17‐2812‐cv Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2018

(Argued: August 16, 2018 Decided: February 15, 2019)

Docket No. 17‐2812‐cv

DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, JANET DIFIORE, as Chief Judge of the New York State Unified Court System, LAWRENCE K. MARKS, as Chief Administrative Judge of the New York State Unified Court System,

Defendants‐Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Before: CABRANES, LYNCH, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.) granting defendants‐

appelleesʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff‐appellant Disability Rights New York (ʺDRNYʺ) alleges constitutional

and other deficiencies in the manner in which guardianship proceedings are

conducted in New York Surrogateʹs Court under Article 17A of the Surrogateʹs

Court Procedure Act. Relying on Younger v. Harris,

(1971), and

OʹShea v. Littleton,

(1974), the district court determined that it was

required to abstain from hearing the case. On appeal, DRNY contends that the

district court erred in abstaining.

AFFIRMED.

JENNIFER J. MONTHIE (Lara H. Weissman, on the brief), Disability Rights New York, Albany, New York, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.

MARK S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General for the State of New York, New York, New York, for Defendants‐ Appellants. ___________

2

CHIN, Circuit Judge:

Article 17A of the New York Surrogateʹs Court Procedure Act (the

ʺSCPAʺ) governs guardianship proceedings in New York State Surrogateʹs Court

for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The statute was

enacted in 1969 to permit the appointment of parents or other interested persons

as guardians for individuals unable to care for themselves. Plaintiff‐appellant

Disability Rights New York (ʺDRNYʺ) brought this action below contending that

the statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide adequate protection

for these individuals, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel

defendants‐appellees ‐‐ the State of New York, its court system, and its Chief

Judge and Chief Administrative Judge (ʺDefendantsʺ) ‐‐ to alter the manner in

which guardianship proceedings are conducted.

The district court did not reach the merits of DRNYʹs claims as it

granted Defendantsʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings, abstaining pursuant

to Younger v. Harris,

(1971), and OʹShea v. Littleton,

(1974).

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.1

1 As we affirm on abstention grounds, we do not reach the issue of standing raised by Defendants on appeal because we may ʺdecide a case under Younger without 3

BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Statutory Provisions

New York State utilizes two primary procedures related to legal

guardianships: Article 17A of the Surrogateʹs Court Procedure Act (the ʺSCPAʺ)

and Article 81 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (the ʺMHLʺ).

1. Article 17A

Article 17A governs guardianship proceedings in New York State

Surrogateʹs Court for individuals with intellectual and developmental

disabilities. It was designed primarily to allow parents to serve as long‐term

guardians of children who cannot care for themselves. See In re Chaim A.K.,

, 586 (Sur. Ct. New York County 2009). Guardianships are not

limited, however, to parent‐child relationships, and guardianship can be

obtained by any ʺinterested person,ʺ including certain non‐profit organizations.

See SCPA §§ 1751, 1760.

addressing [DRNYʹs] constitutional standing to bring suit.ʺ Spargo v. N.Y. State Commʹn on Judicial Conduct,

, 74 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

(1999) (reaffirming the inherent flexibility that federal courts exercise ʺto choose among threshold groundsʺ for disposing of a case without reaching the merits). 4

Article 17A guardianships, which allocate broad decision‐making

authority to the petitioner over the individual with alleged disabilities, are

obtained through judicial proceedings before the New York Surrogateʹs Court.

See In re Chaim A.K., 885 N.Y.S.2d at 585. These procedures are designed to be

accessible to lay people. See id. ʺVirtually allʺ Article 17A proceedings are

uncontested and devoid of controversy. See In re Derek,

, 390

(Sur. Ct. Broome County 2006).

An Article 17A proceeding commences with service of notice by the

person seeking guardianship to a wide range of interested parties. See SCPA

§ 1753. The court then conducts a hearing at ʺwhich [the potential ward] shall

have the right to a jury trial.ʺ Id. § 1754(1). The court can dispense with a

hearing with the consent of both parents. Id. The individual with an alleged

disability shall be present at the hearing, unless the court is satisfied that such

person is ʺmedically incapable of being presentʺ or that her presence would not

be in her best interest. Id. § 1754(3). Though Article 17A does not provide for the

right to an attorney, courts have sometimes appointed attorneys in difficult

cases. See, e.g., In re Zhuo,

(Sur. Ct. Kings County 2016). To

obtain an Article 17A guardianship, a petitioner must present proof that two

5

physicians (or a physician and a psychologist) have certified that (1) the

individual has an intellectual or developmental disability that makes managing

her own life impractical, (2) the situation is ʺpermanentʺ or ʺlikely to continue

indefinitely,ʺ and (3) guardianship is in the individualʹs best interests. See SCPA

§§ 1750, 1750‐a. Courts have recognized that the ʺbest interestsʺ standard is a

lower standard of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard. In re

Mueller,

, 769 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 2009). Once a petition is

granted, the court retains jurisdiction over the guardianship and may modify it

at the request of the ward or anyone acting on her behalf. See SCPA §§ 1755,

1758.

2. Article 81

Article 81 governs guardianship proceedings in New York State

Supreme Court. Unlike Article 17A, Article 81 is designed primarily to deal with

elderly, disabled adults. In re Lavecchia,

, 213 (Sup. Ct. Rockland

County 1996). Article 81 is not limited to individuals diagnosed with specific

disabilities, but instead is designed for adults with ʺfunctional limitationsʺ that

impede their ability to provide for their own personal needs. MHL § 81.02.

6

Article 81 has different requirements than Article 17A. For example,

under Article 81 the court must hold a hearing, at which the prospective ward

must be present. Id. § 81.11(a), (c). At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden

of establishing the need for guardianship by ʺclear and convincing evidence.ʺ Id.

§§ 81.02(b), 81.12(a). And once a petition has been granted, guardians have

ongoing disclosure requirements. See, e.g., id. § 81.31 (requiring the guardian to

file an annual report with the supervising court). In sum, Article 81 proceedings

contain more checks and oversight than Article 17A proceedings: They require

more detailed pleadings, proof, and notice, and they provide appointed counsel,

a hearing that the potential ward must attend, ongoing supervision and

reporting, and narrowly tailored guardianship powers. These more robust

standards form the basis for DRNYʹs argument on the merits.

B. Procedural Background

On September 21, 2016, DRNY brought this action to, inter alia,

enjoin defendants from appointing legal guardians pursuant to Article 17A.

DRNY alleges that Article 17A proceedings, as currently administered, do not

meet the standards of due process and equal protection. Rather than citing the

circumstances of specific individuals subject to Article 17A proceedings,

7

however, DRNYʹs complaint relies primarily on a comparison of the two New

York State guardianship schemes ‐‐ Article 71A of the SCPA and Article 81 of the

MHL.

DRNY brought suit pursuant to (1)

, (2) Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the ʺRehabilitation Actʺ),

, and

(3) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ʺADAʺ),

.

DRNY asked for a declaration that Article 17A violates the Constitution, the

ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. It also sought an injunction requiring

defendants to take certain actions in Article 17A guardianship proceedings, such

as providing notice, applying a certain burden of proof, and providing

substantive and procedural rights equal to those provided in Article 81

proceedings. Appʹx at 41‐42.

Defendants answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the

pleadings. On August 16, 2017, the district court granted defendantsʹ motion on

abstention grounds pursuant to Younger v. Harris,

(1971), and OʹShea

v. Littleton,

(1974). The district court held that DRNYʹs claims fell

ʺsquarelyʺ under the third of the three categories of cases in which Younger

principles require a federal court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in deference

8

to state courts. Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York, No. 16‐cv‐7363,

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017) (citing Sprint Commcʹns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

(2013)). The district court also relied on OʹShea, holding that the

proposed injunction would impose ʺstandards on state court proceedings that

ʹwould require for their enforcement the continuous supervision by the federal

court over the conduct ofʹ those proceedings.ʺ

(quoting OʹShea,

(alteration omitted)). DRNY timely appealed.2

DISCUSSION

DRNY argues that the district court erred in abstaining from

exercising its jurisdiction. In particular, DRNY argues that the district court

erred in holding that the third Younger category applies. It also argues that the

district courtʹs reliance on OʹShea is misplaced. For the reasons set forth below,

we conclude that the district court correctly abstained under OʹShea.

I. Applicable Law

We review de novo the ʺessentiallyʺ legal determination of whether

the requirements for abstention have been met. Diamond ʺDʺ Constr. Corp. v.

2 ʺ[A]n order of abstention is considered final for purposes of appeal, at least when the order applies to the entire complaint.ʺ Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne,

(2d Cir. 2003). 9

McGowan,

, 197‐98 (2d Cir. 2002); accord Schlager v. Phillips,

(2d Cir. 1999).

In general, ʺfederal courts are obliged to decide cases within the

scope of federal jurisdiction.ʺ Sprint,

. The Supreme Court,

however, has recognized ʺcertain instances in which the prospect of undue

interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.ʺ

Federal courts must abstain where a party seeks to enjoin an

ongoing, parallel state criminal proceeding, to preserve the ʺlongstanding public

policy against federal court interference with state court proceedingsʺ based on

principles of federalism and comity. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43‐44. The Younger

doctrine has been extended beyond ongoing criminal cases to include particular

state civil proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

(1975), or that implicate a stateʹs interest in enforcing the orders and

judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,

(1987). In Sprint,

the Supreme Court held that Youngerʹs scope is limited to these three

ʺexceptionalʺ categories ‐‐ ʺongoing state criminal prosecution,ʺ ʺcertain civil

enforcement proceedings,ʺ and ʺcivil proceedings involving certain orders

10

uniquely in furtherance of the state courtsʹ ability to perform their judicial

functions.ʺ Sprint,

.

Here, only the third category is at issue: civil proceedings involving

certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courtsʹ ability to perform their

judicial functions. Civil contempt orders and orders requiring the posting of

bonds on appeal fall into this category. See NOPSI v. Council of City of New

Orleans,

(1989) (citing Juidice v. Vail,

, 336 n.12 (1977);

Pennzoil Co.,

). In Juidice, the Supreme Court abstained from

interfering with the ability of New York state courts to issue contempt decrees

because ʺ[t]he contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a Stateʹs

judicial system,ʺ and ʺstands in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that

its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.ʺ

, 336 n.12.

In Pennzoil, the Supreme Court abstained from interfering with the ability of

Texas state courts to require the posting of appeal bonds because of the

ʺimportance to the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts.ʺ

. We recently followed this line of cases in finding that abstention

was appropriate in a case seeking to enjoin New York courts from ordering

11

attorneysʹ fees in child custody cases. See Falco v. Justices of Matrimonial Parts of

Supreme Court of Suffolk Cty.,

(2d Cir. 2015).

Although Younger mandates abstention only when the plaintiff seeks

to enjoin ongoing state proceedings and only in the three instances identified in

Sprint, the Supreme Court has also held that even where no state proceedings are

pending, federal courts must abstain where failure to do so would result in ʺan

ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.ʺ OʹShea,

. In

OʹShea, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin state court judges from carrying out

allegedly unconstitutional policies and practices relating to bond setting,

sentencing, and jury fees in criminal cases.

at 491‐92. The Court held that ʺan

injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events

that might take place in the course of future state criminal trialsʺ would amount

to ʺnothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state . . . proceedings which

would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that [Younger] and related

cases sought to prevent.ʺ

. Thus, to avoid effecting ʺa major continuing

intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of

state criminal proceedings,ʺ which is ʺantipathetic to established principles of

comity,ʺ

at 501‐02, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the ʺspecial

12

delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and

State administration of its own law,ʺ

at 500 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard,

(1951)). Hence, OʹShea is an extension of the principles set forth in

Younger, and although Younger does not apply in the absence of pending

proceedings, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards,

(1992) (ʺAbsent any

pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts

of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.ʺ (emphasis in original)), the

considerations underlying Younger are still very much at play even when a suit is

filed prior to the onset of state proceedings, see OʹShea,

; see also

Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown,

(7th Cir. 2018) (ʺWhile this

case does not fit neatly into the Younger doctrine, it fits better into the Supreme

Courtʹs extension of the Younger principles in OʹShea . . . .ʺ).

Like Younger, OʹShea has also been applied in certain civil contexts

involving the operations of state courts. See Kaufman v. Kaye,

(2d

Cir. 2006) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining internal state court judicial

assignment procedures). Many of our sister circuits have abstained in similar

situations. See Courthouse News Serv., 908 F.3d at 1065‐66 (abstaining under

OʹShea, and the principles of federalism and comity that underly it, from

13

enjoining the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County to release newly filed

complaints at the moment of receipt); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming,

(8th Cir. 2018) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining allegedly

unconstitutional child custody proceedings because ʺ[t]he relief requested would

interfere with the state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to

comply with numerous procedural requirementsʺ and ʺfailure to comply with

the district court’s injunction would subject state officials to potential sanctionsʺ);

Miles v. Wesley,

(9th Cir. 2015) (abstaining under OʹShea

from enjoining the Los Angeles Supreme Court from reducing the number of

courthouses used for unlawful detainer actions); Hall v. Valeska, 509 F. Appʹx 834,

835‐36 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (abstaining under OʹShea from enjoining

allegedly discriminatory jury selection procedures); Parker v. Turner,

, 8

& n.18 (6th Cir. 1980) (providing that OʹShea establishes a rule of ʺnear‐absolute

restraint . . . to situations where the relief sought would interfere with the day‐to‐

day conduct of state trialsʺ).3

3 While the Supreme Court in Sprint made clear that Youngerʹs scope should be limited to the three specified categories,

, the Court did not suggest that abstention under OʹShea should be circumscribed. Indeed, courts have continued to apply OʹShea even after Sprint. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv.,

; Oglala Sioux Tribe,

; Miles, 801 F.3d at 1064‐65.

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II. Application

DRNY first argues that the third category of Younger does not apply

to this case because there is no pending, parallel state court action. Indeed,

DRNY is not seeking to enjoin any specific pending action, but it is instead

seeking to affect the manner in which all Article 17A proceedings ‐‐ present and

future ‐‐ are conducted.4 Mindful of the Supreme Courtʹs admonition that the

three ʺexceptionalʺ categories under Younger are to be narrowly construed,

Sprint,

(noting that the three categories ʺdefine Youngerʹs

scope,ʺ that Younger extends ʺno further,ʺ and that it has not ʺapplied Younger

outside these three ʹexceptionalʹ categoriesʺ), we do not decide whether this case

fits within the third Younger category, for we conclude that it falls squarely

within OʹSheaʹs abstention framework.

Our decision in Kaufman v. Kaye is instructive. There, we abstained

under OʹShea from declaring that New York Stateʹs system for assigning cases

4 We note that DRNYʹs complaint lacks nearly any specificity in its pleading. The complaint itself merely compares the aspects of two pieces of legislation and fails to mention a single individual by name. Indeed, DRNY ʺtenders ʹnaked assertionsʹ devoid of ʹfurther factual enhancement.ʹʺ Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (alteration omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). As drafted, DRNYʹs pleading ʺgive[s] no indication of the circumstances that support the conclusory allegation of unlawfulness.ʺ Drimal v. Tai,

(2d Cir. 2015). 15

among panels of appellate judges violated the Constitution and we refused to

order the state legislature to establish a new procedure for assigning appeals.

Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 84‐85, 87. Doing so, we held, would ʺraise compliance

issues under the putative federal injunctionʺ as well as claims that ʺthe state

courtʹs chosen remedy violated the Constitution or the terms of that injunction,ʺ

which ʺwould inevitably lead to precisely the kind of piecemeal interruptions of

state proceedings condemned in OʹShea.ʺ Id. at 87 (internal quotation marks and

ellipsis omitted). A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit is also helpful. In Miles

v. Wesley, the Ninth Circuit abstained under OʹShea from enjoining the Los

Angeles Supreme Court from, inter alia, eliminating any courthouses that heard

unlawful detainer actions.

. The court held that the requested

injunction would result in ʺheavy federal interference in such sensitive state

activities as administration of the judicial system.ʺ

at 1063 (quoting L.A. Cty.

Bar Assʹn v. Eu,

, 703 (9th Cir. 1992)).

In seeking the injunction in this case, DRNY asked the district court

(and asks this Court now) to direct the New York State Unified Court System, the

Chief Judge of the State of New York, and the Chief Administrative Judge for the

Courts of New York to (1) notify all current Article 17A wards of their right to

16

request modification or termination of their guardianship order, (2) hold

proceedings that provide augmented substantive and procedural rights ʺno less

thanʺ those of Article 81 proceedings, and (3) cease future Article 17A

adjudications ʺuntil defendants ensure that the proceedings provide substantive

and procedural rightsʺ on par with those of Article 81 proceedings. Appʹx at 42.

As in OʹShea, DRNYʹs requested relief would effect a continuing,

impermissible ʺauditʺ of New York Surrogateʹs Court proceedings, which would

offend the principles of comity and federalism. Simply put, DRNY seeks to

ʺcontrol[] or prevent[] the occurrence of specific events that might take place in

the court of future state [Article 17A proceedings.]ʺ OʹShea,

. With

such an injunction in place, anyone seeking or objecting to Article 17A

guardianship in the future would be able to ʺraise compliance issues under the

putative federal injunction claiming that the state courtʹs chosen remedy violated

the Constitution or the terms of that injunction.ʺ Kaufman,

; see also

(ʺ[A]ny remedy fashioned by the state would then be subject to future

challenges in the district court.ʺ). Ongoing, case‐by‐case oversight of state courts,

like the New York Surrogateʹs Court, is exactly the sort of interference OʹShea

seeks to avoid. Kaufman,

(ʺ[F]ederal courts may not entertain

17

actions . . . that seek to impose ʹan ongoing federal audit of state . . .

proceedings.ʹʺ (quoting OʹShea,

)). Indeed, such ʺmonitoring of the

operation of state court functions . . . is antipathetic to established principles of

comity.ʺ OʹShea, 414 U.S. at 501‐02. Because this Court has ʺno power to

intervene in the internal procedures of the state courtsʺ and cannot ʺlegislate and

engraft new procedures upon existing state . . . practices,ʺ the district court

correctly abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. See Kaufman,

(quoting Wallace v. Kern,

, 404‐05 (2d Cir. 1975)).

DRNY argues that federal courts have often found state statutes

unconstitutional, including statutes resulting in the issuance of state court orders.

It cites landmark decisions such as Obergefell v. Hodges,

(2015)

(holding that Michiganʹs law prohibiting same‐sex marriage violated equal

protection and due process rights), and Blakely v. Washington,

(2004)

(holding that Washingtonʹs sentencing law violates the Sixth Amendment). But

those cases did not implicate Younger. Plaintiffs in Obergefell challenged

substantive state statutes, and plaintiffs in Blakely simply appealed a final

judgment of the state courts. Here, DRNY seeks a far more substantial invasion

of state courtsʹ domain; it would have federal courts conduct a preemptive

18

review of state court procedure in guardianship proceedings, an area in which

states have an especially strong interest. See Falco,

. Such review

would directly impede ʺthe normal course of . . . proceedings in the state courts.ʺ

OʹShea,

; see also Sprint,

(noting that abstention is

proper where relief would impede ʺthe state courtsʹ ability to perform their

judicial functions.ʺ (quoting NOPSI,

)).

DRNY also seeks to have Article 17A declared unconstitutional and

violative of the Americans with Disability Act and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. DRNY argues that its request for declaratory relief is

not subject to abstention, as a declaratory judgment would not order the state

courts to take certain actions. We are not persuaded. In Samuels v. Mackell, the

Supreme Court held that ʺordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in

precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the

longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.ʺ

(1971); see also Miles, 801 F.3d at 1063‐64 (noting that where OʹShea is implicated,

even where plaintiffs narrow their request only to declaratory relief, abstention is

proper where the relief sought ʺwould inevitably set up the precise basis for

future intervention condemned in OʹSheaʺ because ʺthe question of defendantsʹ

19

compliance with any remedy imposed could be the subject of future court

challengesʺ (internal citations omitted)); Kaufman,

(abstaining

under OʹShea from hearing Kaufmanʹs complaint seeking injunctive and

declaratory relief). Thus, the district court properly abstained from exercising

jurisdiction even as to DRNYʹs request for declaratory relief.

We conclude by noting that abstention here is supported by the

ʺavailability of other avenues of relief.ʺ OʹShea,

. DRNY may still

avail itself of the state courts to challenge the constitutionality of Article 17A

proceedings. See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd.,

, 435 (2d Cir. 1998) (ʺState courts are courts of general jurisdiction

and are accordingly presumed to have jurisdiction over federally‐created causes

of action unless Congress indicates otherwise.ʺ). DRNY and any aggrieved

individuals will be able to obtain sufficient review in state court and, if needed,

the Supreme Court of the United States. See Allen v. McCurry,

(1980) (noting the Supreme Courtʹs confidence in state courts to adjudicate

constitutional issues); Kaufman, 466 F.3d at 87‐88. Indeed, New York state courts

have been diligent in reviewing the sufficiency of Article 17A proceedings, see,

e.g., In re Mark C.H.,

, 427 (Sur. Ct. New York County 2010); In re

20

D.D.,

, 869‐71 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 2015), and understand well

the differences between Article 17A proceedings and Article 81 proceedings, see

In re Chaim A.K., 885 N.Y.S.2d at 584‐90.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.

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