SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Christopher Grief, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, “accepting] all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing] all inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We afford a pro se litigant “special solicitude” and interpret his complaint “to raise the strongest claims that it suggests.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

To state a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a plaintiff must allege that there is a substantial burden on the exercise of her sincere religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (“To qualify for RFRA’s protection, an asserted belief must be ‘sincere[J’ ”). In the context of the First Amendment, “[w]e have repeatedly recognized that the judiciary has but a limited function in determining whether beliefs are to be accorded free exercise protection. Our scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal alterations, quotation marks and citations omitted). Our inquiry into the religious nature of professed beliefs employs “a more subjective definition of religion, which examines an individual’s inward attitudes towards a particular belief system.” Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). However, we have also recognized, as a “limiting principle[,] ... that ‘an asserted belief might be so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection.’ ” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 589 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989)).

The district court, in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoned that Griefs “belief that stuffed animals are necessary for his religious practice falls within the category of beliefs that are ‘so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection.’ ” App’x 29 (quoting Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834 n.2, 109 S.Ct. 1514). We will assume arguendo that this free exercise limitation applies equally to RFRA claims. However, whether a professed belief is entitled to free exercise protection under our precedents requires a determination by the “factfinder” regarding “whether the beliefs professed are, in the claimant’s own scheme of things, religious.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 158 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Accepting Griefs allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to him, with the special solicitude that we afford to a pro se litigant, we conclude that the district court erred in deciding that Griefs belief regarding stuffed animals could not plausibly constitute a religious belief, and that the district court therefore erred in dismissing Griefs RFRA claim at this stage.

Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND the judgment of the district court for further proceedings.