expected to proceed in this action by herself’ and cited Guggenheim. Id. at 254. Corrado’s April 2016 letter stating that she had “contacted numerous lawyers” and “tried to retain attorneys,” but her “diligent[ ]” efforts to find counsel were met “without success,” id. at 259-60, must be evaluated in this particular factual context.

In response to Corrado’s letter, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). In the court order, the district court provided the relevant context, explaining that “since discharging her previous attorney, [Corrado] has not been able to retain new counsel” and “refuses to prosecute her case pro se.” Id. at 31. The district court continued, “[Corrado] may only dismiss her ease under Rule 41(a)(2), which requires an order of this Court, ‘on terms that the court considers just and proper.’ ” Id. at 31-32 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)). “Upon review of the record,” the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. at 32. Based on our review of Corrado’s letter and the record, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The dismissal was a matter well within the district court’s discretion in light of the text of Corrado’s April 2016 letter and the full record, including Corra-do’s persistence below in refusing to proceed pro se and the fact that the case had been pending for four years. 1

Because, in context, and under this action’s particular circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action with prejudice, we need not review any prior orders in the action. In any event, we have considered Corrado’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 2 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.