18-1814 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A202 068 909 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 7th day of July, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 GERARD E. LYNCH, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 HARBHAJAN SINGH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-1814 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 26 General; Linda S. Wernery, 27 Assistant Director; Gerald M. 28 Alexander, Trial Attorney, Office 29 of Immigration Litigation, United 30 States Department of Justice, 31 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Harbhajan Singh, a native and citizen of

6 India, seeks review of a May 17, 2018, decision of the BIA

7 affirming a July 5, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge

8 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

9 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

10 (“CAT”). In re Harbhajan Singh, No. A202 068 909 (B.I.A. May

11 17, 2018), aff’g No. A202 068 909 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July

12 5, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

13 underlying facts and procedural history.

14 We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and the

15 BIA. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales,

(2d

16 Cir. 2005). The standards of review are well established.

17 See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

(2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the

19 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

20 base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency

21 between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral

22 statements . . . , the internal consistency of each statement,

2 1 the consistency of such statements with other evidence of

2 record . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such

3 statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,

4 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

5 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

6 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

7 determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

8 it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

9 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

. In this case, substantial evidence supports the

12 adverse credibility determination given multiple

13 inconsistencies regarding the details of the two alleged

14 attacks against Singh and related events.

15 Singh alleged that members of the Badal Party attacked

16 him twice in 2014 because he was a member of the Shiromani

17 Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA”). The agency reasonably

18 relied on several inconsistencies and variations in Singh’s

19 descriptions of the two attacks. As to the first attack,

20 Singh testified that the assailants asked him whether he

21 worked for SADA, but he later testified that they did not ask

22 him this question; and Singh testified that his attackers

3 1 told him that they were members of the Badal party, but he

2 later testified that they had not identified themselves but

3 had asked him to join their party. As to the second attack,

4 he testified that his assailants did not say anything during

5 the attack, but his mother’s and wife’s affidavits stated

6 that the attackers threatened to kill him if he continued to

7 work for SADA. Singh also stated during his credible fear

8 interview that the assailants searched his body after he fell

9 to the ground and pretended to lose consciousness, but he did

10 not testify at his hearing that they searched his body.

11 Although these inconsistencies are not glaring, an IJ may

12 rely on the “cumulative effect” of minor inconsistencies, see

13 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (internal quotation marks

14 omitted), and we do not second-guess an IJ’s finding, where,

15 as here, it is a “permissible view[] of the evidence,” Siewe

16 v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (internal

17 quotation marks omitted).

18 The agency also reasonably relied on several other

19 inconsistencies between Singh’s testimony and witness

20 affidavits. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,

21 534 F.3d at 167. Singh testified that after his first attack,

22 his mother accompanied him to the police station, but his

4 1 mother’s, wife’s, and neighbor’s affidavits stated that his

2 father accompanied him. When asked to explain this

3 discrepancy, Singh stated the affidavits were mistakenly

4 referring to the second attack. However, the record shows

5 each affidavit described the first attack when stating that

6 Singh’s father went with him to the police station. The IJ

7 thus was not compelled to credit Singh’s explanation that

8 three individuals made the same error. See Majidi v.

9 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

10 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

11 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

12 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

13 his testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citations

14 omitted)); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has . . . firmly

16 embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities

17 between affidavits are an indication that the statements are

18 ‘canned.’”). Singh also testified that his mother did not

19 attend SADA events; however, his mother’s affidavit stated

20 that she did, or at least that she “used to.” When asked to

21 explain this discrepancy, Singh changed his testimony to

22 state both that everyone in his family attended and that his

5 1 mother attended events before he joined the party.

2 Given that the record supports the inconsistencies

3 identified by the IJ, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s

4 failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable

5 corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to

6 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

7 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

8 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

9 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The affidavits from Singh’s mother,

11 wife, and neighbor were inconsistent with his testimony and

12 the IJ reasonably declined to give weight to these or other

13 letters because his mother and wife were interested witnesses

14 and none of the authors were available for cross-examination.

15 See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013)

16 (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little weight to

17 husband’s letter from China).

18 Accordingly, given Singh’s inconsistencies and the lack

19 of reliable corroboration, substantial evidence supports the

20 agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.

21 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang,

22 496 F.3d at 273. That determination is dispositive of

6 1 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

2 three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See

3 Paul v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006).

4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

5 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

6 stays VACATED.

7 FOR THE COURT: 8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 9 Clerk of Court

7