SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Farui Ye, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 3, 2016 decision of the BIA, denying Ye’s motion to reopen. In re Farui Ye, No. A097 660 096 (B.I.A. June 3, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). In his motion to reopen, Ye asserted that conditions for Christians had worsened in China, excusing the untimely filing of his motion and demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for asylum based on his conversion to Christianity in the United States. It is undisputed that Ye’s 2016 motion to reopen was untimely filed more than 9 years after his removal order became final in 2006. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Ye failed to demonstrate such conditions.

“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compared] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.” In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007). As the BIA found, reports from the U.S. Department of-State demonstrate that the Chinese government has viewed unfavorably and mistreated unregistered Christian groups since before Ye’s 2004 hearing. Ye’s evidence further demonstrates that the treatment of unregistered religious groups varies widely from region to. region, and it does not reveal increased persecution of members of unregistered Christian groups in Ye’s home province. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 142, 149; cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (“An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality”).

Accordingly, because the BIA reasonably found that Ye did not demonstrate a material change in conditions in China, it did not abuse its discretion in "denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). We do not reach the BIA’s alternative basis for denying Ye’s motion—his failure to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Nor have we considered Ye’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which he has not raised in his brief. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.