17-3466 Vasquez-Ramos v. Barr

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of November, two thousand nineteen.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

MARTHA LUZ VASQUEZ-RAMOS, JOHAN HASSEL DIAZ-VASQUEZ, JUSTIN GEOVANY DIAZ-VASQUEZ, Petitioners,

v. 17-3466 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONERS: Hamdan Qudah, Esq., Paterson, NJ.

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Justin Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel; Andrew Oliveira, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioners Martha Luz Vasquez-Ramos, Johan Hassel Diaz-

Vasquez, Justin Geovany Diaz-Vasquez, natives and citizens of

Honduras, seek review of a September 25, 2017 decision of the

BIA affirming a March 20, 2017 decision of an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re

Martha Luz Vasquez-Ramos, Johan Hassel Diaz-Vasquez, Justin

Geovany Diaz-Vasquez, No. A 206 885 839/840/841 (B.I.A. Sept.

25, 2017), aff’g No. A 206 885 839/840/841 (Immig. Ct.

Hartford Mar. 20, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

the BIA. Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

2005). The applicable standards of review are well

established. See

(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2014). Vasquez-Ramos claimed

2 asylum and withholding of removal based on her membership in

a particular social group, which she defined as Honduran

single mothers who are business owners in Campo Sol with

municipally issued business permits. The agency did not err

in finding that this proposed social group was not socially

distinct, and that Vasquez-Ramos did not show that the harm

she suffered was on account of her membership in the proposed

group.

To demonstrate her eligibility for asylum and withholding

of removal, Vasquez-Ramos had to “establish that race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion was or w[ould] be at least one

central reason for” her persecution.

(b)(1)(B)(i); see also

§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter of

C-T-L-,

(B.I.A. 2010). For her

group to constitute a particular social group, it had to be:

“(1) composed of members who share a common immutable

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and

(3) socially distinct within the society in question.”

Matter of M-E-V-G-,

(B.I.A. 2014);

see also Paloka,

. The agency did not err in 3 finding that Vasquez-Ramos’s proposed social group of

Honduran single mothers who are business owners in Campo Sol

with municipally issued business permits was not cognizable.

Vasquez-Ramos failed to demonstrate that her proposed

group was socially distinct in Honduran society. The country

conditions evidence demonstrates that gang extortion is

common in Honduras and affects a large cross-section of the

population beyond women and business owners. “When the harm

visited upon members of a group is attributable to the

incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to

persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering

those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning

of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” Ucelo-Gomez v.

Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2007); see

(upholding

BIA determination that that the group of “affluent

Guatemalans” failed the social distinction requirement

because it would not be recognized as a group at a greater

risk of crime, extortion, or robbery).

Additionally, Vasquez-Ramos’s testimony reflected that

business owners bore the brunt of gang activity in her

hometown but that all residents suffered from gang violence. 4 She testified further that the gang extorted other business

owners, including those outside her proposed group. A fear

of “general crime conditions” is not a cognizable ground for

asylum. Melgar de Torres v. Reno,

(2d Cir.

1999). Vasquez-Ramos did not assert that the gang members

mentioned her status as a woman, single mother, business

owner, or municipal permitholder when they threatened her.

She provided no evidence that she was targeted because of

those characteristics. See Matter of M-E-V-G-,

(“[A] ‘particular social group’ cannot be defined

exclusively by the claimed persecution, . . . it must be

‘recognizable’ as a discrete group by others in the society,

and . . . it must have well-defined boundaries.”).

Vasquez-Ramos’s failure to establish either a cognizable

social group or that the characteristics of the proposed group

were a central reason for her past harm or fear of future

harm is dispositive of her claims for asylum and withholding

of removal. See

(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).

Because she has not challenged the denial of CAT relief either

before the BIA or in her briefing here, any challenge to that

determination is both unexhausted and waived. See Karaj v. 5 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006); Yueqing Zhang v.

Gonzales,

, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule

34.1(b).

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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