17-3351 Medel Corona v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A088 442 425 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 15th day of July, two thousand nineteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 PETER W. HALL, 9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 IVAN MEDEL CORONA, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 17-3351 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Charles Christophe, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Terri J. 27 Scadron, Assistant Director; 28 Manuel A. Palau, Trial Attorney, 29 Office of Immigration Litigation, 30 United States Department of 31 Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

5 Petitioner Ivan Medel Corona, a native and citizen of

6 Mexico, seeks review of a September 20, 2017 decision of the

7 BIA affirming an August 22, 2016 decision of an Immigration

8 Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and

9 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re

10 Ivan Medel Corona, No. A088 442 425 (B.I.A. Sept. 20, 2017),

11 aff’g No. A088 442 425 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 22, 2016).

12 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

13 and procedural history in this case.

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered

15 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

16 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review

18 are well established. See

(b)(4)(B); Yanqin

19 Weng v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009).

20 Asylum: One-Year Filing Deadline

21 An alien is ineligible for asylum “unless the alien

22 demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the

23 application has been filed within 1 year after the date of 2 1 the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

2 § 1158(a)(2)(B). An application may be considered outside

3 the one-year deadline, however, “if the alien

4 demonstrates . . . the existence of changed circumstances

5 which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for

6 asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay,”

7 id. § 1158(a)(2)(D), and the application is filed within a

8 reasonable time,

(a)(4)(ii), (a)(5). Our

9 jurisdiction to review the agency’s findings regarding the

10 timeliness of an asylum application and the circumstances

11 excusing the untimeliness is limited to “constitutional

12 claims or questions of law.” See

(a)(3),

13 1252(a)(2)(D).

14 Medel Corona does not raise a colorable constitutional

15 claim or question of law regarding the agency’s pretermission

16 of asylum. He concedes that his application was untimely,

17 as he entered the United States in 2003 and did not file for

18 asylum until 2011. He argues that his parents’ arrests in

19 2007 constituted a change in circumstances and that he filed

20 for asylum within a reasonable time after the arrests. What

21 is a reasonable time after a change in circumstances is a

22 fact-specific inquiry. See Matter of T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I.

23 & N. Dec. 193, 193 (B.I.A. 2010) (“Although there may be some 3 1 rare cases in which a delay of one year or more may be

2 justified because of particular circumstances, in most cases

3 such a delay would not be justified.”). The agency found

4 that, assuming the arrests were a changed circumstance, Medel

5 Corona’s three-year delay after the arrests was not

6 reasonable. The agency rejected Medel Corona’s explanation

7 that he “had other legal issues that . . . took precedence.”

8 Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 15. His challenge

9 to the agency’s determination that this was not a reasonable

10 delay “merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual

11 findings” relating to his specific circumstances and does not

12 raise a question of law. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of

13 Justice,

(2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we

14 lack jurisdiction to further review the denial of asylum as

15 untimely. See

(a)(3).

16 Withholding of Removal

17 For withholding of removal, “the applicant must establish

18 that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

19 social group, or political opinion was or will be at least

20 one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.

21 §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-

22 L-,

(B.I.A. 2010) (applying “one

23 central reason” standard to withholding). Medel Corona 4 1 claims withholding of removal based on imputed political

2 opinion and his membership in the “quasi social group” of the

3 “biological son of a man whose wife is an influential member

4 of [the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (“PRI”)].”

5 Petitioner’s Br. at 12, 14. We find no error in the agency’s

6 denial of withholding of removal.

7 To demonstrate that past persecution or a fear of

8 persecution is on account of political opinion, the applicant

9 must “show, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that

10 the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

11 applicant’s political belief,” rather than merely by the

12 persecutor’s own opinion. Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426

(2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The

14 persecution may be on account of an opinion imputed to the

15 applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not

16 this imputation is accurate. See Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424

(2d Cir. 2005).

18 The agency reasonably concluded that Medel Corona did

19 not demonstrate that the men who harassed and beat him at the

20 direction of his biological father’s wife did so on account

21 of his actual or imputed anti-PRI political opinion. The

22 record supports the agency’s conclusion that Medel Corona’s

23 biological father’s wife, though she was politically 5 1 connected, harmed Medel Corona for personal reasons. Medel

2 Corona did not testify that he had any political views or

3 that he was opposed to the PRI. The men who harassed and

4 attacked Medel Corona never mentioned the PRI or politics;

5 they only disparaged his family and told him to stay away

6 from his biological father. Without any direct or

7 circumstantial evidence that the men targeted him or would

8 target him on account of his political opinion, imputed or

9 otherwise, the BIA did not err in finding that he failed to

10 establish his eligibility for withholding on that ground.

11 See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545.

12 To the extent Medel Corona’s social group claim is

13 distinct from his imputed political opinion claim, he did not

14 argue his social group claim before the IJ. Accordingly, the

15 BIA properly deemed it waived on appeal and did not consider

16 it. See Prabhudial v. Holder,

(2d Cir.

17 2015) (per curiam) (“[T]he BIA may refuse to consider an issue

18 that could have been, but was not, raised before an IJ.”).

19 CAT Protection

20 To receive protection under the CAT, an applicant must

21 “establish that it is more likely than not that he . . . would

22 be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”

23

(c)(2). CAT relief does not require a 6 1 nexus to a protected ground. See

“Torture is defined

2 as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical

3 or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . at

4 the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a

5 public official or other person acting in an official

6 capacity.”

(a)(1); see Khouzam v.

7 Ashcroft,

(2d Cir. 2004).

8 Medel Corona argues that because he was beaten at the

9 instigation of “his biological father’s wife who is an

10 influential [PRI] member,” it logically follows that he will

11 be tortured “with the acquiescence of the current Mexican

12 government.” Petitioner’s Br. at 16–17. This claim is more

13 speculative than logical, as it is undermined by Medel

14 Corona’s testimony that when he reported his first attack to

15 the police, they were responsive and said they would look for

16 his assailants. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS,

(2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that “[i]n the

18 absence of solid support in the record” for a claim of future

19 persecution, an applicant’s “fear is speculative at best”).

20 Though the police were unsuccessful in preventing a second

21 attack, the failure did not appear to be the result of

22 acquiescence, and Medel Corona conceded that he never

23 followed up with the police about their efforts to find his 7 1 attackers. Cf. Khouzam,

(“[T]orture requires

2 only that government officials know of or remain willfully

3 blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal

4 responsibility to prevent it.”). The generalized evidence

5 of government and police corruption and the PRI’s power in

6 Mexico, without more, did not establish that Medel Corona

7 will more likely than not be tortured with the consent or

8 acquiescence of the Mexican government. See Mu-Xing Wang v.

9 Ashcroft,

(2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile Wang’s

10 testimony as well as some of his ‘country conditions’

11 documents indicate that some prisoners in China have been

12 tortured, Wang has in no way established that someone in his

13 particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not to

14 be tortured if imprisoned in China.” (citation omitted)); see

15 also Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

, 160

16 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring “particularized evidence” beyond

17 general country conditions to support a CAT claim). Absent

18 particularized evidence that the authorities would acquiesce

19 to Medel Corona’s torture, the agency did not err in denying

20 CAT relief. See Savchuck v. Mukasey,

(2d

21 Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[A]n alien will never be able to

22 show that he faces a more likely than not chance of torture

23 if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be more likely 8 1 than not to occur.” (quoting In re J-F-F-,

912, 918 n.4 (AG 2006))).

3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

4 DISMISSED in part as to asylum and DENIED in remaining part

5 as to withholding of removal and CAT relief. As we have

6 completed our review, Medel Corona’s pending motion for a

7 stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court

9