SUMMARY ORDER

Michelle L. McGuirk, proceeding pro se, appeals from the June 17, 2016 memorandum decision and order dismissing her complaint raising employment discrimination and related claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Except as discussed below, we affirm for largely the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. For the most part, McGuirk’s claims are either time barred or precluded by the finding of the New York State Division of Human Rights that there was no discrimination. See McGuirk v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 139 A.D.3d 570 (1st Dep’t 2016). She otherwise failed to plead plausible claims.

We agree with McGuirk that she properly pled a hostile work environment claim, but affirm the district court’s dismissal because she failed to properly exhaust that claim before the New York State Division of Human Rights. See Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993) (we may affirm “on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which the district court did not rely”). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a pre-condition to bringing suit in federal court, though not a jurisdictional requirement. Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2015). McGuirk’s complaint before the Division of Human Rights did not raise her hostile work environment claim. No equitable defense to the failure to exhaust applies. Since McGuirk exhausted other claims, she was not prevented from raising the hostile work environment claim. The hostile work environment claim was not reasonably related to the other claims, so the agency did not have a basis to investigate McGuirk’s allegations. See Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The central question is whether the complaint filed with the (agency] gave that agency adequate notice to investigate [the unexhausted claims].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have considered the remainder of McGuirk’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. MeGuirk’s motion to remand is DENIED.