17-1829 Yan Rong Liu v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A075 605 166 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 4th day of September, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 YAN RONG LIU, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 17-1829 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 26 General; Claire L. Workman, Senior 27 Litigation Counsel; John B. Holt, 28 Trial Attorney, Office of 29 Immigration Litigation, United 30 States Department of Justice, 31 Washington, DC. 32 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Yan Rong Liu, a native and citizen of the

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 18, 2017,

7 decision of the BIA affirming a March 22, 2016, decision of

8 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liu’s motion to reopen

9 her removal proceedings. In re Yan Rong Liu, No. A 075 605

10 166 (B.I.A. May 18, 2017), aff’g No. A 075 605 166 (Immig.

11 Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 22, 2016). We assume the parties’

12 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history

13 in this case.

14 We review the agency’s denial of Liu’s motion to reopen

15 for abuse of discretion, and review the agency’s factual

16 findings regarding country conditions under the substantial

17 evidence standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

,

18 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).

19 It is undisputed that Liu’s 2015 motion to reopen was

20 untimely because her removal order became final in 2001.

21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)(setting 90-day filing

22 period for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R.

2 1 § 1003.23(b)(1)(same). Although this time limitation does

2 not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed

3 country conditions” since the time of the original hearing,

4 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);

(b)(4)(i),

5 as discussed below, the agency’s conclusion that Liu failed

6 to establish such a change is supported by substantial

7 evidence, see Jian Hui Shao,

.

8 The agency reasonably concluded that Liu did not

9 establish a material change in country conditions because her

10 evidence revealed that the Chinese government has

11 continuously repressed Christians, especially members of

12 unregistered churches, since before 2001, with varying

13 degrees of restriction. In re S-Y-G-,

,

14 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence

15 accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material

16 change in country conditions that would justify reopening,

17 [the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions

18 submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time

19 of the merits hearing. . . .”). Liu’s argument that the

20 evidence “clearly demonstrated” a change in conditions is

21 without merit. The agency cited extensively to Liu’s

22 submissions, which demonstrated that conditions for

3 1 Christians in China were generally poor, and while conditions

2 varied over the years, there was not a marked deterioration.

3 See

(“Change that is incremental or incidental

4 does not meet the regulatory requirements for late motions of

5 this type.”).

6 Moreover, Liu’s evidence was insufficient to establish

7 changed conditions since 2001 because it largely documented

8 country conditions from 2013 to 2015. Even so, the agency

9 properly took administrative notice of State Department

10 reports to conclude that conditions for Christians in China

11 have not worsened. See Yang v. McElroy,

, 163

12 n.4. (2d Cir. 2002)(per curiam)(“It is well-settled that the

13 [agency] has the authority to take administrative notice of

14 current events bearing on an applicant’s well-founded fear of

15 persecution”); Burger v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

16 2007) (explaining that due process concerns arise “where

17 administratively noticed facts are the sole basis” for the

18 denial of relief).

19 Given the absence of evidence demonstrating changed

20 conditions, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying

21 Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C.

22 § 1229a(c)(7)(C);

(b)(1), (4)(i). Because

4 1 the agency’s timeliness ruling is dispositive, we do not reach

2 the agency’s alternative holding regarding Liu’s prima facie

3 eligibility for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i);

4 INS v. Bagamasbad,

(1976)(per curiam).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

6 DENIED. All motions and requests for oral argument are in

7 this petition is DENIED and all stays are VACATED.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court

5