18-1505 Debon-Ramos v. Barr BIA Straus, IJ A208 900 281 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 DORA LINDA DEBON-RAMOS, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 18-1505 18 NAC 19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 27 Attorney General; Linda S. 28 Wernery, Assistant Director; 29 Janice K. Redfern, Senior 1 Litigation Counsel, Office of 2 Immigration Litigation, United 3 States Department of Justice, 4 Washington, DC. 5 6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Dora Linda Debon-Ramos, a native and citizen

11 of Honduras, seeks review of an April 18, 2018, decision of

12 the BIA affirming a July 10, 2017, decision of an Immigration

13 Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding

14 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

15 (“CAT”). In re Dora Linda Debon-Ramos, No. A208 900 281

16 (B.I.A. Apr. 18, 2018), aff’g No. A208 900 281 (Immig. Ct.

17 Hartford July 10, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity

18 with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

20 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of

21 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review

23 are well established. See

(b)(4)(B); Paloka

24 v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2014). Because Debon-

25 Ramos expressly abandons her CAT claim, the only issue before

2 1 us is whether the agency properly denied asylum and

2 withholding of removal based on its finding that she was not

3 a member of her proposed particular social group of Honduran

4 women unable to leave domestic relationships. See Yueqing

5 Zhang v. Gonzales,

, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005)

6 (noting that claims not raised in petitioner’s brief are

7 abandoned).

8 To demonstrate eligibility for asylum and withholding of

9 removal, “the applicant must establish that race, religion,

10 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

11 political opinion was or will be at least one central reason

12 for persecuting the applicant.”

(b)(1)(B)(i);

13 see also

§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N.

14 Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010). To constitute a particular

15 social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of members who

16 share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with

17 particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society

18 in question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-,

, 237

19 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195–97.

20 In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA held that a proposed group

21 of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their

22 relationship” satisfied the requirements for a particular

3 1 social group.

, 392–95 (B.I.A. 2014).

2 In June 2018, the Attorney General overruled Matter of

3 A-R-C-G-, holding that it departed from established legal

4 principles because it defined a social group based primarily

5 on the harm that group members experienced and because it did

6 not comply with the BIA’s social distinction and

7 particularity requirements. Matter of A-B-,

, 335–36 (A.G. 2018).

9 In Debon-Ramos’s case, the agency applied Matter of A-R-

10 C-G- because its decisions predated Matter of A-B-. We need

11 not remand for the agency to apply, in the first instance,

12 the legal standards articulated in Matter of A-B- because,

13 even under more favorable pre-A-B- standards, substantial

14 evidence supports the agency’s finding that Debon-Ramos was

15 not a member of her proposed social group since she was able

16 to leave her relationship with her former partner.

17 Specifically, Debon-Ramos testified that her brother

18 successfully evicted her former partner from her home.

19 Although her former partner subsequently approached her at

20 the fruit stand outside her house on two occasions, she had

21 no further contact with him in the month between the last of

22 those encounters and her departure from Honduras. After she

4 1 left Honduras, he never returned to her house, where her

2 children still live. Based on this testimony, the agency

3 reasonably concluded that Debon-Ramos had been able to leave

4 the relationship and, thus, was not a member of her proposed

5 social group. See

(b)(4)(B); see Rocha v.

6 Sessions,

, 645 (2d Cir. 2018) (upholding

7 agency’s determination that petitioner was able to escape her

8 stepfather’s abuse, noting that the stepfather was

9 subsequently evicted from the house, so “even if [she] were

10 to return to Brazil and move back in with her mother, her

11 stepfather would not be there to abuse her”); cf. Matter of

12 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389 (woman was unable to leave

13 her husband because whenever she left, he followed and secured

14 her return with either threats or promises of changed

15 behavior).

16 Debon-Ramos also argues that the BIA erred by not

17 considering the possibility of future persecution and

18 maintains that she showed that relocation within Honduras was

19 not reasonable. However, the agency’s conclusion that she

20 was not a member of her proposed social group also forecloses

21 a claim based on future persecution. See 8 U.S.C.

22 §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A). And

5 1 because she did not establish persecution on account of

2 membership in her proposed social group, we need not reach

3 the issue of relocation. See

(b)(1)(i)(B)

4 (providing that an applicant found to be a refugee based on

5 past persecution on account of membership in a particular

6 social group may still be denied asylum if relocation is

7 reasonable).

8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

9 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

10 stays VACATED.

11 FOR THE COURT: 12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 13 Clerk of Court

6