18-824 Purba v. Barr BIA A096 423 812 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of September, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

TUMBOR GOLDO ROY PURBA, AKA TUMBOR G.R. PURBA, Petitioner,

v. 18-824 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Jonathan Robbins, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Tumbor Goldo Roy Purba, a native and citizen

of Indonesia, seeks review of a February 27, 2018, decision

of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal

proceedings. In re Tumbor Goldo Roy Purba, No. A 096 423 812

(B.I.A. Feb. 27, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of

discretion and the BIA’s country conditions determination for

substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008). An alien seeking to reopen may

file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the

final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),

(C)(i);

(c)(2). Purba filed his 2017 motion

to reopen more than a decade after the BIA’s final

administrative decision. However, the 90-day time limitation

2 does not apply where the motion seeks asylum “based on changed

country conditions arising in the country of nationality or

the country to which removal has been ordered, if such

evidence is material and was not available and would not have

been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.”

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also

(c)(3)(ii). “In determining whether evidence

accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material

change in country conditions that would justify reopening,

[the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions

submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time

of the merits hearing below.” In re S-Y-G-,

(BIA 2007). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

conclusion that Purba did not establish a material change in

conditions for Christians in Indonesia.

As the BIA found, the country conditions evidence reveals

that discrimination against Christians has been a

longstanding problem. The evidence presented in the record

at the time of Purba’s hearing before an immigration judge in

2004 reported the mistreatment of minority religions, the

existence of political parties advocating for nationwide

3 adoption of Sharia law, limited freedom of expression

regarding religious differences, and instances of religiously

motivated extremism and violence. The evidence Purba

submitted in 2017, including State Department Country Reports

for Indonesia, news articles, and scholarly pieces, described

discrimination against minority religions, campaigns and

political support for adoption of Sharia law, restrictions on

religious speech, and several instances of extremism and

violence. Accordingly, the evidence reflected conditions for

Christians similar to those at the time of the hearing.

Because the country conditions evidence supports the BIA’s

conclusion that Purba failed to demonstrate a material

worsening of conditions for Christians in Indonesia as needed

to bypass the 90-day filing deadline for his motion, the BIA

did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii).

While the BIA has regulatory authority to reopen

proceedings sua sponte despite the time bar,

(a), we lack jurisdiction to review this “entirely

discretionary” determination, see Ali v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006). To the extent that Purba contends

4 that the BIA misstated the record, we find no misperception

of the law that would allow remand. See Mahmood v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the [BIA] may have

declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it

misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly,

that a reopening would necessarily fail, remand to the [BIA]

for reconsideration in view of the correct law is

appropriate.”). The BIA did not state that reopening would

necessarily fail; instead, it simply found that Purba had not

established exceptional circumstances to warrant sua sponte

reopening. And it did not misperceive the law in connection

with Purba’s pending visa petition because Purba may pursue

an unlawful presence waiver without first reopening his

removal proceedings. See

(b)(1); USCIS,

Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers, available at

https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-us-

citizens/provisional-unlawful-presence-waivers (“If you have

a final order of removal . . . , you can only obtain a

provisional unlawful presence waiver if you have applied for,

and we have already approved, Form I-212, Application for

Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States

5 After Deportation or Removal, at the time you file Form I-

601A.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

6