Dekaj v. Barr

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Dekaj v. Barr

Opinion

17-3920 Dekaj v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 429 345 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 19th day of December, two thousand nineteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 8 Chief Judge, 9 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 10 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 FATMIR DEKAJ, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 17-3920 18 NAC 19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Charles Christophe, New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Jeffery R. 28 Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel; 29 Lance L. Jolley, Trial Attorney, 30 Office of Immigration Litigation, 31 United States Department of 32 Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Fatmir Dekaj, a native and citizen of Albania,

6 seeks review of a November 9, 2017, decision of the BIA

7 affirming a February 15, 2017, decision of an Immigration

8 Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

9 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

10 (“CAT”). In re Fatmir Dekaj, No. A206 429 345 (B.I.A. Nov.

11 9, 2017), aff’g No. A206 429 345 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb.

12 15, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

15 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the

16 IJ’s inconsistency findings that the BIA did not affirm. See

17 Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

426 F.3d 520, 522

(2d

18 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well

19 established. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.

20 Sessions,

891 F.3d 67, 76

(2d Cir. 2018).

21 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

22 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

2 1 determination on . . . the consistency between the

2 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

3 the internal consistency of each such statement, the

4 consistency of such statements with other evidence of

5 record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

6 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

7 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

534 F.3d 162

,

9 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the

10 agency’s determination that Dekaj was not credible as to his

11 claims that Socialist Party members attacked him in 2012 and

12 police detained and beat him in 2013 on account of his

13 membership in the Democratic Party.

14 The agency reasonably relied on Dekaj’s inconsistent and

15 changing testimony regarding whether his alleged 2012 attack

16 was reported to police and by whom. See 8 U.S.C.

17 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Dekaj testified inconsistently that

18 he reported the attack to police, his cousin Mark reported

19 it, that Mark’s son found a “guy” to report it, and that

20 either Mark or another cousin Augustine reported it.

21 The agency further reasonably relied on inconsistencies

22 between Dekaj’s testimony that he was attacked in April 2012

3 1 right before the local elections, in which he was “actively

2 involved,” and his father’s and fellow victim’s written

3 statements that the incident occurred shortly before the

4 local elections in May of 2011. See 8 U.S.C.

5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Dekaj insisted that his father and

6 fellow victim had provided the wrong year. The IJ was not

7 compelled to credit Dekaj’s explanation that both his friend

8 and father made identical errors in their written statements.

9 See Majidi v. Gonzales,

430 F.3d 77, 80

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A

10 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

11 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

12 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

13 to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

14 omitted)); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489

15 F.3d 517, 524

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has . . . firmly

16 embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities

17 between affidavits are an indication that the statements are

18 canned.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

19 The agency also reasonably relied on Dekaj’s inconsistent

20 evidence regarding the statements his alleged attackers made

21 during the incident. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(iii).

22 Although “trivial differences in the wording of statements

4 1 describing the same event are not sufficient to create

2 inconsistencies,” Gurung v. Barr,

929 F.3d 56, 61

(2d Cir.

3 2019), the only similarity between Dekaj’s and his fellow

4 victim’s descriptions is that their attackers mentioned the

5 name of a local parliamentary member. Otherwise, Dekaj and

6 the other victim stated that the attackers mentioned the

7 parliamentary member in different contexts and called them

8 different insulting names. The other victim also claimed

9 that the attackers threatened to kill them during the attack

10 and mentioned other Democratic Party members by name, while

11 Dekaj did not make such assertions.

12 Having questioned Dekaj’s credibility, the agency

13 reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his

14 testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An

15 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

16 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

17 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

18 that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.

19 Gonzales,

496 F.3d 268, 273

(2d Cir. 2007). As the agency

20 found, several letters Dekaj submitted were inconsistent with

21 his testimony. Alternatively, the IJ did not err in

22 declining to credit the unsworn letters from Dekaj’s father,

5 1 friend, and cousin because the authors were not made available

2 for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder,

741 F.3d 324

, 334

3 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford

4 little weight to relative’s letter from China because it was

5 unsworn and from an interested witness). As with Dekaj’s

6 testimony, a hospital report and letter from the District

7 Deputy of the Democratic Party were inconsistent with Dekaj’s

8 father’s and fellow victim’s letters regarding the year of

9 the attack. And, aside from his father’s letter, which the

10 agency reasonably declined to credit, Dekaj did not submit

11 any evidence corroborating his claim that he was arrested and

12 beaten in detention in 2013.

13 Given Dekaj’s inconsistent evidence and insufficient

14 corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination

15 is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.

16 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination is dispositive of

17 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

18 three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See

19 Paul v. Gonzales,

444 F.3d 148, 156-57

(2d Cir. 2006).

20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion

22 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot,

6 1 and the pending request for oral argument in this petition is

2 DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

3 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 6 Clerk of Court

7

Reference

Status
Unpublished