Singh v. Barr
Singh v. Barr
Opinion
18-2397 Singh v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A208 198 816 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 9th day of September, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 8 MICHAEL H. PARK, 9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 AMANDEEP SINGH, AKA AMAN THAPA, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-2397 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Jackson 24 Heights, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Leslie McKay, 28 Senior Litigation Counsel, Siu P. 29 Wong, Trial Attorney, Office of 30 Immigration Litigation, United 31 States Department of Justice, 32 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Amandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India,
6 seeks review of a July 19, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming
7 a July 26, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
8 denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
9 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Amandeep Singh,
10 No. A208 198 816 (B.I.A. July 19, 2018), aff’g No. A208 198
11 816 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 26, 2017). We assume the
12 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
13 history.
14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
15 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang
16 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
426 F.3d 520, 522(2d Cir. 2005).
17 The applicable standards of review are well established. See
18
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67,
19 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
20 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
21 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
22 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
23 the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s 2 1 . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal
2 consistency of each statement, the consistency of such
3 statements with other evidence of record . . . and any
4 inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard
5 to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
6 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
7 factor.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to
8 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
9 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
10 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
11 Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 167(2d Cir. 2008) (per
12 curiam); accord Hong Fei Gao,
891 F.3d at 76. Substantial
13 evidence supports the adverse credibility determination given
14 inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and between his
15 testimony and letters he provided to corroborate his claim
16 that he was attacked by members of a rival political party on
17 account of his work for the Akali Dal Amritsar Mann Party
18 (“Mann Party”).
19 First, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s
20 inconsistent statements regarding whether Jarnail Singh was
21 his uncle. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)(B)(iii). Jarnail Singh
22 provided a letter to corroborate Singh’s activities in the
23 Mann Party and that he was targeted by the Akali Dal Badal 3 1 Party (“Badal Party”). Singh initially testified that
2 Jarnail was his father’s elder brother, but when asked why
3 the letter did not mention that family relationship, Singh
4 testified variously that Jarnail was his father’s brother, a
5 “distant relative,” and a “brother to all of people in the
6 neighborhood.” While Singh asserts that this perceived
7 inconsistency is irrelevant because it does not relate to his
8 claim of persecution, an IJ “may rely on any inconsistency,”
9 even one that is “collateral or ancillary.” Hong Fei Gao,
10
891 F.3d at 76(quoting Xiu Xia Lin,
534 F.3d at 162); see
11 also Siewe v. Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 167(2d Cir. 2007)
12 (where “competing inferences” can be drawn, we generally
13 defer to the fact finder).
14 Second, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s
15 inconsistent statements as to Jarnail’s position on the
16 village council. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)(B)(iii). Singh
17 testified that Jarnail was a member of the council, not the
18 village sarpanch or leader, but Jarnail’s letter stated that
19 he was acting in the capacity of sarpanch. Singh merely
20 repeated that Jarnail was not the sarpanch when asked to
21 explain this discrepancy. See Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 22 77, 80(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer
23 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 4 1 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
2 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal
3 quotation marks omitted)). Singh did not exhaust his new
4 argument that this was a “typographical error.” See Lin
5 Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
480 F.3d 104, 122–23 (2d Cir.
6 2007) (holding that we are generally limited to review of
7 issues raised before the agency).
8 Third, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies
9 in Singh’s statements as to the source of the letter from the
10 Mann Party. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)(B)(iii). The letter
11 was signed by Harvinder Singh. Singh initially testified,
12 however, that Simranjit Singh Mann—the leader of the Mann
13 Party—had signed the letter; Singh later testified that a
14 person who worked for the party had signed the letter; and
15 when asked who that person was, Singh reverted to stating it
16 was Simranjit Singh Mann before finally conceding that he did
17 not know. Although Singh asserts that this issue is
18 immaterial to his claim of persecution, the agency was allowed
19 to rely on it, see Hong Fei Gao,
891 F.3d at 76, and the
20 discrepancy undermines the reliability of a letter produced
21 to corroborate the political affiliation that allegedly gave
22 rise to his claim.
23 Lastly, the agency did not err in finding that Singh 5 1 failed to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable
2 corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to
3 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
4 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
5 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
6 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 7268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The agency properly
8 afforded limited weight to Singh’s documents because they
9 were not contemporaneous with the alleged events (including
10 the medical documents describing his treatment) and, as
11 discussed above, they were inconsistent with his testimony.
12 See Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 332(2d Cir. 2013) (“We
13 defer to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to
14 an alien’s documentary evidence.”); see also In re H-L-H- &
15 Z-Y-Z-, 25 I.&N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (letters from an
16 alien’s friends and family were insufficient to provide
17 substantial support for the alien’s claims because they were
18 from interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination),
19 overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677
20 F.3d 130, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012). The agency also reasonably
21 declined to credit letters from village members and temple
22 representatives because the letters used identical language.
23 See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
489 F.3d 517, 524 6 1 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that we “ha[ve] firmly embraced the
2 commonsensical notion that striking similarities between
3 affidavits are an indication that the statements are
4 ‘canned’”); Surinder Singh v. BIA,
438 F.3d 145, 148(2d Cir.
5 2006) (per curiam) (same).
6 Given the inconsistencies and the lack of reliable
7 corroboration, the adverse credibility determination is
8 supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,
534 F.3d at 167. The
10 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,
11 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms
12 of relief are based on the same discredited factual predicate.
13 See Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
15 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
16 stays VACATED.
17 FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 19 Clerk of Court
7
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished