17Ȭ2823ȱ(L)ȱ KayheemȱLillyȱv.ȱTheȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱetȱal.ȱ

2 In the 3 United States Court of Appeals 4 For the Second Circuit 5 ________ȱ 6 ȱ 7 AUGUSTȱTERM,ȱ2018ȱ 8 ȱ 9 ARGUED:ȱOCTOBERȱ30,ȱ2018ȱȱ 10 DECIDED:ȱAUGUSTȱ14,ȱ2019ȱ 11 ȱ 12 Nos.ȱ17Ȭ2823(L)Ȭcv,ȱ17Ȭ3000(XAP)Ȭcvȱ 13 ȱ 14 KAYHEEMȱLILLY,ȱ 15 PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant,ȱ 16 ȱ 17 v.ȱ 18 ȱ 19 THEȱCITYȱOFȱNEWȱYORK;ȱNYPDȱDETECTIVEȱMALCOLMȱFREEMAN,ȱ SHIELDȱNO.ȱ7049;ȱNYPDȱPOLICEȱOFFICERȱSOULȱKIM,ȱSHIELDȱNO.ȱ10804,ȱ 21 DefendantsȬAppellantsȬCrossȬAppellees,ȱ 22 ȱ 23 JOHNȱDOEȱSERGEANT;ȱJOHNȱDOES,ȱRICHARDȱROES;ȱANDREWȱHONG;ȱ 24 DONALDȱCAMBRIDGE;ȱJORGEȱTAJEDA;ȱFRANKȱBATISTA;ȱKEVINȱ 25 WHETSTONE,ȱ 26 Defendants.*ȱ 27 ________ȱ 28 ȱ 29 AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱ 30 forȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.ȱ 31 No.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ–ȱEdgardoȱRamos,ȱJudge.ȱ 32 ________ȱ ȱConsistentȱwithȱtheȱorderȱenteredȱbyȱthisȱCourtȱonȱOctoberȱ18,ȱ2013,ȱECFȱNo.ȱ118,ȱ * weȱuseȱtheȱshortȬformȱcaptionȱforȱtheȱpurposeȱofȱpublishingȱthisȱopinion.ȱ 1 ȱ Before:ȱWALKER,ȱLEVAL,ȱANDȱDRONEY,ȱCircuitȱJudges.ȱ 3 ________ȱ 4 Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ [the]ȱoffer.”ȱ 28 ________ȱ 29 JEFFREYȱ A.ȱ ROTHMAN,ȱ Lawȱ Officeȱ ofȱ Jeffreyȱ A.ȱ 30 Rothman,ȱ Newȱ York,ȱ NY,ȱ forȱ PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬ 1 CrossȬAppellant.ȱ 2 ELINAȱ DRUKER,ȱ Ofȱ Counselȱ (Richardȱ Dearing,ȱ onȱ 3 theȱ brief),ȱ forȱ Zacharyȱ W.ȱ Carter,ȱ Corporationȱ 4 Counsel,ȱNewȱYork,ȱNY,ȱforȱDefendantsȬAppellantsȬ 5 CrossȬAppellees.ȱ 6 ________ȱ 7 JOHNȱM.ȱWALKER,ȱJR.,ȱCircuitȱJudge:ȱ 8 Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ [the]ȱoffer.”ȱ 3 BACKGROUNDȱ 4 PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellantȱ Lillyȱ filedȱ aȱ complaintȱ onȱ Januaryȱ14,ȱ2016,ȱallegingȱthatȱhisȱcivilȱrightsȱwereȱviolatedȱbyȱtheȱCityȱ ofȱNewȱYorkȱandȱseveralȱNewȱYorkȱCityȱpoliceȱofficersȱ(collectively,ȱ theȱ“City”)ȱonȱtwoȱoccasionsȱinȱOctoberȱ2014.ȱȱTheȱfirstȱclaimȱwasȱforȱ useȱofȱexcessiveȱforceȱandȱtheȱsecondȱwasȱforȱimproperȱissuanceȱofȱ threeȱ summonsesȱ forȱ threateningȱ behaviorȱ towardȱ anȱ officer,ȱ possessionȱofȱanȱopenȱcontainer,ȱandȱlittering,ȱallȱofȱwhichȱwereȱlaterȱ dismissed.ȱ 12 LillyȱwasȱrepresentedȱbyȱJeffreyȱRothmanȱ(“Rothman”),ȱaȱcivilȱ rightsȱ attorneyȱ andȱ soloȱ practitioner,ȱ whoȱ filedȱ theȱ complaintȱ onȱ Lilly’sȱbehalf.ȱȱOnȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱtheȱCityȱpresentedȱLillyȱwithȱanȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ pursuantȱtoȱ Ruleȱ68ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱofȱ Civilȱ Procedure,ȱwhichȱLillyȱaccepted.ȱȱTheȱofferȱstated:ȱ 17 Pursuantȱ toȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱ ofȱ Civilȱ 18 Procedure,ȱ defendantsȱ herebyȱ offerȱ toȱ allowȱ plaintiffȱ 19 [Kayheem]ȱ Lillyȱ toȱ takeȱaȱ judgmentȱ againstȱ theȱCityȱ ofȱ 20 Newȱ Yorkȱ inȱ thisȱ actionȱ forȱ theȱ totalȱ sumȱ ofȱ Tenȱ 21 ThousandȱandȱOneȱ($10,001.00)ȱDollars,ȱplusȱreasonableȱ 22 attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ thisȱ 23 offerȱforȱplaintiff’sȱfederalȱclaims.1ȱ ȱ TheȱCityȱandȱLillyȱ(throughȱRothman)ȱattemptedȱtoȱnegotiateȱaȱ settlementȱ regardingȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ butȱ wereȱ unsuccessful.ȱ ȱ Rothmanȱ filedȱ aȱ formalȱ motionȱ forȱ anȱ awardȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,ȱpursuantȱ toȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988,ȱforȱaȱtotalȱsumȱofȱ$34,527.ȱȱThatȱfigureȱrepresentsȱ 50.3ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ workȱ upȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ andȱ 6.5ȱ ȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ hoursȱofȱworkȱpreparingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeeȱapplicationȱatȱanȱhourlyȱ rateȱofȱ$600,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ11.5ȱhoursȱforȱworkȱafterȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ andȱthroughȱtheȱfilingȱofȱLilly’sȱreplyȱbriefȱatȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$625.2ȱȱ Theȱ Cityȱ objectedȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ requestȱ onȱ theȱ groundsȱ that:ȱ (1)ȱ hisȱ requestedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ wasȱ excessive,ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ expendedȱwasȱunreasonable,ȱandȱ(3)ȱfeesȱincurredȱafterȱacceptanceȱofȱ theȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱareȱnotȱrecoverableȱunderȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱoffer.ȱ 8 TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱRothmanȱreducedȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱ costsȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ ofȱ $28,128.99.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ courtȱ agreedȱ thatȱ Rothmanȱhadȱcomparableȱexperienceȱandȱqualificationsȱtoȱotherȱcivilȱ rightsȱattorneysȱwhoȱhaveȱreceivedȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱinȱtheȱlowȱ $600ȱ perȱ hourȱ range,ȱ butȱ believedȱ thatȱ theȱ “simplicityȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ warrant[ed]ȱ aȱ reductionȱ ofȱ hisȱ claimedȱ hourlyȱ rates.”3ȱ ȱ Dueȱ toȱ theȱ “relativelyȱ straightforward”ȱ natureȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ foundȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱtoȱbeȱreasonable.4ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ cutȱ toȱ theȱ awardȱ becauseȱ someȱofȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱwereȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱheȱhadȱbilledȱatȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Lastly,ȱ notwithstandingȱ theȱ factȱ thatȱ theȱ Ruleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱlimitedȱrecoverableȱfeesȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ priorȱtoȱtheȱoffer,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱ timeȱRothmanȱspentȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱThisȱappealȱandȱ crossȬappealȱfollowed.ȱȱȱ 23 DISCUSSIONȱ 24 Theȱ Cityȱ appealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ orderȱ grantingȱ “feesȱ onȱ fees”ȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ Rothmanȱ incurredȱ inȱ litigatingȱ theȱ applicationȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfees)ȱbecauseȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ 2ȱTheȱincreaseȱreflectsȱaȱ$25ȱincreaseȱinȱRothman’sȱhourlyȱrateȱthatȱbecameȱeffectiveȱ onȱJanuaryȱ1,ȱ2016.ȱȱ 3ȱJointȱApp’xȱ277–79.ȱ 4ȱId.ȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ limitedȱ theȱ recoverableȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ toȱ onlyȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ offer.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ crossȬappealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ orderȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ $450ȱ andȱ prohibitingȱ Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱclericalȱtasks.ȱ 5 Weȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱawardȱforȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ forȱ abuseȱ ofȱ discretion.5ȱ ȱ “Aȱ districtȱ courtȱ abusesȱ itsȱ discretionȱ ifȱ itȱ (1)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ anȱ errorȱ ofȱ lawȱ orȱ usesȱ theȱ wrongȱ legalȱ standard;ȱ (2)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ aȱ clearlyȱ erroneousȱ factualȱ finding;ȱ orȱ (3)ȱ reachesȱ aȱ conclusionȱ that,ȱ thoughȱ notȱ necessarilyȱtheȱproductȱofȱaȱlegalȱerrorȱorȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱ finding,ȱcannotȱbeȱlocatedȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions.”6ȱȱ “Givenȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ inherentȱ institutionalȱ advantagesȱ inȱ thisȱ area,ȱourȱreviewȱofȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱhighlyȱdeferential.”7ȱȱ Thisȱhighȱdegreeȱofȱdeferenceȱisȱappropriateȱbecauseȱ“[w]eȱcanȱhardlyȱ thinkȱ ofȱ aȱ sphereȱ ofȱ judicialȱ decisionmakingȱ inȱ whichȱ appellateȱ micromanagementȱhasȱlessȱtoȱrecommendȱit.”8ȱȱWeȱreviewȱquestionsȱ ofȱlawȱregardingȱtheȱlegalȱstandardȱforȱgrantingȱorȱdenyingȱattorney’sȱ feesȱdeȱnovo.9ȱȱWeȱalsoȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱinterpretationȱofȱaȱRuleȱ 68ȱofferȱdeȱnovo.10ȱ 20 I. CalculationȱofȱtheȱReasonableȱHourlyȱRateȱ 21 LillyȱarguesȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱinȱreducingȱRothman’sȱ rateȱ fromȱ $600ȱ andȱ $625ȱ perȱ hourȱ toȱ $450ȱ perȱ hourȱ becauseȱ ofȱ theȱ “durationȱandȱsimplicity”ȱofȱtheȱcase.ȱȱSpecifically,ȱheȱarguesȱthatȱafterȱ

5ȱSeeȱMilleaȱv.ȱMetroȬNorthȱR.ȱCo.,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱ154,ȱ166ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011).ȱ 6ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ 7ȱMcDonaldȱexȱrel.ȱPrendergastȱv.ȱPensionȱPlanȱofȱtheȱNYSAȬILAȱPensionȱTrustȱFund,ȱ 450ȱF.3dȱ91,ȱ96ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2006)ȱ(perȱcuriam).ȱ 8ȱFoxȱv.ȱVice,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱ826,ȱ838ȱ(2011).ȱ 9ȱSeeȱScarangellaȱv.ȱGroupȱHealth,ȱInc.,ȱ731ȱF.3dȱ146,ȱ151ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2013).ȱ 10ȱSteinerȱv.ȱLewmar,ȱInc.,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱ26,ȱ31ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2016).ȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ decisionȱ inȱ Perdueȱ v.ȱ Kennyȱ A.ȱ exȱ rel.ȱ Winn,11ȱ districtȱcourtsȱcanȱnoȱlongerȱconsiderȱtheȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱ natureȱ ofȱ anȱ actionȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ beȱ awarded.ȱȱToȱtheȱextentȱourȱdecisionȱinȱArborȱHillȱConcernedȱCitizensȱ NeighborhoodȱAssociationȱv.ȱCountyȱofȱAlbany12ȱpermitsȱconsiderationȱofȱ theȱsimplicityȱofȱlitigationȱinȱdeterminingȱtheȱappropriateȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ LillyȱcontendsȱthatȱPerdueȱoverruledȱArborȱHill.ȱȱLilly’sȱargumentsȱareȱ withoutȱmerit.ȱ 9 A. EarlyȱHistoryȱofȱFeeȬShiftingȱJurisprudenceȱ 10 BeforeȱaddressingȱArborȱHillȱandȱPerdue,ȱweȱthinkȱitȱhelpfulȱtoȱ brieflyȱreviewȱtheȱrelevantȱhistoryȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱjurisprudence.ȱ 12 Inȱ 1976,ȱ Congressȱ enactedȱ theȱ Civilȱ Rightsȱ Attorney’sȱ Feesȱ AwardȱAct,ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988ȱ(“FeesȱAct”),ȱwhichȱauthorizedȱdistrictȱ courtsȱ toȱ awardȱ theȱ prevailingȱ partyȱ inȱ civilȱ rightsȱ actionsȱ “aȱ reasonableȱattorney’sȱfee.”13ȱȱTheȱActȱdidȱnotȱspecifyȱtheȱappropriateȱ methodȱforȱcalculatingȱaȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfee,ȱbutȱtheȱHouseȱandȱ Senateȱ Reportsȱ referredȱ toȱ twoȱ methodsȱ thatȱ hadȱ developedȱ inȱ theȱ circuitȱcourts.14ȱȱ 19 Theȱfirst,ȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestarȱmethod,ȱwasȱadoptedȱbyȱtheȱ Thirdȱ Circuitȱ inȱ Lindyȱ Bros.ȱ Builders,ȱ Inc.ȱ ofȱ Philadelphiaȱ v.ȱ Americanȱ Radiatorȱ &ȱ Standardȱ Sanitaryȱ Corp.15ȱ ȱ Thisȱ approachȱ calculatesȱ attorney’sȱfeesȱbyȱmultiplyingȱtheȱattorney’sȱusualȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱtheȱ numberȱofȱhoursȱbilled,ȱtoȱproduceȱaȱfigureȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestar.16ȱȱ Afterȱdeterminingȱtheȱlodestar,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱthenȱhasȱdiscretionȱ 11ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱ542ȱ(2010).ȱ 12ȱ522ȱF.3dȱ182ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱ 13ȱSeeȱHensleyȱv.ȱEckerhart,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424,ȱ429ȱ(1983).ȱ 14ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186;ȱseeȱalsoȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ429–30.ȱ 15ȱ487ȱF.2dȱ161ȱ(3dȱCir.ȱ1973).ȱ 16ȱId.ȱatȱ167–68.ȱ toȱadjustȱtheȱfinalȱamountȱtoȱensureȱthatȱtheȱfeeȱisȱreasonable.17ȱ 2 Theȱ secondȱ method,ȱ knownȱ asȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ approach,ȱ wasȱ developedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱinȱJohnsonȱv.ȱGeorgiaȱHighwayȱExpress,ȱ Inc.18ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ startingȱ withȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ multiplyingȱitȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱworked,ȱandȱthenȱdeterminingȱ whetherȱ thatȱ figureȱ (theȱ lodestar)ȱ shouldȱ beȱ adjusted,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ determinesȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ oneȱ stepȱ byȱ consideringȱtwelveȱfactors.19ȱȱTheseȱtwelveȱfactorsȱare:ȱ 9 (1)ȱ theȱ timeȱ andȱ laborȱ required;ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ 10 difficultyȱofȱtheȱquestions;ȱ(3)ȱtheȱlevelȱofȱskillȱrequiredȱ 11 toȱperformȱtheȱlegalȱserviceȱproperly;ȱ(4)ȱtheȱpreclusionȱ 12 ofȱemploymentȱbyȱtheȱattorneyȱdueȱtoȱacceptanceȱofȱtheȱ 13 case;ȱ (5)ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ customaryȱ hourlyȱ rate;ȱ (6)ȱ 14 whetherȱ theȱ feeȱ isȱ fixedȱ orȱ contingent;ȱ (7)ȱ theȱ timeȱ 15 limitationsȱ imposedȱ byȱ theȱ clientȱ orȱ theȱ circumstances;ȱ 16 (8)ȱ theȱ amountȱ involvedȱ inȱ theȱ caseȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ 17 obtained;ȱ(9)ȱtheȱexperience,ȱreputation,ȱandȱabilityȱofȱtheȱ 18 attorneys;ȱ (10)ȱ theȱ “undesirability”ȱ ofȱ theȱ case;ȱ (11)ȱ theȱ 19 natureȱ andȱ lengthȱ ofȱ theȱ professionalȱ relationshipȱ withȱ 20 theȱclient;ȱandȱ(12)ȱawardsȱinȱsimilarȱcases.20ȱ 21 TheȱSupremeȱCourtȱfirstȱconsideredȱtheȱappropriateȱmethodȱtoȱ calculateȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ Hensleyȱ v.ȱ Eckerhart.21ȱ ȱ Theȱ Courtȱ“adoptedȱtheȱlodestarȱmethodȱinȱprinciple,ȱwithout,ȱhowever,ȱ fullyȱ abandoningȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ method.”22ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ usingȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ instructedȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ

17ȱId.ȱatȱ168–69.ȱ 18ȱ488ȱF.2dȱ714ȱ(5thȱCir.ȱ1974),ȱabrogatedȱonȱotherȱgroundsȱbyȱBlanchardȱv.ȱBergeron,ȱ 489ȱU.S.ȱ87ȱ(1989).ȱ 19ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ717–19.ȱ 20ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186ȱn.3ȱ(citingȱJohnson,ȱ488ȱF.2dȱatȱ717–19).ȱȱ 21ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424ȱ(1983).ȱ 22ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted).ȱ determineȱaȱ“reasonableȱhourlyȱrate,”ȱandȱspecificallyȱreferredȱtoȱtheȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ asȱ usefulȱ toolsȱ forȱ determiningȱ whatȱ isȱ reasonable.23ȱȱ TheȱCourtȱdescribedȱthisȱprocessȱofȱdeterminingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ thenȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ asȱ “anȱ objectiveȱbasisȱonȱwhichȱtoȱmakeȱanȱinitialȱestimateȱofȱtheȱvalueȱofȱaȱ lawyer’sȱservices,”ȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).24ȱȱTheȱCourtȱwentȱonȱtoȱholdȱthatȱ afterȱ calculatingȱ theȱ lodestarȱ inȱ thisȱ manner,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ discretionȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱfinalȱfeeȱinȱ“casesȱofȱexceptionalȱ success”ȱorȱ“onlyȱpartialȱorȱlimitedȱsuccess,”ȱrespectively.25ȱȱ 10 Aȱyearȱlater,ȱinȱBlumȱv.ȱStenson,ȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱholdingȱ inȱ Hensley,ȱ thatȱ theȱ initialȱ feeȱ awardȱ shouldȱ beȱ determinedȱ byȱ multiplyingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ expended,ȱandȱthatȱtheȱfinalȱawardȱcanȱbeȱincreasedȱorȱdecreasedȱinȱ exceptionalȱcasesȱtoȱachieveȱaȱreasonableȱfee.26ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplainedȱ thatȱtheȱFeesȱAct:ȱ 16 requiresȱ aȱ “reasonableȱ fee,”ȱ andȱ thereȱ mayȱ beȱ 17 circumstancesȱinȱwhichȱtheȱbasicȱstandardȱofȱreasonableȱ 18 ratesȱmultipliedȱbyȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhoursȱresultsȱinȱ 19 aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ eitherȱ unreasonablyȱ lowȱ orȱ unreasonablyȱ 20 high.ȱȱWhen,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱapplicantȱforȱaȱfeeȱhasȱcarriedȱ 21 hisȱburdenȱofȱshowingȱthatȱtheȱclaimedȱrateȱandȱnumberȱ 22 ofȱ hoursȱ areȱ reasonable,ȱ theȱ resultingȱ productȱ isȱ 23 presumedȱ toȱ beȱ theȱ reasonableȱ feeȱ contemplatedȱ byȱ 24 §ȱ1988.27ȱ 25 ThisȱhybridȱapproachȱwasȱagainȱapprovedȱbyȱtheȱCourtȱinȱtheȱ 1986ȱcaseȱofȱPennsylvaniaȱv.ȱDelawareȱValleyȱCitizen’sȱCouncilȱforȱCleanȱ

23ȱId.ȱ(citingȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9).ȱ 24ȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ433.ȱ 25ȱId.ȱatȱ435–37.ȱ 26ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱ886,ȱ896–97ȱ(1984).ȱ 27ȱId.ȱatȱ897.ȱ Air.28ȱȱInȱbothȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱCourtȱclarifiedȱ thatȱ manyȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ “areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ calculation”ȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱ(reasonableȱhoursȱexpendedȱmultipliedȱbyȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate),ȱ andȱ thereforeȱ “cannotȱ serveȱ asȱ independentȱbasesȱforȱincreasingȱ[orȱdecreasing]ȱtheȱbasicȱfeeȱaward,”ȱ (i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).29ȱȱSpecifically,ȱtheȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱ complexityȱofȱtheȱissues,ȱtheȱspecialȱskillȱandȱexperienceȱofȱcounsel,ȱ theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ representation,ȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ fromȱ theȱ litigationȱ shouldȱ beȱ “fullyȱ reflectedȱ inȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ billableȱ hoursȱ recordedȱbyȱcounsel”ȱorȱ“theȱreasonablenessȱofȱtheȱhourlyȱrates.”30ȱȱAsȱ aȱresult,ȱitȱisȱinappropriateȱforȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱ theȱlodestarȱfigureȱonȱaccountȱofȱanyȱofȱtheseȱfactors,ȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ alreadyȱ accountedȱ forȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ reasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱtoȱdetermineȱtheȱlodestar.31ȱ 15 B. ArborȱHillȱ 16 Theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ adoptionȱ ofȱ aȱ hybridȱ approachȱ causedȱ confusionȱamongstȱtheȱlowerȱcourtsȱasȱtoȱhowȱtoȱbalanceȱtheȱbrightȬ lineȱstandardsȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱmodelȱwithȱtheȱnumerousȱevaluationsȱ requiredȱ byȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ andȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ abilityȱ toȱ exerciseȱ itsȱ discretionȱ toȱ enhanceȱ orȱ cutȱ theȱ finalȱ feeȱ awardȱ inȱ exceptionalȱcircumstances.32ȱ 22 InȱArborȱHill,ȱweȱattemptedȱtoȱresolveȱsomeȱofȱthisȱtensionȱandȱ 28ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱ546,ȱ563–64ȱ(1986).ȱȱ 29ȱId.ȱatȱ564–65ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)ȱ(citingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898– 900).ȱ 30ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65.ȱ 31ȱSeeȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898–99,ȱ900;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65,ȱ566– 67.ȱ 32ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(“AfterȱHensleyȱandȱBlum,ȱcircuitȱcourtsȱstruggledȱ withȱ theȱ nettlesomeȱ interplayȱ betweenȱ theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ andȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ method.”).ȱ clarifyȱourȱcircuit’sȱfeeȬsettingȱjurisprudence.ȱȱWeȱinstructedȱdistrictȱ courtsȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”33ȱbyȱdeterminingȱ theȱ appropriateȱ billableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ andȱ “settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ takingȱ accountȱ ofȱ allȱ caseȬspecificȱ variables.”34ȱ ȱ Weȱ explainedȱwithȱrespectȱtoȱtheȱlatter:ȱ 6 [T]heȱ districtȱ court,ȱ inȱ exercisingȱ itsȱ considerableȱ 7 discretion,ȱ[should]ȱbearȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȬspecificȱ 8 variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ identifiedȱ asȱ 9 relevantȱtoȱtheȱreasonablenessȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱsettingȱ 10 aȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.ȱȱTheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱ 11 theȱ rateȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.ȱ ȱ Inȱ 12 determiningȱwhatȱrateȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱ 13 toȱpay,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱshouldȱconsider,ȱamongȱothers,ȱ 14 theȱ Johnsonȱ factors;ȱ itȱ shouldȱ alsoȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ 15 reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱ 16 necessaryȱ toȱ litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ 17 courtȱshouldȱalsoȱconsiderȱthatȱsuchȱanȱindividualȱmightȱ 18 beȱableȱtoȱnegotiateȱwithȱhisȱorȱherȱattorneys,ȱusingȱtheirȱ 19 desireȱ toȱ obtainȱ theȱ reputationalȱ benefitsȱ thatȱ mightȱ 20 accrueȱfromȱbeingȱassociatedȱwithȱtheȱcase.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 21 courtȱ shouldȱ thenȱ useȱ thatȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ 22 calculateȱ whatȱ canȱ properlyȱ beȱ termedȱ theȱ 23 “presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.”35ȱȱ ȱ Inȱ theȱ wakeȱ ofȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ weȱ haveȱ consistentlyȱ appliedȱ thisȱ methodȱ ofȱ determiningȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ consideringȱ allȱ pertinentȱfactors,ȱincludingȱtheȱJohnsonȱfactors,ȱandȱthenȱmultiplyingȱ 33ȱWeȱusedȱtheȱtermȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”ȱinsteadȱofȱtheȱtraditionalȱtermȱ “lodestar”ȱbecauseȱtheȱmeaningȱofȱtheȱlatterȱtermȱ“hasȱshiftedȱoverȱtime,ȱandȱitsȱ valueȱasȱaȱmetaphorȱhasȱdeterioratedȱtoȱtheȱpointȱofȱunhelpfulness.”ȱȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱȱ TheȱSupremeȱCourt,ȱhowever,ȱcontinuesȱtoȱuseȱtheȱtermȱaccordingȱtoȱtheȱdefinitionȱ providedȱ byȱ theȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley.ȱ ȱ Forȱ allȱ intentsȱ andȱ purposes,ȱ theȱ twoȱ termsȱ meanȱtheȱsameȱthing.ȱ 34ȱId.ȱatȱ189–90.ȱ 35ȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱ thatȱrateȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱtoȱdetermineȱ theȱ presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee.36ȱ ȱ Itȱ isȱ onlyȱ afterȱ thisȱ initialȱ calculationȱ ofȱ theȱ presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ feeȱ isȱ performedȱ thatȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ may,ȱ inȱ extraordinaryȱ circumstances,ȱ adjustȱ theȱ presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱwhenȱitȱ“doesȱnotȱadequatelyȱtakeȱintoȱ accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ reasonableȱfee.”37ȱ 8 C. Perdueȱ 9 Afterȱ announcingȱ theȱ hybridȱ approachȱ forȱ calculatingȱ attorney’sȱfeesȱinȱHensley,ȱandȱclarifyingȱwhenȱitȱisȱpermissibleȱforȱaȱ districtȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱlodestarȱvalueȱinȱexceptionalȱ casesȱinȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱtheȱSupremeȱCourt’sȱrevisitedȱitsȱ feeȬshiftingȱjurisprudenceȱinȱ2010ȱinȱPerdueȱv.ȱKennyȱA.ȱexȱrel.ȱWinn.ȱȱ

36ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱGortatȱv.ȱCapalaȱBros.,ȱInc.,ȱ621ȱF.ȱApp’xȱ19,ȱ22ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2015)ȱ(summaryȱ order)ȱ (“Inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ ‘presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee,’ȱ whichȱ isȱ generallyȱ arrivedȱ atȱ byȱ multiplyingȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ onȱ theȱ litigationȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ byȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ thisȱ Courtȱ hasȱ recommendedȱ thatȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ takeȱ intoȱ accountȱ whatȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.”ȱ (internalȱ citationȱ andȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted));ȱ Torresȱ v.ȱ Gristede’sȱ Operatingȱ Corp.,ȱ 519ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 1,ȱ 3–4ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2013)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“[W]eȱ haveȱ directedȱ considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ identifiedȱ asȱ relevantȱ toȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees—includingȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factors—inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted));ȱBergersonȱv.ȱN.Y.ȱStateȱOfficeȱofȱMentalȱHealth,ȱCent.ȱN.Y.ȱPsychiatricȱCtr.,ȱ 652ȱF.3dȱ277,ȱ289ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011)ȱ(“Attorneys’ȱfeesȱareȱawardedȱbyȱdeterminingȱaȱ presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee,ȱreachedȱbyȱmultiplyingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱ theȱnumberȱofȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhours.”);ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ166ȱ(“Bothȱthisȱ Courtȱ andȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ haveȱ heldȱ thatȱ theȱ lodestar—theȱ productȱ ofȱ aȱ reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱandȱtheȱreasonableȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱrequiredȱbyȱtheȱcase— createsȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”);ȱKonitsȱv.ȱValleyȱStreamȱCent.ȱHighȱSch.ȱ Dist.,ȱ 350ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 501,ȱ 503ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2009)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“Inȱ determiningȱ reasonableȱattorneys’ȱfees,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmust:ȱ(1)ȱsetȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ bearingȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȱspecificȱvariables,ȱandȱ(2)ȱuseȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ rateȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”).ȱ 37ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ167ȱ(quotingȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554).ȱ 1 InȱPerdue,ȱ theȱCourtȱwasȱ“askedȱtoȱdecideȱwhetherȱeitherȱtheȱ qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ areȱ factorsȱthatȱmayȱproperlyȱprovideȱaȱbasisȱforȱanȱenhancement”ȱofȱtheȱ lodestarȱvalue.38ȱȱTheȱCourtȱfirstȱaffirmedȱitsȱlongȬstandingȱpositionȱ thatȱ “theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ yieldsȱ aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ presumptivelyȱ sufficient,”ȱ butȱ “thatȱ presumptionȱ mayȱ beȱ overcomeȱ inȱ thoseȱ rareȱ circumstancesȱ inȱ whichȱ theȱ lodestarȱ doesȱ notȱ adequatelyȱ takeȱ intoȱ accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ reasonableȱfee.”39ȱȱFactorsȱthatȱareȱalreadyȱsubsumedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱ calculationȱcannotȱbeȱusedȱtoȱenhanceȱorȱcutȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.40ȱȱ Theȱ Courtȱ reiteratedȱ thatȱ “theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ caseȱ generallyȱmayȱnotȱbeȱusedȱasȱaȱgroundȱforȱenhancementȱbecauseȱtheseȱ factorsȱ‘presumablyȱareȱfullyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱnumberȱofȱbillableȱhoursȱ recordedȱbyȱcounsel,’”ȱasȱwellȱasȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.41ȱȱThus,ȱ Perdueȱ confirmedȱ theȱ longȬstandingȱ approachȱ toȱ calculatingȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ endorsedȱ byȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley,ȱ Blum,ȱ DelawareȱValley,ȱasȱwellȱasȱourȱcircuitȱinȱArborȱHill.ȱ 18 D. Theȱ Districtȱ Court’sȱ Reasonableȱ Hourlyȱ Rateȱ 19 Determinationȱ 20 Inȱhisȱfeeȱapplication,ȱLillyȱrequestedȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱfirstȱatȱ$600ȱ andȱ laterȱ atȱ $625ȱ perȱ hourȱ forȱ Rothman’sȱ workȱ onȱ theȱ matter.ȱ ȱ Theȱ Cityȱarguedȱthatȱthisȱrateȱwasȱunreasonableȱbecauseȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱaȱ simple,ȱ“gardenȱvariety”ȱcivilȱrightsȱcase.42ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱagreedȱ withȱtheȱCityȱthatȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱ“relative[ly]ȱsimpl[e]”43ȱand,ȱrelyingȱ 38ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554.ȱ 39ȱId.ȱatȱ552,ȱ553–54.ȱ 40ȱId.ȱatȱ553ȱ(citingȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ566).ȱ 41ȱId.ȱ(quotingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898ȱ(bracketsȱomitted)).ȱȱ 42ȱLillyȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ(ER),ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*2ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱ Aug.ȱ15,ȱ2017).ȱ 43ȱId.ȱatȱ*3–5.ȱ onȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ thatȱ theȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ shouldȱ reflectȱ thisȱ lackȱ ofȱ complexity.44ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱlookedȱtoȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ ratesȱ forȱ civilȱ rightsȱ attorneysȱ workingȱ onȱ aȱ simple,ȱ gardenȱ varietyȱ civilȱrightsȱcaseȱinȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.45ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ courtȱ foundȱ thatȱ similar,ȱ straightforwardȱ civilȱ rightsȱ casesȱ inȱ theȱ Southernȱ Districtȱ involvingȱ attorneysȱ withȱ similarȱ experienceȱ andȱ qualificationsȱasȱRothmanȱresultedȱinȱhourlyȱratesȱbetweenȱ$350ȱandȱ $450.46ȱȱTherefore,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱawardedȱRothmanȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱ ofȱ$450,ȱatȱtheȱtopȱofȱtheȱrange.ȱ 10 Weȱ findȱ noȱ errorȱ inȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ reasoning.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ emphasizedȱinȱArborȱHill,ȱ“[t]heȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱtheȱrateȱaȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ payȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ bear[ing]ȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱnecessaryȱtoȱ litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.”47ȱ ȱ Itȱ wasȱ entirelyȱ appropriateȱ forȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ toȱ considerȱ theȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ matterȱ becauseȱ aȱ reasonableȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱconsiderȱtheȱcomplexityȱofȱhisȱorȱherȱ caseȱ whenȱ decidingȱ whetherȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ proposedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ isȱ fair,ȱ reasonable,ȱ andȱ commensurateȱ withȱ theȱ proposedȱ action.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱconsiderȱbothȱRothman’sȱexperienceȱandȱ theȱgardenȬvarietyȱnatureȱofȱtheȱlitigation,ȱwhichȱ“lastedȱlessȱthanȱ10ȱ months,ȱ requiredȱ noȱ depositions,ȱ andȱ involvedȱ noȱ substantialȱ motionsȱorȱbriefings”ȱorȱappearancesȱbeforeȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,48ȱwasȱ consistentȱwithȱourȱdirectionȱforȱdistrictȱcourts,ȱ“inȱexercisingȱ[their]ȱ considerableȱ discretion,ȱ toȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ allȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ variablesȱthatȱweȱandȱotherȱcourtsȱhaveȱidentifiedȱasȱrelevantȱtoȱtheȱ

44ȱId.ȱatȱ*4.ȱ 45ȱId.ȱatȱ*4–5.ȱ 46ȱId.ȱatȱ*5.ȱ 47ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱ 48ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*5.ȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”49ȱ 3 Lilly’sȱ argumentȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ simpleȱ natureȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ andȱ ourȱ opinionȱ inȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ permittingȱ suchȱ considerationȱ areȱ inȱ conflictȱ withȱ Perdueȱ isȱ misplaced.ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ addressedȱ whetherȱ aȱ districtȱ court,ȱ afterȱ calculatingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ workedȱtoȱproduceȱtheȱlodestar,ȱcouldȱgrantȱaȱfeeȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱ toȱ theȱ lodestarȱ amountȱ inȱ recognitionȱ ofȱ theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtained.50ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ didȱ notȱ involveȱ aȱ challengeȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱcomputationȱofȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ rateȱatȱall—itȱonlyȱconcernedȱtheȱproprietyȱofȱtheȱfeeȱenhancement.ȱȱItȱ wasȱinȱthisȱcontextȱthatȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱpriorȱstatementsȱfromȱ BlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱ generallyȱ mayȱ notȱ beȱ usedȱ asȱ aȱ groundȱ forȱ anȱ enhancementȱ orȱ reductionȱbecauseȱthoseȱfactorsȱareȱalreadyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱreasonableȱ hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).51ȱȱȱ 18 Perdue,ȱ therefore,ȱ didȱ notȱ overruleȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ orȱ otherwiseȱ prohibitȱdistrictȱcourtsȱfromȱconsideringȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱ aȱ caseȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ hoursȱ billed.ȱȱ PerdueȱisȱconsistentȱwithȱpriorȱSupremeȱCourtȱopinionsȱthatȱindicateȱ thatȱcaseȬspecificȱfactorsȱlikeȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱmatterȱ areȱ appropriatelyȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱorȱhoursȱbilled.ȱȱImportantly,ȱtheȱPerdueȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱ“theȱ 49ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱȱ 50ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ548ȱ(describingȱhowȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeterminedȱaȱreasonableȱ hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilled,ȱmultipliedȱthemȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱlodestarȱofȱ approximatelyȱ$6ȱmillion,ȱandȱ“thenȱenhancedȱthisȱawardȱbyȱ75%,ȱconcludingȱthatȱ theȱlodestarȱcalculationȱdidȱnotȱtakeȱintoȱaccount”ȱvariousȱfactorsȱwarrantingȱanȱ increase).ȱ 51ȱId.ȱatȱ553.ȱ lodestarȱmethodȱproducesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱ feeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱwouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱ beenȱ representingȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ whoȱ wasȱ billedȱ byȱ theȱ hourȱ inȱ aȱ comparableȱ case.”52ȱ ȱ Andȱ asȱ inȱ Delawareȱ Valleyȱ andȱ Blum,ȱ theȱ Perdueȱ Courtȱspecificallyȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱareȱ presumablyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.53ȱ 7 Finally,ȱ Lillyȱ pointsȱ toȱ aȱ quoteȱ fromȱ theȱ Perdueȱ opinion,ȱ inȱ whichȱtheȱCourtȱcriticizesȱtheȱoldȱJohnsonȱmethodȱcreatedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱ Circuitȱbecauseȱitȱ“gaveȱveryȱlittleȱactualȱguidanceȱtoȱdistrictȱcourts”ȱ andȱ “placedȱ unlimitedȱ discretionȱ inȱ trialȱ judgesȱ andȱ producedȱ disparateȱ results.”54ȱ ȱ This,ȱ Lillyȱ says,ȱ isȱ evidenceȱ thatȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factors,ȱincludingȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱcannotȱbeȱ usedȱ byȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ determineȱ aȱ reasonableȱ fee.ȱ ȱ Butȱ Lillyȱ confusesȱ theȱ Court’sȱ criticismȱ ofȱ theȱ “Johnsonȱ approach”55ȱ withȱ theȱ permissiveȱ useȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ toȱ determineȱ theȱ presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱorȱlodestar.56ȱȱHensleyȱandȱitsȱprogenyȱ makeȱ clearȱ thatȱ whileȱ aȱ strictȱ applicationȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ methodȱ ofȱ calculatingȱattorney’sȱfeesȱusedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱisȱtooȱimpreciseȱ andȱ variableȱ toȱ beȱ reliable,ȱ theȱ twelveȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ remainȱ importantȱtoolsȱforȱhelpingȱdistrictȱcourtsȱcalculateȱtheȱlodestarȱand,ȱ inȱexceptionalȱcases,ȱdeterminingȱwhetherȱanȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱtoȱ

52ȱId.ȱatȱ551ȱ(emphasisȱomitted)ȱ(emphasisȱadded).ȱ 53ȱId.ȱatȱ553;ȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ565;ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898.ȱ 54ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ550–51ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ 55ȱId.ȱatȱ551–52.ȱ 56ȱSeeȱJinȱv.ȱPacificȱBuffetȱHouse,ȱInc.,ȱNo.ȱ06ȬCVȬ579ȱ(VVP),ȱ2010ȱWLȱ2653334,ȱatȱ*2ȱ n.2ȱ (E.D.N.Y.ȱ Juneȱ 25,ȱ 2010)ȱ (Perdueȱ “cautionsȱ againstȱ usingȱ aȱ strictȱ Johnsonȱ approachȱ asȱ theȱ primaryȱ basisȱ forȱ determiningȱ reasonableȱ attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ butȱ nowhereȱcallsȱintoȱquestionȱtheȱideaȱofȱusingȱrelevantȱJohnsonȱfactorsȱinȱhelpingȱtoȱ comeȱtoȱaȱreasonableȱfee”).ȱ theȱlodestarȱisȱwarranted.57ȱȱȱ 2 Findingȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ correctlyȱ appliedȱ theȱ law,ȱ reachedȱaȱconclusionȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions,ȱandȱ didȱnotȱabuseȱitsȱdiscretionȱonȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱfinding,ȱweȱ haveȱnoȱbasisȱtoȱvacateȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱawardȱRothmanȱ anȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱaffirmȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱ court’sȱorder.ȱ 8 II. ReductionȱofȱtheȱFeeȱforȱClericalȱTasksȱ 9 Lillyȱ alsoȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ erredȱ byȱ prohibitingȱ Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱforȱclericalȱtasks,ȱ suchȱ asȱ sendingȱ faxes,ȱ printingȱ documents,ȱ etc.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ arguesȱ thatȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ shouldȱ notȱ “reduceȱ theȱ hourlyȱ billingȱ rateȱ ofȱ aȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ whoȱ doesȱ notȱ operateȱ withȱ theȱ assistanceȱ ofȱ associates,ȱparalegals,ȱorȱotherȱsupportȱstaffȱconcerningȱtimeȱheȱorȱsheȱ reasonablyȱspendsȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱinȱadvancingȱtheȱlitigation.”58ȱȱȱ 16 Weȱhaveȱnotȱaddressedȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱdiscountȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ orȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ anȱ attorneyȱspendsȱonȱtasksȱthatȱareȱclericalȱorȱadministrativeȱinȱnature.ȱȱ Butȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ providedȱ guidanceȱ onȱ thisȱ questionȱ inȱ Missouriȱv.ȱJenkinsȱbyȱAgyei.59ȱȱInȱthatȱcase,ȱtheȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱplaintiffsȱ couldȱrecoverȱattorney’sȱfeesȱunderȱtheȱFeesȱActȱforȱworkȱperformedȱ byȱparalegalsȱandȱlawȱclerksȱunderȱtheȱsupervisionȱofȱanȱattorneyȱatȱ

57ȱSeeȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9ȱ(“Theȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱmayȱconsiderȱ[the]ȱfactorsȱ identifiedȱinȱJohnsonȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ,ȱthoughȱitȱshouldȱnoteȱthatȱmanyȱofȱtheseȱfactorsȱusuallyȱ areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ calculationȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ atȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”);ȱ Delawareȱ Valley,ȱ 478ȱ U.S.ȱ atȱ 563–64ȱ (“[Inȱ Hensley,ȱ we]ȱ adoptedȱaȱhybridȱapproachȱthatȱsharedȱelementsȱofȱbothȱJohnsonȱandȱtheȱlodestarȱ methodȱofȱcalculation.”).ȱ 58ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ7.ȱ 59ȱ491ȱU.S.ȱ274ȱ(1989).ȱ theȱmarketȱrateȱforȱtheirȱservices,ȱratherȱthanȱatȱcostȱtoȱtheȱattorney.60ȱȱ However,ȱtheȱCourtȱcautionedȱthatȱ“purelyȱclericalȱorȱsecretarialȱtasksȱ shouldȱnotȱbeȱbilledȱatȱaȱparalegalȱrate”ȱbyȱeitherȱaȱparalegalȱorȱanȱ attorneyȱperformingȱsuchȱtasks.61ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplained:ȱ 5 Itȱisȱappropriateȱtoȱdistinguishȱbetweenȱlegalȱwork,ȱinȱtheȱ 6 strictȱsense,ȱandȱinvestigation,ȱclericalȱwork,ȱcompilationȱ 7 ofȱfactsȱandȱstatisticsȱandȱotherȱworkȱwhichȱcanȱoftenȱbeȱ 8 accomplishedȱ byȱ nonȬlawyersȱ butȱ whichȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 9 paralegal]ȱmayȱdoȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱnoȱotherȱhelpȱavailable.ȱȱ 10 Suchȱ nonȬlegalȱ workȱ mayȱ commandȱ aȱ lesserȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Itsȱ 11 dollarȱ valueȱ isȱ notȱ enhancedȱ justȱ becauseȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 12 paralegal]ȱdoesȱit.62ȱ 13 Weȱ thereforeȱ concludeȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ commitȱ legalȱerrorȱinȱreducingȱLilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱ performedȱ byȱ Rothman.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ haveȱ stated,ȱ theȱ keyȱ inquiryȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ hoursȱbilledȱisȱwhetherȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱtoȱpayȱtheȱ fee.63ȱȱTheȱanswerȱtoȱthisȱquestion,ȱofȱcourse,ȱwillȱvaryȱdependingȱonȱ theȱ circumstancesȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ attorney,ȱ andȱ theȱ customsȱ inȱ theȱ relevantȱlegalȱmarket.ȱȱTherefore,ȱwhileȱdistrictȱcourtsȱhaveȱtheȱlegalȱ authorityȱandȱdiscretionȱtoȱeitherȱreduceȱanȱattorney’sȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱ timeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱorȱapplyȱanȱacrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱ theȱhoursȱbilledȱorȱtotalȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱtimeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱ tasksȱ(orȱblockȬbilledȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱaȱmixȱofȱclericalȱandȱlegalȱ work),ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱnotȱrequiredȱtoȱmakeȱsuchȱreductions.ȱȱAsȱ 60ȱId.ȱ286–87.ȱ 61ȱId.ȱatȱ288ȱn.10.ȱ 62ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ 63ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190;ȱseeȱalsoȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ551ȱ(“[T]heȱlodestarȱmethodȱ producesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱfeeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱ wouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱbeenȱrepresentingȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwhoȱwasȱ billedȱbyȱtheȱhourȱinȱaȱcomparableȱcase.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.”ȱ(emphasisȱinȱoriginal)).ȱ withȱ allȱ aspectsȱ ofȱ ourȱ feeȬshiftingȱ jurisprudence,ȱ weȱ affordȱ districtȱ courtsȱbroadȱdiscretionȱinȱawardingȱattorneys’ȱfeesȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ muchȱ closerȱ toȱ theȱ detailsȱ ofȱ eachȱ individualȱ caseȱ andȱ canȱ betterȱ determineȱwhatȱisȱreasonableȱandȱappropriateȱinȱtheȱfeeȱcalculusȱforȱ theȱparticularȱcase.64ȱ 6 Here,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱreviewedȱtheȱtimeȱsheetsȱsubmittedȱbyȱ Rothmanȱandȱfoundȱaȱvarietyȱofȱobviouslyȱclericalȱtasks,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ entriesȱthatȱ“blendȱclericalȱtasksȱwithȱlegalȱtasks.”65ȱȱAȱreviewȱofȱtheȱ timeȱsheetsȱconfirmsȱthatȱmanyȱentriesȱdescribeȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱareȱ notȱappropriatelyȱbilledȱatȱRothman’sȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450,ȱ suchȱasȱsendingȱandȱreceivingȱfaxes,ȱrequestingȱandȱreceivingȱmedicalȱ records,ȱ servingȱ papers,ȱ andȱ handȬdeliveringȱ courtesyȱ copiesȱ ofȱ filingsȱtoȱtheȱcourthouse.66ȱȱTheȱfactȱthatȱRothmanȱisȱaȱsoloȱpractitionerȱ doesȱnotȱentitleȱhimȱtoȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱasȱanȱattorneyȱforȱpurelyȱ clericalȱwork.ȱȱIndeed,ȱitȱisȱhighlyȱunlikelyȱthatȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱ agreeȱtoȱ payȱanyȱ personȱ $450ȱforȱ anȱ hourȱ ofȱ sendingȱ andȱ receivingȱ faxes,ȱ callingȱ medicalȱ offices,ȱ andȱ deliveringȱ papers.ȱ ȱ Weȱ findȱ theȱ districtȱcourt’sȱimpositionȱofȱaȱtenȱpercentȱreductionȱtoȱtheȱfeeȱawardȱ onȱaccountȱofȱclericalȱworkȱappropriate,ȱandȱcertainlyȱnotȱanȱabuseȱofȱ discretion,ȱbecauseȱtheȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱ50.3ȱhoursȱofȱworkȱshowȱ atȱ leastȱ 5ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ purelyȱ clericalȱ work.67ȱ ȱ Inȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ hoursȱ byȱ tenȱ percentȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasks,ȱ weȱ areȱ confidentȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ achievedȱ “roughȱ justice,”ȱ ifȱ notȱ “auditingȱ perfection,”ȱ inȱ itsȱ calculationȱ ofȱ theȱ appropriateȱ feeȱ award.68ȱ ȱ Weȱ

64ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ 65ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*6.ȱ 66ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ78,ȱ89–92,ȱ247.ȱ 67ȱSeeȱMcDonald,ȱ450ȱF.3dȱatȱ96ȱ(“Aȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱexerciseȱitsȱdiscretionȱandȱ useȱ aȱ percentageȱ deductionȱ asȱ aȱ practicalȱ meansȱ ofȱ trimmingȱ fatȱ fromȱ aȱ feeȱ application.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱ 68ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ thereforeȱupholdȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱorder.ȱ 2 III. AwardȱofȱFeesȱonȱFeesȱ 3 Finally,ȱtheȱCityȱchallengesȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱgrantȱ attorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtimeȱRothmanȱspentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ andȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱCityȱassertsȱthatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ haveȱ theȱ authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ thoseȱ feesȱ becauseȱtheyȱwereȱincurredȱafterȱtheȱCityȱmade,ȱandȱLillyȱaccepted,ȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgment,ȱ whichȱ explicitlyȱ contemplatedȱ theȱ paymentȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonlyȱ“upȱuntilȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer.”69ȱȱȱ 10 Ordinarily,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ authorityȱ andȱ discretionȱ toȱ awardȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱhoursȱexpendedȱonȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱmadeȱ underȱ theȱ Feesȱ Act,ȱ soȬcalledȱ feesȱ onȱ fees.70ȱ ȱ Theȱ questionȱ hereȱ isȱ whetherȱtheȱparties’ȱagreementȱtoȱsettleȱtheȱcaseȱandȱcutȱoffȱattorney’sȱ feesȱ asȱ ofȱ theȱ timeȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ circumscribesȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ feesȱ accruedȱ afterȱ theȱ offerȱ date.ȱ ȱ Weȱ believeȱ itȱ does.ȱ 17 FederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ68ȱpermitsȱaȱpartyȱdefendingȱaȱ claimȱtoȱserveȱanȱopposingȱpartyȱwithȱ“anȱofferȱtoȱallowȱjudgmentȱonȱ specifiedȱterms.”71ȱȱIfȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱacceptsȱtheȱoffer,ȱthenȱeitherȱ partyȱmayȱfileȱtheȱofferȱandȱnoticeȱofȱacceptanceȱwithȱtheȱcourt,ȱandȱ theȱ “clerkȱ mustȱ thenȱ enterȱ [the]ȱ judgment”ȱ specifiedȱ inȱ theȱ agreement.72ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ opposingȱ partyȱ rejectsȱ theȱ offerȱ andȱ thatȱ partyȱ eventuallyȱ obtainsȱ aȱ judgmentȱ thatȱ isȱ notȱ asȱ favorableȱ asȱ theȱ

69ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ 70ȱSeeȱGagneȱv.ȱMaher,ȱ594ȱF.2dȱ336,ȱ343–44ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ1979),ȱaff’d,ȱ448ȱU.S.ȱ122ȱ(1980);ȱ seeȱalsoȱHinesȱv.ȱCityȱofȱAlbany,ȱ862ȱF.3dȱ215,ȱ223ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2017)ȱ(“Prevailingȱpartiesȱ underȱSectionȱ1988ȱareȱthereforeȱentitledȱtoȱrecoverȱaȱreasonableȱfeeȱforȱpreparingȱ andȱdefendingȱaȱfeeȱapplication.”).ȱ 71ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(a).ȱ 72ȱId.ȱ unacceptedȱoffer,ȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱmustȱpayȱtheȱcostsȱincurredȱbyȱ theȱdefendantȱafterȱtheȱofferȱwasȱmade,73ȱwhichȱincludesȱattorney’sȱ fees.74ȱ ȱ Theȱ purposeȱ ofȱ thisȱ mechanismȱ isȱ toȱ “encourageȱ settlementȱ andȱ avoidȱ litigation”ȱ byȱ “prompt[ing]ȱ bothȱ partiesȱ toȱ aȱ suitȱ toȱ evaluateȱtheȱrisksȱandȱcostsȱofȱlitigation,ȱandȱtoȱbalanceȱthemȱagainstȱ theȱlikelihoodȱofȱsuccessȱuponȱtrialȱonȱtheȱmerits.”75ȱ 7 Likeȱaȱtypicalȱsettlementȱagreement,ȱanȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ isȱ aȱ contract,ȱ andȱ itȱ mustȱ beȱ interpretedȱ accordingȱ toȱ ordinaryȱcontractȱprinciples.76ȱȱCritically,ȱ“[i]fȱtheȱtermsȱofȱaȱcontractȱ areȱclear,ȱcourtsȱmustȱtakeȱcareȱnotȱtoȱalterȱorȱgoȱbeyondȱtheȱexpressȱ termsȱofȱtheȱagreement,ȱorȱtoȱimposeȱobligationsȱonȱtheȱpartiesȱthatȱ areȱ notȱ mandatedȱ byȱ theȱ unambiguousȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ agreementȱ itself.”77ȱȱ 14 Theȱ acceptedȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ atȱ issueȱ hereȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ contract)ȱ unambiguouslyȱstatesȱthatȱtheȱrecoverableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ andȱcostsȱareȱlimitedȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱbyȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱwhichȱ wasȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016.78ȱȱTheȱfeesȱRothmanȱchargedȱforȱworkȱonȱtheȱ feeȱ applicationȱ andȱ replyȱ briefȱ inȱ supportȱ ofȱ thatȱ applicationȱ wereȱ incurredȱbetweenȱNovemberȱ30,ȱ2016,ȱandȱJanuaryȱ20,ȱ2017,ȱafterȱtheȱ cutȬoffȱ dateȱ forȱ feesȱ inȱ theȱ agreement.79ȱ ȱ Therefore,ȱ theyȱ cannotȱ beȱ recoveredȱbyȱLilly,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱhadȱnoȱauthorityȱtoȱawardȱ them.ȱ 23 Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ determinedȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ

73ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(d).ȱ 74ȱMarekȱv.ȱChesny,ȱ473ȱU.S.ȱ1,ȱ9ȱ(1985).ȱ 75ȱId.ȱatȱ5.ȱ 76ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ 77ȱId.ȱatȱ32ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ 78ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45–47.ȱ 79ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ247.ȱ partiesȱactedȱinȱgoodȱfaithȱinȱnegotiatingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱpaidȱ toȱ Lilly,ȱ butȱ wereȱ simplyȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ aȱ reasonableȱ amount,ȱ equityȱcounseledȱinȱfavorȱofȱgrantingȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱ spentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbrief.80ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ courtȱisȱnotȱaloneȱinȱgrantingȱtheseȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱ despiteȱ theȱ clearȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ parties’ȱ agreementsȱ barringȱ suchȱ awards.81ȱ ȱ Asȱ nobleȱ asȱ thisȱ practiceȱ mayȱ be,ȱ itȱ violatesȱ theȱ firstȱ principleȱ ofȱ contractȱ interpretation:ȱ “whereȱ theȱ languageȱ ofȱ theȱ contractȱisȱclearȱandȱunambiguous,ȱtheȱcontractȱisȱtoȱbeȱgivenȱeffectȱ accordingȱ toȱ itsȱ terms.”82ȱ ȱ Byȱ awardingȱ Lillyȱ feesȱ beyondȱ whatȱ theȱ partiesȱ agreedȱ to,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ effectivelyȱ rewroteȱ theȱ contract.ȱȱ Thisȱitȱcannotȱdo.ȱ 13 Lillyȱmakesȱthreeȱargumentsȱforȱwhyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdidȱnotȱ err,ȱ noneȱ ofȱ whichȱ isȱ persuasive.ȱ ȱ First,ȱ heȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgment’sȱinclusionȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfeesȱupȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱ theȱofferȱ“necessarilyȱincludesȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱthatȱanȱattorneyȱmustȱ spendȱtoȱmoveȱtoȱobtainȱthoseȱunderlyingȱfeesȱifȱDefendantsȱwillȱnotȱ enterȱintoȱaȱreasonableȱsettlementȱconcerningȱtheȱunderlyingȱfees.”83ȱȱ Thisȱinterpretationȱofȱtheȱcontractȱisȱnotȱsupportedȱbyȱitsȱclearȱterms,ȱ 80ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8.ȱ 81ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱRosadoȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ11ȱCiv.ȱ4285ȱ(SAS),ȱ2012ȱWLȱ955510,ȱatȱ*6ȱ (S.D.N.Y.ȱMar.ȱ15,ȱ2012)ȱ(“Plaintiffȱalsoȱseeksȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱcounselȱinȱpreparingȱ theȱ instantȱ feeȱ application.ȱ ȱ However,ȱ bothȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ Offerȱ ofȱ Judgmentȱ andȱ plaintiff’sȱ Noticeȱ ofȱ Acceptanceȱ specificallyȱ limitedȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expensesȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱNonetheless,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity,ȱ plaintiffȱ shouldȱ beȱ awardedȱ someȱ amountȱ forȱ theȱ timeȱ hisȱ counselȱ spentȱ inȱ preparingȱtheȱinstantȱfeeȱapplication.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱȱButȱseeȱ Schoolcraftȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ10ȱCiv.ȱ6005ȱ(RWS),ȱ2016ȱWLȱ4626568,ȱatȱ*13ȱ (S.D.N.Y.ȱSept.ȱ6,ȱ2016)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱJudgmentȱprovidesȱ‘plaintiffȱshallȱbeȱentitledȱ toȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.’ȱȱOnȱtheȱ termsȱofȱtheȱagreementȱalone,ȱfeesȬonȬfeesȱareȱdenied.”ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted)).ȱ 82ȱ Steiner,ȱ 816ȱ F.3dȱ atȱ 31ȱ (modificationsȱ omitted)ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted).ȱ 83ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ28.ȱ norȱisȱitȱaȱnecessaryȱassumption.ȱȱThereȱisȱnothingȱinȱtheȱagreement’sȱ termsȱ toȱ indicateȱ that,ȱ inȱ theȱ eventȱ aȱ feeȱ applicationȱ toȱ theȱ courtȱ isȱ neededȱ toȱ determineȱ whatȱ constitutesȱ “reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,”ȱ theȱpartiesȱintendedȱforȱanyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱLillyȱinȱthatȱ processȱ toȱ beȱ includedȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ theȱ Cityȱ agreedȱ toȱ payȱ asȱ reasonableȱattorney’sȱfees.ȱȱToȱtheȱcontrary,ȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱ contractȱstateȱthatȱtheȱCityȱwillȱonlyȱbeȱliableȱforȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱ feesȱincurredȱonȱorȱbeforeȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱandȱnotȱsubsequentȱ thereto.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱacknowledgedȱthatȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱ containsȱ“languageȱexpresslyȱlimitingȱrecoverableȱfeesȱandȱexpensesȱ toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ Offer”ȱ beforeȱ itȱ thenȱ grantedȱ feesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity.84ȱ 13 Second,ȱLillyȱinvokesȱtheȱdoctrineȱofȱcontraȱproferentemȱtoȱassertȱ thatȱ theȱ ambiguousȱ languageȱ inȱ theȱ agreementȱ “mustȱ beȱ construedȱ againstȱDefendantsȱsinceȱtheyȱdraftedȱitȱunilaterallyȱinȱtheȱcontextȱofȱ makingȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱoffer.”85ȱȱLilly’sȱstatementȱofȱtheȱruleȱisȱcorrect:ȱthatȱ ambiguitiesȱinȱtheȱlanguageȱofȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱareȱtoȱbeȱ “construedȱagainstȱtheȱpartyȱmakingȱtheȱoffer.”86ȱȱBut,ȱasȱdiscussed,ȱ theȱofferȱisȱnotȱambiguous.ȱȱLillyȱcannotȱreadȱambiguityȱintoȱtheȱclearȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ contractȱ inȱ orderȱ toȱ invokeȱ theȱ doctrineȱ ofȱ contraȱ proferentem.ȱ 22 Finally,ȱLillyȱurgesȱthatȱevenȱifȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgment’sȱtermsȱdoȱ inȱ factȱ precludeȱ feesȱ onȱ fees,ȱ thenȱ theyȱ shouldȱ beȱ heldȱ “voidȱ asȱ aȱ matterȱofȱpublicȱpolicy.”87ȱȱWeȱareȱsympatheticȱtoȱtheȱfactȱthatȱbecauseȱ theȱ partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ Rothmanȱwasȱforcedȱtoȱprepare,ȱfile,ȱandȱargueȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱ

84ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*7.ȱ 85ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ31–32.ȱ 86ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ 87ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ36.ȱ seekȱhisȱfee,ȱandȱthatȱdueȱtoȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱparties’ȱagreement,ȱheȱisȱ notȱ ableȱ toȱ beȱ compensatedȱ forȱ thatȱ extraȱ work.ȱ ȱ Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ argumentȱthatȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱorȱsettlementȱagreementȱthatȱcutsȱ offȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱisȱvoidȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱpublicȱpolicyȱisȱcontradictedȱbyȱ controllingȱSupremeȱCourtȱprecedent.ȱȱȱ 6 Inȱ Evansȱ v.ȱ Jeffȱ D.,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ heldȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ Feesȱ Actȱ bestowedȱtheȱrightȱtoȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱcivilȱrightsȱactionsȱ toȱtheȱprevailingȱparty,ȱandȱnotȱtheȱattorney,ȱpartiesȱwereȱfreeȱtoȱwaiveȱ theirȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱsettlementȱagreementȱonȱtheȱ merits.88ȱ ȱ Specificallyȱ theȱ Courtȱ statedȱ thatȱ Congressȱ neitherȱ “bestowedȱ feeȱ awardsȱ uponȱ attorneysȱ norȱ renderedȱ themȱ nonwaivableȱorȱnonnegotiable;ȱinstead,ȱitȱaddedȱthemȱtoȱtheȱarsenalȱ ofȱremediesȱavailableȱtoȱcombatȱviolationsȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱaȱgoalȱnotȱ invariablyȱinconsistentȱwithȱconditioningȱsettlementȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱonȱ aȱ waiverȱ ofȱ statutoryȱ attorney’sȱ fees.”89ȱ ȱ Theȱ Courtȱ reasonedȱ thatȱ itȱ wouldȱ beȱ poorȱ policyȱ toȱ prohibitȱ litigantsȱ fromȱ waivingȱ theirȱ statutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱcompromiseȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱ becauseȱitȱwouldȱ“impedeȱvindicationȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱatȱleastȱinȱsomeȱ cases,ȱbyȱreducingȱtheȱattractivenessȱofȱsettlement.”90ȱȱIndeed,ȱbecauseȱ theȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱoftenȱsimilarȱtoȱorȱgreaterȱthanȱtheȱamountȱ ofȱ damagesȱ receivedȱ onȱ theȱ merits,91ȱ itȱ isȱ “notȱ implausibleȱ toȱ anticipateȱthatȱpartiesȱtoȱaȱsignificantȱnumberȱofȱcivilȱrightsȱcasesȱwillȱ refuseȱ toȱ settleȱ ifȱ liabilityȱ forȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ remainsȱ open,ȱ therebyȱ forcingȱ moreȱ casesȱ toȱ trial,ȱ unnecessarilyȱ burdeningȱ theȱ judicialȱ 88ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱ717,ȱ730–32ȱ(1986);ȱseeȱalsoȱVenegasȱv.ȱMitchell,ȱ495ȱU.S.ȱ82,ȱ87–88ȱ(1990)ȱ (holdingȱ thatȱ itȱ isȱ theȱ party’sȱ rightȱ toȱ waive,ȱ settle,ȱ orȱ negotiateȱ theȱ party’sȱ entitlementȱtoȱreceiveȱattorney’sȱfees).ȱȱ 89ȱEvans,ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱatȱ731–32.ȱ 90ȱId.ȱatȱ732.ȱ 91ȱId.ȱatȱ734–35ȱ&ȱn.24ȱ(collectingȱexamplesȱofȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱgreaterȱthanȱ theȱmeritsȱaward).ȱȱInȱfact,ȱthisȱcaseȱisȱoneȱsuchȱexample.ȱ system,ȱ andȱ disservingȱ civilȱ rightsȱ litigants.”92ȱ ȱ Theseȱ pronouncementsȱfromȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱillustrateȱthat,ȱcontraryȱtoȱ Lilly’sȱarguments,ȱitȱisȱnotȱagainstȱpublicȱpolicyȱforȱlitigantsȱtoȱwaiveȱ theirȱstatutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfees—letȱaloneȱfeesȱonȱfees.ȱ 5 Thus,ȱweȱconcludeȱthatȱwhenȱaȱsettlementȱcutsȱoffȱaȱplaintiff’sȱ entitlementȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonȱaȱspecificȱdate,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱ notȱawardȱaȱpartyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱworkȱincurredȱafterȱthatȱcutȬoffȱ date.ȱ ȱ Thisȱ includesȱ feesȱ forȱ workȱ performedȱ preparingȱ aȱ feeȱ applicationȱsubmittedȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱtheȱeventȱtheȱpartiesȱareȱ unableȱtoȱagreeȱonȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱawardedȱdespiteȱaȱgoodȱ faithȱeffortȱtoȱnegotiate.93ȱȱIfȱaȱplaintiffȱdesiresȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱinȱtheȱeventȱ aȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱrequired,ȱtheȱplaintiffȱshouldȱ ensureȱthatȱ theȱ settlementȱtermsȱdoȱ notȱ forecloseȱ theȱ availabilityȱ ofȱ suchȱfees.ȱȱAccordingly,ȱtheȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱandȱ orderȱ grantingȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ allȱ workȱ performedȱ afterȱ Octoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱcannotȱstand.ȱ 17 CONCLUSIONȱ 18 Weȱhaveȱconsideredȱtheȱparties’ȱotherȱargumentsȱandȱfindȱthemȱ toȱbeȱwithoutȱmerit.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱAFFIRM,ȱinȱpart,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱ orderȱsettingȱ Rothman’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱatȱ$450ȱ perȱ hourȱ andȱ reducingȱ Lilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱbyȱtenȱpercentȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱbilledȱbyȱ

92ȱId.ȱatȱ736–37.ȱ 93ȱBecauseȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱfoundȱthatȱtheȱpartiesȱinȱthisȱcaseȱnegotiatedȱinȱgoodȱ faith,ȱseeȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8,ȱweȱdeclineȱtoȱconsiderȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱ courtȱmay,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱorȱotherwise,ȱawardȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱwhenȱaȱpartyȱ negotiatesȱinȱbadȱfaith,ȱdespiteȱtheȱpresenceȱofȱaȱcutȬoffȱclauseȱinȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ orȱsettlementȱagreement.ȱȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱLongȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ09ȱCiv.ȱ6099ȱ(AKH),ȱ 2010ȱU.S.ȱDist.ȱLEXISȱ81020,ȱatȱ*5–6ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱAug.ȱ6,ȱ2010)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱjudgmentȱ limitedȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ andȱ expensesȱ toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ offer.ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ City’sȱ disputeȱ overȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ wereȱ inȱ badȱ faith,ȱ th[e]nȱ compensationȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ necessaryȱ forȱ plaintiff[’]sȱ feeȱ applicationȱ mayȱ beȱ justified.”).ȱ Rothman,ȱ andȱ REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ inȱ part,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱandȱorderȱawardingȱLillyȱ$7,290.00ȱforȱRothman’sȱworkȱonȱ theȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱ