18-1823 Liu v. Barr BIA Douchy, IJ A205 804 265 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 3rd day of December, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 8 REENA RAGGI, 9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 JINLONG LIU, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-1823 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 26 Attorney General; Paul Fiorino, 27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Andrew 28 B. Insenga, Trial Attorney, Office 29 of Immigration Litigation, United 30 States Department of Justice, 31 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Jinlong Liu, a native and citizen of the

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 25, 2018,

7 decision of the BIA affirming a July 6, 2017, decision of an

8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of

9 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

10 (“CAT”). In re Jinlong Liu, No. A205 804 265 (B.I.A. May 25,

11 2018), aff’g No. A205 804 265 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 6,

12 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

13 underlying facts and procedural history.

14 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

15 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

16 Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). The

17 applicable standards of review are well established. See

18

(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. Holder,

, 332

19 (2d Cir. 2013). The agency did not err in concluding that

20 Liu failed to satisfy his burden of proving a well-founded

21 fear of future persecution in China on account of his practice

22 of Christianity.

23 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish

2 1 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear

2 of future persecution.

(b)(2); Hongsheng

3 Leng v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008). To do so,

4 an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that

5 he would be singled out for persecution or that the country

6 of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly

7 situated individuals.

(b)(2)(iii);

8 Hongsheng Leng,

. “[A]n alien must make some

9 showing that authorities in his country of nationality are

10 either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of

11 his activities.” Hongsheng Leng,

.

12 As an initial matter, we find no merit to Liu’s arguments

13 that the IJ applied an incorrect burden of proof,

14 mischaracterized his claim, and ignored his fear that he will

15 be persecuted for proselytizing in China. The IJ explicitly

16 set forth the correct well-founded fear standard and

17 recognized that Liu’s claim was based on his assertion that

18 he would proselytize as well as attend an underground church

19 in China.

20 The agency did not err in finding that Liu failed to

21 establish a well-founded fear of persecution because he did

22 not demonstrate that Chinese officials are aware or likely to

23 become aware of his religious activities. At his hearing,

3 1 Liu admitted that Chinese officials do not know about his

2 religious practice. As to whether Chinese officials are

3 likely to discover his religious activities, Liu testified

4 that that he would attend an unregistered Christian church in

5 China and spread the gospel, and he speculated that

6 nonbelievers would report him to government officials. Liu

7 did not testify that he knew anyone who had such an

8 experience, and he admitted that he did not know of anyone by

9 name who had been persecuted in his hometown. Further, the

10 agency reasonably declined to credit Liu’s mother’s unsworn

11 letter because the letter was written by an interested witness

12 who was not available for cross-examination. See Y.C., 741

13 F.3d at 334. Regardless, the letter claimed that unnamed

14 Christians were detained and beaten but provided no details

15 from which to conclude that Liu’s religious practice would

16 likely be discovered. And, as the IJ noted, the State

17 Department’s International Religious Freedom Report provides

18 that there are 68 million Christians in China and that

19 approximately 45 million of them practice in unregistered

20 churches. Given Liu’s purely speculative testimony that

21 officials will likely discover his religious practice and the

22 fact that there are tens of millions of Christians practicing

23 in unregistered churches in China, Liu did not demonstrate

4 1 that Chinese officials are likely to discover his religious

2 practice as required to state an objectively reasonable fear

3 of being singled out for persecution. See Hongsheng Leng,

4

; see also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421

, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support

6 in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at

7 best.”).

8 The agency also did not err in determining that Liu

9 failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of

10 similarly situated individuals. The IJ acknowledged that the

11 country conditions evidence demonstrated that Chinese

12 government officials restrict religious activities and

13 harass, detain, and sentence religious practitioners in some

14 areas of China. As the IJ noted, however, the country

15 conditions evidence also provides that Christians practice

16 their religion without government interference in some areas

17 of the country. The IJ also reasonably relied on the fact

18 that none of the evidence mentions any incidents of harm

19 befalling Christians in Liu’s home province of Fujian. See

20 Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

21 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s requirement that an

22 applicant demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution

23 specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts vary

5 1 according to locality). Given that restrictions on Christian

2 activities varied by region, the agency did not err in

3 determining that Liu failed to demonstrate “systemic or

4 pervasive” persecution of similarly situated Christians

5 sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of

6 persecution. In re A-M-,

(BIA 2005);

7 see also

(b)(2)(iii).

8 Accordingly, the agency did not err in concluding that

9 Liu failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.

10 See

(b)(1)(B)(i); Hongsheng Leng,

142–43. That finding was dispositive of asylum, withholding

12 of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based

13 on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

16 DENIED.

17 FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 19 Clerk of Court

6