17-844 Singh v. Sessions BIA Wright, IJ A205 922 840 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 16th day of October, two thousand eighteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 GERARD E. LYNCH, 8 DENNY CHIN, 9 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 TAKHVINDER SINGH, 13 Petitioner, 14 15 v. 17-844 16 NAC 17 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 18 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19 Respondent. 20 _____________________________________ 21 22 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Dalbir Singh & 23 Associates, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy 26 Assistant Attorney General; 27 Russell J. E. Verby, Senior 28 Litigation Counsel; Kristin 29 Moresi, Trial Attorney, Office of 30 Immigration Litigation, United 31 States Department of Justice, 32 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Takhvinder Singh, a native and citizen of

6 India, seeks review of a February 24, 2017, decision of the

7 BIA affirming an August 24, 2016, decision of an Immigration

8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for withholding of

9 removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture

10 (“CAT”). In re Takhvinder Singh, No. A 205 922 840 (B.I.A.

11 Feb. 24, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 922 840 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

12 Aug. 24, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

14 We have reviewed the decisions of both the BIA and the

15 IJ “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

16 Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). The

17 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8

(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

,

19 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

20 “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to

21 sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but 2 1 only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the

2 applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers

3 to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the

4 applicant is a refugee.”

(b)(1)(B)(ii); see

5

§ 1231(b)(3)(C). “Where the trier of fact determines

6 that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates

7 otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided

8 unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot

9 reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

10 “No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of

11 fact with respect to the availability of corroborating

12 evidence . . . unless the court finds, . . . that a reasonable

13 trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating

14 evidence is unavailable.” Id. § 1252(b)(4).

15 As the agency found, Singh did not produce reasonably

16 available documentary evidence. The IJ reasonably required

17 proof that Singh worshipped Baba Ram Rahim in India,

18 whether through a letter from Baba Ram Rahim or one of his

19 followers, as well as evidence of persecution from fellow

20 followers of Baba Ram Rahim who were also beaten by Sikhs.

21 See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that IJ can require 3 1 corroboration of even credible testimony). Singh was asked

2 several times to explain his failure to submit a letter or

3 other proof of his religious practice in India, and the IJ

4 did not err in concluding that Singh did not show the

5 evidence was unavailable as his explanations were

6 nonresponsive and he acknowledged that he had made no

7 attempt to obtain any letters. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder,

8

(2d Cir. 2009) (“An IJ should point to

9 specific pieces of missing, relevant documentation and show

10 that this documentation was reasonably available; an alien

11 must have an opportunity to explain the omission; and the

12 IJ must assess any explanation that is given.” (internal

13 citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted)).

14 Although Singh also stated that he did not know Baba Ram

15 Rahim personally and knew his fellow practitioners only

16 from meetings, the IJ was not compelled to find any letters

17 unavailable because Singh admitted that he personally knew

18 some of the practitioners and because his failure to

19 request supporting documents did not establish that they

20 were not available. See id.; Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509

, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding IJ’s finding when it 4 1 is “tethered to record evidence, and there is nothing else

2 in the record from which a firm conviction of error could

3 properly be derived”). Thus, the record does not compel a

4 finding that the evidence was unavailable. See

1252(b)(4).

6 Finally, Singh raises new arguments regarding the lack

7 of documentation of his religious practice in the United

8 States and the sufficiency of the documentation he provided,

9 such as a letter from the village leader and country

10 conditions evidence. But because he did not raise these

11 arguments before the BIA, we decline to consider them. See

12 Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

, 107 n.1 (2d

13 Cir. 2007) (providing that judicially imposed issue

14 exhaustion is mandatory). Even if sufficiently exhausted,

15 Singh has not identified any error in the burden finding given

16 the inconsistency between the village leader’s letter and

17 Singh’s testimony and the lack of evidence of recent or

18 ongoing violence against adherents of Baba Ram Rahim.

19 Given the absence of reliable corroboration and the fact

20 that Singh did not demonstrate that he could not produce

21 letters from his fellow followers of Baba Ram Rahim, the 5 1 agency reasonably concluded that Singh failed to meet his

2 burden of proof.

(b)(1)(B)(ii). This

3 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

4 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on

5 the same factual predicate. See Lecaj v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2010).

7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

8 DENIED.

9 FOR THE COURT: 10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 11 Clerk of Court

6