18-776 Run v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 466 061

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 19th day of September, two thousand nineteen.

PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

ZHUO DA RUN, AKA, RUN DA ZHUO Petitioner,

v. 18-776 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, Karikari & Associates, P.C., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; Erik R. Quick, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Zhuo Da Run (“Zhuo”), a native and citizen of

the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February

27, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming a May 18, 2017,

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zhuo’s

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhuo Da

Run, No. A 206 466 061 (B.I.A. Feb. 27, 2018), aff’g No. A 206

466 061 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 18, 2017). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history in this case.

We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See

Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005).

We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial

evidence. See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.

Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the

totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or

2 witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or

witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such

statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements . . . .”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin

v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

Gao,

. The multiple inconsistencies in Zhuo’s

statements and between his and his witness’s testimony

provide substantial evidence for the agency’s decision.

As an initial matter, it was reasonable for the agency

to rely on the record of Zhuo’s credible fear interview. The

interview record bears sufficient indicia of reliability

because it “was memorialized in a typewritten document

setting forth the questions put to [Zhuo] as well as [his]

responses;” questioning was delayed so that Zhuo had an

opportunity to consult counsel; questioning was conducted

through a Mandarin interpreter; and the asylum officer asked

3 questions to elicit details of Zhuo’s claim. See Ming Zhang

v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009)

Zhuo alleged that he was persecuted in China for his

practice of Christianity and feared persecution because he

continued to practice Christianity. Inconsistencies between

his interview and later statements provide substantial

evidence for the adverse credibility determination on both

points. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xian Tuan Ye v.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006).

Zhuo’s application, interview, and testimony were

inconsistent as to (1) whether Chinese police officers

routinely threatened Zhuo after they released him from

detention or beat Zhuo four additional times when he reported

to them after his release, (2) whether Zhuo was baptized, and

(3) why Zhuo did not attend church from 2014 to 2016 and where

he was living during that period. These inconsistencies

alone, which call into question both his past harm and his

practice of Christianity in the United States, are adequate

support for the adverse credibility determination. See Xian

Tuan Ye,

. Zhuo did not provide a compelling

explanation for any of these discrepancies and did not specify

or document his allegation that the translation or

4 interpretation was erroneous. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than

offer a plausible explanation for . . . inconsistent

statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Moreover, the agency did not err in relying on Zhuo’s

lack of knowledge of Christmas, given his testimony that he

came from a Christian family, was actively practicing

Christianity, and had attended a Christmas dinner where the

participants studied the Bible. See Rizal v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that when “an individual

applicant’s account would render his lack of a certain degree

of doctrinal knowledge suspect” that lack of knowledge “could

. . . provide substantial evidence in support of an adverse

credibility finding”). It was reasonable for the agency to

take into account Zhuo’s failure to rehabilitate his

questionable testimony with reliable corroboration. See Biao

Yang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An

applicant’s failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

5 that has already been called into question.”). Zhuo’s

witness contradicted Zhuo’s representations and lacked

knowledge of his practice of Christianity. The IJ did not

err in declining to give weight to a letter from Zhuo’s pastor

who was not available for cross-examination. Zhuo did not

call witnesses from his U.S. church or provide any

corroboration from his family in China who were also

practicing Christians. Id.; see also Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e

generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to

be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence” and

deferring to decision to afford little weight to letter from

applicant’s spouse in China).

The inconsistencies among Zhuo’s application, interview,

and hearing testimony as well as his lack of reliable

corroborating evidence provide substantial evidence for the

agency’s adverse credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of

the application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

relief because all three claims were based on the same factual

predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,

(2d

Cir. 2006).

6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion

for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

7