17-1299 Wei Zhang v. Barr BIA Zagzoug, IJ A205 883 110 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of April, two thousand nineteen.

PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

WEI ZHANG, Petitioner,

v. 17-1299 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Louis H. Klein, The Kasen Law Firm, PLLC, Flushing, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Janette L. Allen, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jessica D. Strokus, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Wei Zhang, a native and citizen of the

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 4, 2017,

decision of the BIA affirming a September 1, 2016, decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zhang’s application

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wei Zhang, No. A

205 883 110 (B.I.A. Apr. 4, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 883 110

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sep. 1, 2016). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history

in this case.

Because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility

ruling, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions.

See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

2005). We review the agency’s findings of fact under the

substantial evidence standard. See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018). Under this standard, “[w]e

treat factual findings as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable

2 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”

(quoting

(b)(4)(B)).

The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides

as follows:

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, . . . or any other relevant factor.

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

credibility determination.

First, Zhang has waived any challenge to the IJ’s

reliance on inconsistencies in his testimony and between his

testimony and documentation. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,

, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that

petitioner abandons issues and claims not raised in his

brief). Second, Zhang has waived and failed to exhaust any 3 challenge to the agency’s demeanor finding because he did not

challenge that finding before the BIA and he does not

challenge it in his brief in this Court. See Lin Zhong v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2007)

(explaining that petitioner generally must exhaust issues

before the BIA); Yueqing Zhang,

n.1, 545 n.7.

That finding provides substantial evidence for the adverse

credibility determination.

Furthermore, the agency reasonably concluded that Zhang

failed to rehabilitate his credibility with reliable

corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to

corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

been called into question”). Zhang alleged that he was

detained and beaten by the police for protesting a “quasi-

public” company’s loss of his investment. But Zhang did not

provide any evidence to corroborate his involvement with the

company or his investment, such as a copy of his own contract

with the company or other financial documentation of his

investment. And the agency reasonably declined to give 4 weight to affidavits from Zhang’s father and friend given

their lack of detail. See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to give little

weight to letter from applicant’s spouse in China). Although

Zhang submitted a fine receipt relating to his arrest and

detention, the fine receipt itself contained little detail,

and once again Zhang provided no corroboration or

authentication, such as a letter from his brother who paid

the fine.

(“We defer to the agency’s determination of

the weight afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”).

Given the agency’s inconsistency and demeanor findings,

which Zhang has not challenged, and the lack of reliable

corroborating evidence to rehabilitate his testimony, the

totality of the circumstances supports the adverse

credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin,

.

Because Zhang’s claims were all based on the same factual

predicate, the adverse credibility determination is

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

relief. See Paul v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

2006).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

6