18-1957 Singh v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A208 569 583 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 16th day of September, two thousand 5 nineteen. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 9 REENA RAGGI, 10 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 DMARMINDER SINGH, AKA DHARMINDER 15 SINGH, 16 Petitioner, 17 18 v. 18-1957 19 NAC 20 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 21 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 22 Respondent. 23 _____________________________________ 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 28 General; Jonathan A. Robbins, 29 Senior Litigation Counsel; Dana M. 30 Camilleri, Trial Attorney, Office 31 of Immigration Litigation, United 32 States Department of Justice, 33 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Dmarminder Singh, a native and citizen of

6 India, seeks review of a June 13, 2018, decision of the BIA

7 affirming an August 7, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge

8 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

9 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

10 (“CAT”). In re Dmarminder Singh, No. A208 569 583 (B.I.A.

11 June 13, 2018), aff’g No. A208 569 583 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

12 Aug. 7, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

13 underlying facts and procedural history.

14 Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s

15 and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”

16 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security,

, 528

17 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well

18 established. See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.

19 Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018).

20 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

21 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

22 determination on . . . the consistency between the

2 1 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

2 the internal consistency of each such statement, the

3 consistency of such statements with other evidence of

4 record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

5 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

6 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

,

8 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the

9 agency’s determination that Singh was not credible as to his

10 claim that members of the Akali Dal Badal party beat him twice

11 in India on account of his membership in the Shiromani Akali

12 Dal Amritsar Party.

13 The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent

14 statements regarding whether police in India detained and

15 harmed him when he reported being beaten by members of the

16 Badal Party. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh did

17 not provide compelling explanations for this inconsistency.

18 See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A

19 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

20 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

21 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

22 to credit his testimony.” (internal citation and quotation

3 1 marks omitted)).

2 The agency also reasonably found that Singh’s inability

3 to recall the name of his political party impugned his

4 credibility because it was inconsistent with his claim that

5 he was targeted and beaten on account of his active membership

6 in that party. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh

7 attempted to explain that he could not recall the name of his

8 party because his beatings had impacted his memory. The IJ

9 was not compelled to credit that explanation because Singh

10 did not submit medical evidence of memory issues and was able

11 to recall the name of the party that targeted him. See

12 Majidi,

.

13 The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistency

14 between Singh’s statements during his credible fear interview

15 and his hearing testimony regarding when he was threatened

16 and beaten in India. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). As

17 an initial matter, the agency did not err in relying on the

18 record of Singh’s credible fear interview because the record

19 of the interview was sufficiently reliable, in that the

20 interview was conducted with an interpreter, it was

21 memorialized in a typewritten, question-and-answer format,

22 the questions posed were designed to elicit details of Singh’s

4 1 asylum claim, and Singh’s responses indicated that he

2 understood the questions. See Ming Zhang v. Holder,

715, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009). Singh testified that the

4 beatings he suffered occurred in the fourth and fifth months

5 of 2015. When confronted with his inconsistent statement at

6 his credible fear interview that he was beaten in the sixth

7 month, Singh changed his testimony to conform with his

8 interview, stating that he was beaten in the fifth and sixth

9 months. This created a new inconsistency with his interview,

10 in which he had stated that his second beating occurred during

11 the ninth month. Further, his testimony that he was

12 threatened in the fourth and fifth months was inconsistent

13 with his interview statement that he was threatened in the

14 eighth month.

15 Given the inconsistency findings, the agency’s adverse

16 credibility determination is supported by substantial

17 evidence. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). That

18 determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of

19 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based

20 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444

(2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we do not

22 consider the agency’s alternative burden finding. See I.N.S.

5 1 v. Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule

2 courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

3 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results

4 they reach.”).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

7 stays VACATED.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 10 Clerk of Court 11

6