17‐76‐cv Montero v. City of Yonkers, et al. 1 2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

4 _______________

5 August Term, 2017

6 (Argued: September 08, 2017 Decided: May 16, 2018)

7 Docket No. 17‐76‐cv 8 _______________ 9 10 RAYMOND MONTERO, 11 12 Plaintiff‐Appellant, 13 14 – v. – 15 16 CITY OF YONKERS, NEW YORK, KEITH OLSON, in his official and individual 17 capacities, BRIAN MORAN, in his official and individual capacities, JOHN 18 MUELLER, in his official and individual capacities, 19 20 Defendants‐Appellees, 21 22 POLICE ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, INC., AKA YONKERS 23 POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, EDMUND HARTNETT, in his official 24 and individual capacities, 25 26 Defendants. 27 _______________

28 Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, SACK and HALL, Circuit Judges. 1 _______________

2 Plaintiff‐Appellant Raymond Montero appeals from a judgment entered in

3 favor of Defendants‐Appellees the City of Yonkers, Keith Olson, Brian Moran,

4 and John Mueller by the United States District Court for the Southern District of

5 New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge). Montero, a Yonkers police officer and

6 former Yonkers police union official, alleges that the defendants violated his First

7 Amendment right to freedom of speech by retaliating against him for criticizing

8 management decisions by Yonkers police officials during the course of two union

9 meetings. The district court agreed with the defendants that because Monteroʹs

10 union speech was not made in his capacity as a private citizen, his union remarks

11 were not protected by the First Amendment and he could therefore not state a

12 claim for retaliation against the defendants. We conclude that because Monteroʹs

13 union remarks were not made pursuant to his official duties as a police officer, he

14 spoke as a private citizen for purposes of the First Amendment. We also

15 conclude, however, that defendants Moran and Mueller are entitled to qualified

16 immunity, and that Montero has not alleged a plausible claim for municipal

17 liability against the City of Yonkers. Accordingly, the district courtʹs judgment is:

2 1 AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for further

2 proceedings. 3 _______________

4 CHRISTOPHER D. WATKINS, Sussman & Associates, Goshen, New 5 York, for Plaintiff‐Appellant. 6 7 ELIZA M. SCHEIBEL (Lalit K. Loomba, on the brief), Wilson, Elser, 8 Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains, New York, 9 for Defendants‐Appellees City of Yonkers, New York, Brian Moran, 10 and John Mueller.

11 ANDREW C. QUINN, The Quinn Law Firm, PLLC, White Plains, 12 New York, for Defendant‐Appellee Keith Olson.

13 _______________

SACK, Circuit Judge:

1 Plaintiff‐Appellant Raymond Montero, a Yonkers, New York police officer

2 and former union official in the Police Association of the City of Yonkers, Inc.,

3 also known as the Yonkers Police Benevolent Association (the ʺYonkers PBAʺ),

4 appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District

5 of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge) dismissing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of

6 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure his First Amendment employment retaliation

7 claim against Defendants‐Appellees the City of Yonkers, Keith Olson, Brian

3 1 Moran, and John Mueller (the ʺCity defendantsʺ). Montero alleges that the City

2 defendants violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by

3 retaliating against him for criticizing management decisions by Yonkers police

4 officials at two Yonkers PBA meetings. The district court held that because the

5 speech at issue was not made in Monteroʹs capacity as a private citizen, his union

6 remarks were not protected by the First Amendment and he could therefore not

7 state a claim for retaliation against the City defendants.

8 We conclude that because Monteroʹs union remarks were not ʺʹpart‐and‐

9 parcel of his concernsʹ about his ability to ʹproperly executeʹʺ his official job

10 duties, Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.,

(2d Cir.) (quoting Williams v.

11 Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,

(5th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied,

12 (2010), he spoke as a private citizen for purposes of his First Amendment right to

13 free speech. We also conclude, however, that defendants Moran and Mueller are

14 entitled to qualified immunity, and that Montero has not alleged a plausible claim

15 for municipal liability against the City of Yonkers. Accordingly, we affirm the

16 district courtʹs dismissal of the plaintiffʹs First Amendment retaliation claim

17 against defendants Moran, Mueller, and the City of Yonkers, vacate the district

4 1 courtʹs dismissal of the plaintiffʹs First Amendment retaliation claim against

2 defendant Keith Olson, and remand the case for further proceedings.

3 4 BACKGROUND

5 As required in our review of a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

6 Procedure 12(b)(6), ʺ[w]e . . . accept[] all factual allegations as true and draw[] all

7 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.ʺ Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Engʹrs Pension

8 Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt.,

(2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,

9 (2017).

10 Monteroʹs Union Remarks

11 Montero has been a police officer in the City of Yonkers Police Department

12 (the ʺYPDʺ) for more than twenty‐seven years. In January 2010, the Yonkers PBA,

13 which serves as the official union for the YPD, held elections. Montero was

14 elected vice president. Defendant Olson, a fellow Yonkers police officer, was

15 elected president.

16 Montero testified that Olson had opposed Monteroʹs candidacy, favoring

17 another police officer, Michael Farina, for vice president instead. Following the

5 1 election, tensions between Montero and Olson increased dramatically. In June

2 2010, during a Yonkers PBA meeting, Montero criticized Olsonʹs close

3 relationship with then Police Commissioner Edmund Hartnett. He said that

4 Hartnettʹs decision to discontinue several police units—those ʺdedicated to

5 investigating domestic violence and burglaryʺ and the ʺcommunity unit dedicated

6 to supporting the Police Athletic Leagueʺ—would adversely affect the YPD, the

7 Yonkers PBA, and the surrounding community. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15‐17. Montero

8 alleges that shortly thereafter, Mueller, then a lieutenant and at the time of the

9 filing of the complaint, the acting Police Chief of the YPD, pulled him into his

10 office, and told Montero to stop criticizing the YPD and Police Commissioner

11 Hartnett, or Montero would be transferred to another division. Despite Muellerʹs

12 warning, at a Yonkers PBA meeting in February 2011,1 Montero called for a no‐

13 confidence vote with respect to Hartnett.

1 Although the amended complaint does not specify where Montero made these comments, the partiesʹ briefing indicates that he did so at this union meeting. Montero v. City of Yonkers,

(S.D.N.Y. 2016).

6 1 The Alleged Retaliation Against Montero

2 Based on his comments at the June 2010 and February 2011 union meetings

3 (the ʺunion speechʺ or ʺunion remarksʺ), Montero alleges that Olson, acting with

4 Olsonʹs close associates Mueller and Detective Sergeant Moran, engaged in a

5 campaign of retaliation against him.2 The district court discussed Olson, Moran,

6 and Muellerʹs actions in some detail. Montero v. City of Yonkers,

, 260‐63 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). We rehearse those allegations only insofar as we

8 think them relevant to this appeal.

9 In March 2011, a month after Monteroʹs call for a no‐confidence vote with

10 respect to Police Commissioner Hartnett, Montero alleges, Olson, Mueller, and

11 Moran conducted an unauthorized investigation focused on Monteroʹs use of

12 overtime slips. Because of this investigation, Montero asserts that the YPD

2 We note that, although the plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that he criticized Olsonʹs leadership from January 2010 to January 2012, he provides no specific examples of such assertedly protected speech other than the June 2010 and February 2011 union speeches discussed above. Nor did Montero raise any other examples during oral argument before the district court, in his briefs below, in his appellate briefs, or in oral argument before this Court. Consequently, like the district court, we focus our attention on whether these two speech incidents were constitutionally protected.

7 1 wrongly denied him forty hours of compensatory pay and issued a disciplinary

2 write‐up of him. The next month, Montero alleges he was transferred from the

3 Special Investigations Unit, which Montero describes as ʺhighly desirable,ʺ to the

4 (less desirable) Detective Division. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. While in the Detective

5 Division, Montero was apparently assigned to desk duty, and became ineligible

6 for overtime pay. According to Montero, a month later, Olson admitted to him

7 that this transfer was directed by Moran and at Muellerʹs instruction, and was

8 effected because of Monteroʹs criticisms of Olsonʹs leadership of the Yonkers PBA

9 at the June 2010 union meeting and Hartnettʹs leadership of the YPD at the June

10 2010 and the February 2011 union meetings.

11 In September 2011, Montero alleges, Mueller conducted a second

12 unauthorized investigation of Montero, this time for insubordination. That same

13 month, Olson, after learning that Montero was planning to run against him for

14 the Yonkers PBA presidency, allegedly confronted Montero, calling him a

15 ʺfucking pussyʺ and threatening to ʺkick his assʺ for refusing to debate him. Am.

16 Compl. ¶ 29. Montero asserts that his office was vandalized shortly thereafter,

17 with pictures of ʺThe Cowardly Lionʺ posted throughout it. Although Montero

8 1 alleges that he reported Olsonʹs threats and the vandalism of his office to the

2 YPDʹs Internal Affairs Department, the department apparently took no action in

3 response to these reports.

4 In January 2012, Montero further alleges, Olson, Mueller, and Moran

5 conducted a third unauthorized investigation of Montero, this time seeking to

6 prove that Montero had been outside of his home while on sick leave. Although

7 Montero contends that he had permission to leave his residence during this

8 period, the YPD nevertheless docked him two daysʹ salary.

9 In August 2012, Montero alleges, Olson told Monteroʹs commanding

10 officer, Detective Sergeant Michael Kivel, among other things, that ʺ[Montero]

11 better be fucking careful.ʺ Am. Compl. ¶ 43. These remarks apparently followed

12 Monteroʹs refusal to acknowledge Olson and Moranʹs presence while visiting a

13 fellow officer receiving medical treatment in a hospital. Although Montero states

14 that Kivel reported Olsonʹs comments to Internal Affairs, the department

15 apparently, once again, undertook no investigation.

16 In October 2013, Montero asserts, Olson sent a text message to Montero

17 telling him that he wanted Montero to meet him ʺin another jurisdiction and

9 1 preferably off duty,ʺ which the plaintiff understood to be a threat of violence.

2 Am. Compl. ¶ 50. Also in September, Montero asserts, Olson ʺcompelledʺ

3 Internal Affairs to investigate Montero for his alleged communications with a

4 reporter from the Yonkers Tribune, following an online article criticizing Olsonʹs

5 leadership of the Yonkers PBA. Am. Compl. ¶ 52. When Montero refused to tell

6 Internal Affairs whether he was the source of the article, the YPD—allegedly at

7 Olsonʹs behest—threatened Montero with termination.

8 In January 2014, at a Yonkers PBA meeting, Olson formally called for

9 Monteroʹs expulsion from the union. When Montero attempted to leave the

10 meeting, he was allegedly blocked from exiting by one of Olsonʹs allies.

11 According to Montero, at Olsonʹs behest, police officers then seized videotapes of

12 the meeting. Montero once more reported Olsonʹs actions to Internal Affairs, but

13 the department again allegedly refrained from confronting or disciplining Olson.

14 In February 2014, Montero asserts, Mueller urged Police Chief William

15 Cave to remove Montero as the YPDʹs representative at county‐wide intelligence

16 meetings. After Cave agreed, Montero contends, he lost an additional twenty‐

17 four hours of pay per month. Later that year, Montero alleges, Olson started a

10 1 petition about him containing false statements, after which Montero was formally

2 expelled from the Yonkers PBA.

3 Finally, in July 2014, Montero alleges, his office was broken into and his

4 shield stolen. Shortly thereafter, Moran returned Monteroʹs shield, and wrote a

5 report that he had received it from another person who had found it discarded on

6 the street. Montero thinks Moran stole his shield with the intention that Montero

7 be disciplined by his superiors for losing it, although no disciplinary measures

8 were taken against him.

9 The District Court Proceedings

10 In June 2015, Montero initiated an action under

in the

11 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that

12 the City defendants had retaliated against him for his remarks at union meetings

13 in violation of the First Amendment. Following a pre‐motion conference held on

14 September 9, 2015, Montero amended his complaint, providing additional alleged

15 facts in support of his claims. On March 4, 2016, the City defendants moved to

16 dismiss Monteroʹs amended complaint on the grounds that: (1) Montero had

17 failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; (2)

11 1 Moran and Mueller were entitled to dismissal based on their qualified immunity;

2 (3) Montero did not sufficiently plead an adverse employment action against

3 Olson; and (4) Montero failed to state a claim for municipal liability against the

4 City of Yonkers.

5 On December 20, 2016, the district court granted the City defendantsʹ

6 motions to dismiss with prejudice, holding that Monteroʹs remarks at the June

7 2010 and February 2011 meetings were not constitutionally protected because

8 Montero had not made them while acting as a ʺprivate citizen,ʺ as was required to

9 create a cause of action based on his constitutional right to free speech. Because

10 the district court found this issue to be dispositive, it did not consider any of the

11 City defendantsʹ remaining arguments for dismissal.

12 In its opinion, the district court relied principally on the Supreme Courtʹs

13 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,

(2006). There, the Court made clear

14 that, to determine whether a public employeeʹs speech is constitutionally

15 protected, courts must determine both that the employee spoke as a private

16 citizen and that the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern. See

17 Garcetti,

; see also Montero, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 264‐65 (citing Garcetti).

12 1 The district court concluded that Montero had not been speaking as a private

2 citizen when he made the statements at issue. In reaching that conclusion, the

3 court relied principally on our decision in Weintraub v. Board of Education.

4 Montero, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 265‐71.

5 In Weintraub, a public‐school teacher filed a grievance through his union

6 complaining about his schoolʹs failure to discipline a student who had assaulted

7 him. 593 F.3d at 198‐99. Relying on Garcetti, we concluded that because

8 Weintraubʹs grievance was pursuant to his official teaching duties, he did not

9 speak as a private citizen. Id. at 203 (concluding that ʺWeintraubʹs grievance was

10 pursuant to his official duties because it was part‐and‐parcel of his concerns . . . as

11 a public school teacher—namely, to maintain classroom discipline, which is an

12 indispensable prerequisite to effective teaching and classroom learningʺ) (citation

13 and internal quotation marks omitted). We also thought it relevant that union

14 grievances had no civilian analogue, or a ʺform or channel of discourse available

15 to non‐employee citizens.ʺ Id. at 204.

16 Here, the district court decided that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it could

17 not resolve whether Monteroʹs union remarks were made in accordance with his

13 1 official duties as a police officer. See Montero, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 266‐69. The

2 district court further determined that, although the union meetings contained no

3 civilian analogue, the absence of a civilian analogue was not dispositive, and

4 turned to the ʺcontent and circumstancesʺ of Monteroʹs union remarks. Id. at 269‐

5 70. Because Monteroʹs union speech ʺlacked any civilian analogue, and because

6 Plaintiffʹs speech, made behind closed doors outside the presence of both the

7 public and Commissioner Hartnett, was at least tangentially related to his official

8 duties,ʺ id. at 271, the district court ultimately concluded that Montero was not

9 protected by the First Amendment from retaliation for his remarks, id. at 273.

10 Accordingly, the district court dismissed Monteroʹs complaint. Id. at 275.

11 We conclude that the district court correctly held that the existence of a

12 civilian analogue is not dispositive of whether a public employee spoke as a

13 private citizen, but it is merely a factor the court could consider as part of the

14 inquiry into whether the public employeeʹs speech was made pursuant to his

15 ordinary employment‐related responsibilities. We nevertheless find that the

16 district court erred in ruling that Monteroʹs speech was not protected because it

14 1 was tangentially related to his job responsibilities. That fact is not dispositive as a

2 matter of law.

3 It is clear from the pleadings that Monteroʹs union remarks did not fall

4 within his responsibilities as a police officer, and he therefore made these remarks

5 as a private citizen. Because at least some of Monteroʹs remarks addressed a

6 matter of public concern, moreover, we vacate and remand the district courtʹs

7 judgment dismissing Monteroʹs First Amendment retaliation claim as to

8 defendant Olson. We affirm the district courtʹs dismissal of the claims against

9 defendants Moran and Mueller for a different reason: their alleged acts were

10 protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Finally, we affirm the dismissal

11 of Monteroʹs claim for municipal liability against the City of Yonkers for failure to

12 state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

13 14 DISCUSSION

15 I. Standard of Review

16 ʺWe review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure

17 to state a claim, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all

15 1 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.ʺ Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Engʹrs Pension

2 Fund,

. The complaintʹs allegations, however must be ʺplausible on

3 [their] face,ʺ a standard that ʺasks for more than a sheer possibility that a

4 defendant has acted unlawfully.ʺ Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009).

5 II. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

6 Where, as here, a plaintiff claims that he or she was retaliated against in

7 violation of the First Amendment, he or she must plausibly allege that ʺ(1) his [or

8 her] speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant

9 took an adverse action against him [or her]; and (3) there was a causal connection

10 between this adverse action and the protected speech.ʺ Cox v. Warwick Valley

11 Cent. Sch. Dist.,

(2d Cir. 2011).

12 For many years, ʺthe unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had

13 no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment,ʺ including

14 those terms which restricted his or her right to speak freely in the workplace.

15 Garcetti,

(internal quotation marks omitted). In Pickering v. Board of

16 Education,

(1968), however, the Supreme Court made clear that public

17 employees do not automatically surrender all their rights of free expression at the

16 1 office door. An employee may be protected from retaliation even when speaking

2 in the workplace when he or she is speaking ʺas a citizen . . . upon matters of

3 public concern.ʺ

.

4 The Supreme Court, relying on Pickering,

, and Connick v.

5 Myers,

(1983), further explained in Garcetti v. Ceballos that the

6 First Amendment inquiry must proceed in two parts. ʺThe first [component]

7 requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of

8 public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause

9 of action based on his or her employerʹs reaction to the speech.ʺ Garcetti,

at 418 (citations omitted). If the first component is present, an employer must

11 then show that it ʺhad an adequate justification for treating the employee

12 differently [based on his or her speech] from any other member of the general

13 public.ʺ

(citing Pickering,

).

14 A. Citizen Speech

15 In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, a prosecutor in the Los Angeles

16 District Attorney Gil Garcettiʹs office, sent a memorandum to his supervisor

17 asserting that a search warrant affidavit in a case being prosecuted by the office

17 1 contained significant misrepresentations. Id. at 420. The supervisor declined to

2 dismiss the case in which the affidavit was being used, and Ceballos testified for

3 the defense about these misrepresentations. Id. at 414‐15. Ceballos subsequently

4 alleged that because of the memorandum, he had been subject to various

5 retaliatory employment actions by Garcettiʹs office. Id.

6 The Supreme Court stated that ʺwhen public employees make statements

7 pursuant to their official duties,ʺ which the Court determined that Ceballos had,

8 ʺthe employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and

9 the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer

10 discipline.ʺ Id. at 421. Although the Court refrained from proffering a detailed

11 definition of what constitutes oneʹs ʺofficial duties,ʺ it noted that ʺ[w]hen a public

12 employee speaks pursuant to [his or her] employment responsibilities . . . there is

13 no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.ʺ

14 Id. at 424.

15 In Lane v. Franks,

(2014), the Supreme Court further

16 considered what qualifies as ʺcitizen speech.ʺ There, the director of a state

17 program for underprivileged youth asserted that he was demoted by the state

18 1 because of his testimony to a federal grand jury about issues relating to his

2 departmentʹs payroll.

at 2375‐78. The Eleventh Circuit had decided that the

3 plaintiff had not engaged in citizen speech, inasmuch as his testimony concerned

4 information learned solely during the course of his employment.

at 2378‐79.

5 The Supreme Court reversed. It noted that ʺGarcetti said nothing about

6 speech that simply relates to public employment or [that] concerns information

7 learned in the course of public employment,ʺ and that ʺthe mere fact that a

8 citizenʹs speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public

9 employment does not transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—

10 speech.ʺ

.

11 This Court has sought to further refine the characteristics of public

12 employee speech that is also protected citizen speech for purposes of the First

13 Amendment. In Weintraub, as described above, a public‐school teacher filed a

14 grievance through his union chastising his superiorsʹ failure to discipline a

15 student who had assaulted him. 593 F.3d at 198‐99. We concluded that

16 Weintraubʹs grievance did not constitute citizen speech because the

17 communication was ʺpart‐and‐parcelʺ of his ability to execute his ʺofficial dutiesʺ

19 1 as a school teacher—ʺnamely, to maintain classroom discipline, which is an

2 indispensable prerequisite to effective teaching and classroom learning.ʺ

at

3 203 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

4 We also thought it significant that Weintraubʹs union grievance lacked a

5 citizen analogue, i.e., a ʺrelevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not

6 government employees.ʺ

(quoting Garcetti,

). In Garcetti, the

7 Supreme Court provided two examples of speech containing a citizen analogue:

8 (1) ʺa schoolteacherʹs ʹletter to a local newspaper,ʹʺ which ʺbore similarities to

9 letters submitted by numerous citizens every day,ʺ and (2) ʺdiscussi[ons] [of]

10 politics with a co‐worker.ʺ

at 203‐04 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422‐23). The

11 plaintiff in Weintraub, by contrast, had ʺmade an internal communication

12 pursuant to an existing dispute‐resolution policy established by his employer.ʺ

13 Id. at 204. Such a grievance was ʺnot a form or channel of discourse available to

14 non‐employee citizens.ʺ Id. Although we cautioned that this ʺlack of a citizen

15 analogueʺ was not dispositive of the question whether the plaintiff spoke in the

20 1 exercise of his official employment duties, it provided additional evidence that

2 Weintraub had not spoken as a citizen—ʺthe central issue after Garcetti.ʺ Id.3

3 In Jackler v. Byrne,

(2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

4 (2012), and Ross v. Breslin,

(2d Cir. 2012), we further considered what

5 constitutes ʺcitizen speechʺ for these purposes.

6 In Jackler, the plaintiff, a probationary police officer, alleged that he had

7 been terminated by the police department by which he was employed for refusing

8 to retract a report that he had made to an independent state agency in support of

9 a civilian complaint accusing a fellow officer of using excessive force.

230‐32. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(c), reasoning that the

11 plaintiff refused to alter his report while acting in his capacity as a police officer.

12

. We reversed, holding that the officerʹs refusal was not made pursuant

13 to his employment duties because his obligation to do so was based on his

3 We note the possibility that Weintraub could have been decided on the public‐ concern prong and not on the basis that the plaintiff was not acting as a private citizen. In that case, though, we ultimately focused on whether the plaintiff was required to file a union grievance about troublesome students as part of his employment duties, rather than the content of the plaintiffʹs speech (i.e., what he was protesting). 593 F.3d at 201‐204.

21 1 obligation as a citizen to obey the law. We noted that it was illegal for both

2 civilians and police officers to make materially false statements to government

3 officers and agencies when providing evidence.

at 239 (citing

;

4

;

). Thus, the Jackler Court

5 recognized that a public employee speaks ʺas a citizenʺ when he or she refuses to

6 commit a crime because all citizens have a duty to follow the law. Id at 240.

7 Additionally, in line with Weintraub,

, we stated in Jackler

8 that ʺan indicium that speech by a public employee has a civilian analogue is that

9 the employeeʹs speech was to an independent state agency responsible for

10 entertaining complaints by any citizen in a democratic society regardless of his

11 status as a public employee.ʺ

(italicization provided and internal

12 quotation marks omitted). We noted that our holding was bolstered by the fact

13 that Jackler had made his report to an independent state agency,

a ʺchannel[]

14 available to citizens generally,ʺ

at 238 (quoting Weintraub,

).

15 In Ross, a payroll‐clerk typist alleged that she was retaliated against by her

16 employers for reporting financial malfeasance to a superior.

. We

17 first observed that ʺthe inquiry into whether a public employee is speaking

22 1 pursuant to her official duties is not susceptible to a brightline rule.ʺ

. In

2 making that assessment, we said, courts ʺmust examine the nature of the

3 plaintiffʹs job responsibilities, the nature of the speech, and the relationship

4 between the two. Other contextual factors, such as whether the complaint was

5 also conveyed to the public, may [also] properly influence a courtʹs decision.ʺ

6 We concluded that because ʺreporting pay irregularities to a supervisorʺ was one

7 of the plaintiffʹs job duties and ʺmade in furtherance of those duties,ʺ the speech

8 at issue was not made in her capacity as a citizen.

. She was therefore

9 not protected by the First Amendment from retaliation for making her report. See

10

.

11 Most recently, in Matthews, 779 F.3d at 169, we considered whether a police

12 officer had acted as a private citizen for purposes of assessing his First

13 Amendment rights in criticizing an arrest‐quota policy to his commanders. In

14 reviewing the Supreme Courtʹs decisions in Garcetti and Lane, and our prior case

15 law, we identified two relevant inquiries to determine whether a public employee

16 speaks as a citizen: (1) whether ʺthe speech fall[s] outside of the employeeʹs

17 ʹofficial responsibilities,ʹʺ and (2) whether ʺa civilian analogue exist[s].ʺ Id. at 173

23 1 (citing Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203‐04). We concluded that Matthewsʹs complaints

2 were not what he was ʺemployed to do,ʺ id. at 174 (ʺMatthews had no role in

3 setting policy; he was neither expected to speak on policy nor consulted on

4 formulating policy.ʺ), and ordinary citizens were also ʺregularly provided the

5 opportunity to raise issues with the [p]recinct commanders,ʺ id. at 176 (ʺMatthews

6 did not follow internal grievance procedures, but rather went directly to the

7 [p]recinct commanders . . . who had an open door to community comments and

8 complaints.ʺ). Matthews had thus spoken as a citizen and was therefore

9 constitutionally protected against employment retaliation.

10 There may be some confusion as to whether both questions (1) and (2) in

11 Matthews—i.e., whether (1) the speech was outside the speakerʹs official

12 responsibilities and (2) there was a civilian analogue—must be answered in the

13 affirmative for the speech to be protected citizen speech under Garcetti. See., e.g.,

14 Brown v. Office of State Comptroller,

(D. Conn. 2016), appeal

15 dismissed in part,

(2d Cir. 2018) (ʺMatthews I makes it clear that the

16 existence of a civilian analogue is typically a prerequisite to a holding that the

17 employee was speaking as a citizen.ʺ). We think that the Supreme Court has

24 1 made the answer clear: Although the presence or lack of a civilian analogue may

2 be of some help in determining whether one spoke as a citizen, ʺ[t]he critical

3 question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within

4 the scope of an employeeʹs duties,ʺ Lane,

. We said as much in

5 Weintraub: ʺAlthough the lack of a citizen analogue is not dispositive in this case,

6 it does bear on the perspective of the speaker—whether the public employee is

7 speaking as a citizen—which is the central issue after Garcetti.ʺ

8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the question, then, is

9 whether the employeeʹs speech was ʺpart‐and‐parcel of [that personʹs] concerns

10 about his ability to properly execute his duties.ʺ

(citation and internal

11 quotation marks omitted).

12 In the case at bar, the district court therefore was correct in deciding that

13 the lack of a civilian analogue was not critical to a decision as to whether Montero

14 spoke as a private citizen. Montero, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 270‐71. But the district

15 court treated this factor as analytically distinct from the core inquiry: whether

16 Monteroʹs union remarks were made pursuant to his official employment

17 responsibilities. See

at 266‐68. Instead, the district court concluded that,

25 1 irrespective of whether Monteroʹs union statements could be considered part of

2 his job responsibilities, the lack of a civilian analogue combined with the fact that

3 Monteroʹs union remarks were ʺtangentially related to his official dutiesʺ indicated

4 he had not spoken as a private citizen.

(emphasis added). Because the

5 district court did not squarely determine whether Monteroʹs union speech was

6 made pursuant to Monteroʹs employment duties, its decision that the remarks

7 necessarily failed to qualify as citizen speech protected by the First Amendment

8 was thus at best premature.

9 We conclude that Montero sufficiently pled that his union remarks cannot

10 be considered ʺpart‐and‐parcel of his concerns about his ability to properly

11 execute his duties.ʺ Weintraub,

(citation and internal quotation

12 marks omitted). The ʺcritical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at

13 issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employeeʹs duties, not whether it

14 merely concerns those duties.ʺ Lane,

. Montero made his remarks

15 as union vice president, a role in which he was not required to serve. See

16 Matthews, 779 F.3d at 174 (concluding that the plaintiffʹs speech was not part of

17 his official duties where it ʺwas neither part of his job description nor part of the

26 1 practical reality of his everyday workʺ). Nor is it determinative that Monteroʹs

2 union remarks may have touched on matters that he learned through the course

3 of his employment. See Lane,

(ʺ[T]he mere fact that a citizenʹs

4 speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does

5 not transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech.ʺ).

6 Because, based on his pleading, Monteroʹs remarks did not fall within his

7 employment responsibilities, the district court erred in concluding on a motion to

8 dismiss that Montero spoke as an employee.

9 Nevertheless, Montero would have us go further and decide categorically,

10 as some circuits have, that when a person speaks in his or her capacity as a union

11 member, he or she speaks as a private citizen. See Boulton v. Swanson,

(6th Cir. 2015) (ʺIt is axiomatic that an employeeʹs job responsibilities do

13 not include acting in the capacity of a union member, leader, or official.ʺ); Ellins v.

14 City of Sierra Madre,

(9th Cir. 2013) (ʺGiven the inherent

15 institutional conflict of interest between an employer and its employeesʹ union,

16 we conclude that a police officer does not act in furtherance of his public duties

17 when speaking as a representative of the police union.ʺ); Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet

27 1 Park,

(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that when one speaks ʺin his

2 capacity as a union official, his comments [are] made as a citizen rather than as a

3 public employeeʺ).

4 In support of this position, Montero cites Clue v. Johnson,

(2d

5 Cir. 1999). There, various union officers alleged that they had suffered

6 employment retaliation after seeking to recall union leaders whom they viewed as

7 having colluded with management.

at 59‐60. We stated, albeit in dicta, that

8 ʺ[t]here is no doubt that retaliation against public employees solely for their union

9 activities violates the First Amendment,ʺ and that ʺactivities on behalf of a union

10 faction that necessarily entail a substantial criticism of management raise matters

11 of public concern.ʺ

at 60‐61.

12 But we think Clue is unhelpful here. First, Clueʹs broad dicta that union

13 activities criticizing management constitute matters of public concern has been

14 walked back by our subsequent case law. See Lynch v. Ackley,

, 582

15 (2d Cir. 2016) (ʺThough the court [in Clue] said in dicta that ʹretaliation solely for

16 union activity clearly raises a public concernʹ . . . it obviously did not mean that all

17 activities undertaken through a union necessarily become matters of public

28 1 concern merely by virtue of their collateral connection to the union.ʺ) (quoting 179

2 F.3d at 61). Second, and we think more important, Clue was decided prior to

3 Garcetti. Post‐Garcetti, it is clear that courts must not only determine whether the

4 plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern, but whether he or she spoke as a

5 private citizen—an inquiry not contemplated by Clue.

6 While we therefore decline to decide categorically that when a person

7 speaks in his capacity as a union member, he speaks as a private citizen, we

8 conclude that, under the facts of this case as set out in the amended complaint,

9 when Montero spoke in his capacity as a union member, he spoke as a private

10 citizen. This was because, taking the amended complaintʹs allegations as true,

11 Montero spoke in his role as a union officer, and his union speech was not

12 composed of statements made as a ʺmeans to fulfillʺ or ʺundertaken in the course

13 of performingʺ his responsibilities as a police officer. Weintraub,

14 (quotation marks omitted). Consequently, he engaged in citizen speech for

15 purposes of the First Amendment.

16

17

29 1 B. Matter of Public Concern

2 If Montero spoke as a citizen, it does not necessarily follow that his speech

3 was constitutionally protected. The successful plaintiff must also demonstrate

4 that the speech at issue was on a matter of public concern. Garcetti,

418.

6 Whether speech is on a matter of public concern is a question of law, and ʺis

7 to be answered by the court after examining the ʹcontent, form, and context of a

8 given statement, as revealed by the whole record.ʹʺ Jackler,

9 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147‐48). ʺTo constitute speech on a matter of public

10 concern, an employeeʹs expression must ʹbe fairly considered as relating to any

11 matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.ʹʺ

at 236 (quoting

12 Connick,

); see also City of San Diego v. Roe,

, 83‐84 (2004)

13 (stating that a topic is a matter of public concern if it is of ʺgeneral interestʺ or of

14 ʺlegitimate news interestʺ). On the other hand, speech that principally focuses on

15 ʺan issue that is ʹpersonal in nature and generally related to [the speakerʹs] own

16 situation,ʹʺ Jackler,

(quoting Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.,

17

, 781 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

(1991)) (brackets in original),

30 1 or that is ʺcalculated to redress personal grievancesʺ— even if touching on a

2 matter of general importance—does not qualify for First Amendment protection,

3 Lewis v. Cowen,

(2d Cir.), cert. denied,

(1999).

4 Because the district court found that Montero did not make his union

5 remarks as a private citizen, it did not reach the issue of whether all such remarks

6 implicated matters of public concern. In a footnote, the district court asserted that

7 Monteroʹs criticism of Olsonʹs leadership, which stemmed from their union

8 rivalry, did not involve a matter of public concern. Montero,

274 n.3. Nevertheless, the district court stated that whether Monteroʹs ʺopposition

10 to cuts that were allegedly ʹbad for the community,ʹ implicat[ed] a public concern

11 present[ed] a closer question,ʺ

(quoting Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16‐17), a question it

12 declined to answer.

13 The district court did not err when it found that Monteroʹs criticism of

14 Olsonʹs union leadership reflected a personal rivalry between two union leaders,

15 and concluded that it thus ʺplainly do[es] not implicate a public concern.ʺ Id.; see

16 Am. Compl. ¶ 15 (stating that Montero criticized Olsonʹs leadership of the

17 Yonkers PBA, and in particular his cozy relationship with Hartnett, Olsonʹs

31 1 agreement to manpower cuts, and Olsonʹs preference that ʺhis close friend,

2 Mueller, be made a Police Chiefʺ). But we conclude, as a matter of law, that

3 Montero has sufficiently alleged that his June 2010 union remarks expressing

4 opposition to some of Commissioner Hartnettʹs personnel cuts and Monteroʹs call

5 at the February 2011 meeting for a no‐confidence vote with respect to Hartnett

6 involved matters of public concern. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16‐17, 20. In his amended

7 complaint, Montero specifically alleges that he criticized Hartnett for

8 discontinuing police units ʺdedicated to investigating domestic violence and

9 burglaryʺ and ʺthe community unit dedicated to supporting the Police Athletic

10 League,ʺ cuts which Montero believed were ʺbad for the police force, bad for

11 members of the PBA and bad for the community[.]ʺ

at ¶¶ 16‐17. Such speech

12 about the termination of the police units—which Montero allegedly stated would

13 endanger public safety—plainly constituted speech on a matter ʺof political,

14 social, or other concernʺ to the Yonkers community. See Connick,

.

15 In response, the City defendants contend that these remarks, made at two

16 closed‐door meetings, reflect no more than Monteroʹs own ambition: to be elected

17 the Yonkers PBA president. And to be sure, ʺ[a] public employee may not

32 1 transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a

2 supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.ʺ Ruotolo v. City

3 of N.Y.,

(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Boyce v. Andrew,

,

4 1343 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 781 (stating that personal

5 grievances do not become public concerns by ʺthe mere fact that one or two of

6 [the plaintiffʹs] comments could be construed broadly to implicate matters of

7 public concernʺ). As we have noted, however, an ʺindividual motivated by a

8 personal grievance can simultaneously speak on a matter affecting the public at

9 large.ʺ Golodner v. Berliner,

(2d Cir. 2014); see also Nagle v.

10 Marron,

(2d Cir. 2011) (ʺWe agree that the primary question for

11 First Amendment purposes is whether the matter is of public concern, not

12 whether the speech was also made to serve some private interest.ʺ).

13 At this stage in the proceedings, we cannot say that Monteroʹs union

14 remarks about how reductions in police manpower might reduce public safety

15 and his call for a vote of no‐confidence in Commissioner Hartnett were solely

16 ʺcalculated to redress [his] personal grievancesʺ against Olson and his allies.

17 Lewis,

. Nor, despite the City defendantsʹ contentions otherwise,

33 1 do we find it critical to this inquiry that Montero made his remarks at a non‐

2 public meeting. See Jackler,

(ʺThe fact that a statement was made to

3 the employer in private is not determinative of whether its subject was a matter of

4 public concern.ʺ (citing Connick,

& n.8)). We therefore conclude

5 that Montero has sufficiently pled that his criticism of cuts in police manpower at

6 the June 2010 union meeting and his call for a no‐confidence vote in Police

7 Commissioner Hartnett at the February 2011 union meeting qualified as

8 statements on matters of public concern.4

9 C. Liability of Defendant Olson

10 To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show

11 not only that the speech at issue was constitutionally protected, but that as a

12 result of this speech, he or she suffered an adverse employment action caused by

13 the defendant. Cox,

. An adverse employment action may include

4 Because the issue has not been briefed by either party and requires determining matters of fact that we cannot determine in the first instance on the present record, we do not consider Pickeringʹs third inquiry: ʺwhether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently [for his or her speech] from any other member of the general public.ʺ Garcetti,

(citing Pickering,

).

34 1 discharging, refusing to hire, refusing to promote, demoting, reducing the pay, or

2 reprimanding an employee. Morris v. Lindau,

(2d Cir. 1999)

3 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party,

(1990), abrogated on other grounds

4 by Lore v. City of Syracuse,

(2d Cir. 2012)). Such actions may also

5 include a pattern of harassment, where, using an ʺobjective standard,ʺ a plaintiff

6 shows that ʺthe total circumstances of her working environment changed to

7 become unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical or normal,

8 not ideal or model, workplace.ʺ Phillips v. Bowen,

(2d Cir. 2002).

9 On appeal, defendant Olson contends that an adverse employment action

10 must be caused by ʺa supervisor, employer, a member of management, or a hiring

11 body.ʺ Def. Olsonʹs Br. at 25. Because the pleadings demonstrate that he

12 occupied none of those positions vis‐à‐vis Montero, Olson argues that he cannot

13 be found liable for taking any adverse employment actions against the plaintiff.

14 In response, Montero contends that Olson, a ʺunion president who has an

15 exceedingly close relationship with managementʺ and used this relationship to

16 ʺexact revenge against [the] plaintiff on the job,ʺ can be held responsible for

17 violating Monteroʹs First Amendment rights by, at the very least, influencing

35 1 supervisors to retaliate against the plaintiff for his union speech. Pl.ʹs Reply Br. at

2 19‐20.

3 In focusing on whether Olson can be found liable for an adverse

4 employment action, however, both parties have put the cart before the horse. To

5 make a successful section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant not

6 only violated a constitutional right, but acted ʺunder the color of state law.ʺ Cox,

7

. A defendant can only be said to do so if his or her actions were

8 made as a state actor, or where the person acts ʺin his official capacity or while

9 exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.ʺ Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida,

F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins,

, 49‐50

11 (1988)).

12 As noted above, the parties dispute whether Olson, as a concededly non‐

13 supervisory employee, can be said to have taken an adverse employment action

14 against Montero in the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The

15 parties have not addressed, however, whether Olson qualifies as a ʺstate actorʺ in

16 the first place and if he can therefore be held liable under section 1983 for his

36 1 alleged retaliatory actions. We therefore leave this issue to be addressed on

2 remand.5

3 D. Liability of Defendants Moran and Mueller

4 Defendants Moran and Mueller argue that even if Monteroʹs speech was

5 constitutionally protected and they took adverse employment actions against him

6 for this speech, they are, even on the present state of the proceedings, entitled to

7 qualified immunity. We agree.

8 Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense, shields officials from personal

9 liability for civil damages so long as ʺtheir conduct does not violate clearly

10 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

11 have known.ʺ Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

(1982); see also Anderson v.

12 Creighton,

(1987) (explaining that a right is clearly established

5 We also note that Olson, unlike Moran and Mueller, did not raise qualified immunity in his Rule 12(b)(6) motion to the district court and has therefore failed to preserve the right to raise this affirmative defense on appeal. See Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp.,

(2d Cir. 1989) (ʺ[The appellant] did not raise this issue at the district court . . . and so [] failed to preserve its claim for appeal.ʺ). Olson may, however, still raise that affirmative defense in his answer. See Santos v. District Council,

, 967 (2d Cir. 1980).

37 1 when ʺ[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

2 would understand that what he is doing violates that rightʺ). ʺ[T]he need for

3 ʹclearly establishedʹ law is satisfied if the law on the subject was defined at the

4 time with reasonable clarity or clearly foreshadowed in rulings of the Supreme

5 Court or the Second Circuit, so that the defendant should have understood that

6 her conduct was unlawful.ʺ Lynch, 811 F.3d at 578‐79. ʺThis is not to say that an

7 official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

8 question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre‐

9 existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.ʺ Wilson v. Layne,

,

10 615 (1999). Put simply,6 qualified immunity ʺprovides [] protection to all but the

11 plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.ʺ Malley v. Briggs,

12

(1986).

13 It is true that at the time Moran and Mueller allegedly retaliated against

14 Montero, we had stated in Weintraub that the ʺlack of a citizen analogue [was] ʹnot

15 dispositiveʹ in [that] case.ʺ

(quoting Garcetti,

). As

16 detailed above, the role of a citizen analogue in determining whether one speaks

6 Perhaps rather too simply.

38 1 as a citizen remained murky, however, and we had expressed no view as to its

2 role in protecting union speech outside the context of a union grievance. See Sira

3 v. Morton,

(2d Cir. 2004) (ʺTo be clearly established, a right must

4 [be] recognized in a particularized rather than a general sense.ʺ). Thus, we had

5 not made clear that, under the circumstances as alleged in the amended

6 complaint, Montero spoke in his capacity as a private citizen.

7 On appeal, Montero contends, once again, that Clue ʺclearly establishe[s]ʺ

8 that a personʹs union activity criticizing management is categorically protected by

9 the First Amendment. Pl.ʹs Reply Br. at 10. But, as noted above, Clue was decided

10 before Garcetti, and focused solely on whether the union plaintiffs had spoken on

11 a matter of public concern. See discussion in section II A., supra. After Garcetti, it is

12 clear that courts must determine both whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of

13 public concern and whether he or she spoke as a private citizen. Moreover, in

14 Weintraub, we plainly rejected the notion that one is necessarily speaking as a

15 private citizen when acting in his or her union capacity.

16 Because the specific question of whether the plaintiffʹs alleged union

17 remarks were protected by the First Amendment was not beyond debate at the

39 1 time of Moran and Muellerʹs alleged retaliation against Montero, nor does Clue

2 hold otherwise, we conclude as a matter of law that under the claims as pled by

3 Montero, these defendants are protected from liability by qualified immunity.

4 E. Municipal Liability

5 In Monell v. Department of Social Services,

(1978), the

6 Supreme Court established that municipalities may be construed as ʺpersonsʺ in

7 the context of violations of section 1983, and that they may be subjected to direct

8 claims for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the municipality

9 allegedly implemented an unconstitutional custom or policy.

at 690‐91, 694‐95.

10 Such a custom or policy may be reflected through policy statements, ordinances,

11 regulations, or decisions ʺofficially adopted and promulgated by that bodyʹs

12 officers.ʺ

.

13 Although ʺofficial policyʺ often refers to formal rules or customs that

14 intentionally establish ʺfixed plans of actionʺ over a period of time, when a

15 municipality ʺchooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation,ʺ this

16 may also ʺrepresent[] an act of official government ʹpolicyʹ as that term is

17 commonly understood.ʺ Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,

(2d

40 1 Cir. 2004) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

, 480‐81 (1986)). Nor

2 must such policies be authorized or ratified by multiple decisionmakers of the

3 municipality in question for liability to accrue. ʺ[E]ven a single action by a

4 decisionmaker who ʹpossesses final authority to establish municipal policy with

5 respect to the action orderedʹʺ may deprive the plaintiff of his or her

6 constitutional rights.

at 126 (quoting Pembaur,

). When a non‐

7 decisionmaker committed the constitutional violation, however, the plaintiff must

8 show that the decisionmaker ordered or ratified such a subordinateʹs conduct or

9 ʺwas aware of a subordinateʹs unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to

10 ignore them, effectively ratifying the actions.ʺ

11 In his amended complaint, Montero asserts that the YPD, ʺacting through

12 its final policymaking officials,ʺ aided Olson and his allies in retaliating against

13 him, and that the department ʺadopted an unwritten policyʺ in doing so by

14 condoning and ratifying this action. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84‐86. But ʺ[t]he mere

15 assertion . . . that a municipality has such a custom or policy is insufficient in the

16 absence of allegations of fact tending to support, at least circumstantially, such an

17 inference.ʺ Dwares v. City of N.Y.,

, 100 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled on other

41 1 grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507

(1993).

3 Montero nevertheless contends that a reasonable juror could conclude that

4 he was retaliated against at the specific behest of then Police Commissioner

5 Hartnett, who, as a final policymaker, allegedly had the requisite authority to

6 carry out Monteroʹs continual investigations, transfers, and pay cuts. Montero

7 fails to allege, however, that Hartnett had or should have had any knowledge of

8 these retaliatory actions.7 He asserts only that Mueller told him that Hartnett ʺdid

9 not like what Plaintiff had been saying about Hartnett and others at PBA

10 meetings.ʺ Am. Compl. ¶ 19; see Jones v. Town of E. Haven,

(2d Cir.

11 2012) (ʺTo establish deliberate indifference a plaintiff must show that a

12 policymaking official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of

13 constitutional injury, but failed to take appropriate action to prevent or sanction

7Montero does assert that ʺhigh ranking officers within the Department advised the Cityʹs corporation counsel that Plaintiff was the subject of ongoing harassment and negative treatmentʺ based on his opposition to Olsonʹs union leadership and that the YPD took no action in response to this. Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Montero does not allege that this information ever reached Hartnett or any other final decisionmaker, however.

42 1 violations of constitutional rights.ʺ), cert. denied,

(2013). Moreover,

2 Montero specifically asserts that it was Olson, Moran, and Mueller who directed

3 the retaliatory actions against him. Because Montero merely asserts the existence

4 of a policy or custom instituted or promulgated by the YPD or conducted or

5 deliberately ignored by its policymakers, he has failed to plausibly claim that the

6 City of Yonkers can be held municipally liable for violating his First Amendment

7 rights.

8 CONCLUSION

9 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courtʹs dismissal of the

10 plaintiffʹs First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Moran, Mueller,

11 and the City of Yonkers, VACATE the district courtʹs dismissal of the plaintiffʹs

12 First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Keith Olson, and REMAND

13 for further proceedings.

43