18-2879 Singh v. Rosen BIA Nelson, IJ A205 585 720 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 21st day of January, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 KARAMVIR SINGH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-2879 17 NAC 18 JEFFREY A. ROSEN, ACTING UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent.* 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Jessica E. 27 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel; 28

* Pursuant to Fed R. App. R. 43(c)(2), Jeffrey A. Rosen is automatically substituted for former Attorney General William P. Barr. 1 2 3 Juria L. Jones, Trial Attorney, 4 Office of Immigration Litigation, 5 United States Department of 6 Justice, Washington, DC. 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

9 AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of

10 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.

11 Petitioner Karamvir Singh, a native and citizen of India,

12 seeks review of a September 4, 2018, decision of the BIA

13 affirming an October 3, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge

14 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

15 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16 (“CAT”). In re Karamvir Singh, No. A205 585 720 (B.I.A. Sep.

17 4, 2018), aff’g No. A205 585 720 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct.

18 3, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

19 underlying facts and procedural history.

20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

21 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the

22 IJ’s credibility and internal relocation determinations

23 because the BIA did not rely on those grounds in affirming

24 the IJ’s decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

25 Justice,

(2d Cir. 2005); see also Lin Zhong

26 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2007)

27 (“[W]hen the BIA issues an opinion . . . and that opinion 2 1 constitutes the final agency determination, we may consider

2 only those issues that formed the basis for that decision.”).

3 The applicable standards of review are well established. See

4

(b)(4)(B); Lecaj v. Holder,

, 114

5 (2d Cir. 2010).

6 Singh claimed that Muslims who belonged to the Congress

7 Party threatened and attacked him after he refused to sell

8 them land on which they wanted to build a mosque. As to

9 asylum and withholding of removal, the agency denied relief

10 because Singh did not establish a nexus between the attacks

11 and a protected ground of religion or political opinion.

12 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination.

13 For asylum and withholding of removal, an “applicant must

14 establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a

15 particular social group, or political opinion was or will be

16 at least one central reason for” the claimed persecution. 8

(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see also 8 U.S.C.

18 § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N.

19 Dec. 341, 348 (BIA 2010) (holding that the “one central

20 reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal).

21 Relief “may be granted where there is more than one motive

22 for mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for

23 the mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.”

3 1 Acharya v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2014) (internal

2 quotation marks omitted). Under this “one central reason”

3 standard, “the protected ground cannot play a minor role in

4 the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future

5 mistreatment. That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential,

6 superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” In

7 re J-B-N- & S-M-,

(BIA 2007).

8 Singh testified that he was attacked by members of the

9 Congress Party because he refused to sell his land to them.

10 He denied belonging to or supporting any political party in

11 India. He said that his attackers wanted to buy his land

12 because it “was right beside the highway,” and he heard from

13 other villagers that his attackers “wanted to put the mosque

14 there.” He testified that he was Hindu and his attackers

15 wanted to build a mosque, but he did not state that his

16 attackers knew his religion or that his religion was a reason

17 he was targeted. Based on this testimony, the agency

18 reasonably concluded that the motive for the attack was a

19 land dispute, and Singh did not provide evidence that his

20 political beliefs or religion were “at least one central

21 reason for the [attacks].” Acharya,

; see

22 also INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

(1992) (holding

23 that an applicant “must provide some evidence of [a

4 1 persecutor’s motives], direct or circumstantial”); Yueqing

2 Zhang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“The

3 applicant must also show, through direct or circumstantial

4 evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises

5 from the applicant’s political belief.”).

6 Singh’s argument that “no questions were asked” at the

7 merits hearing about his religion or how his attackers urged

8 him to convert to Islam is unavailing. If he is faulting his

9 prior attorney for not asking such questions, the argument is

10 unexhausted and not subject to review because he did not raise

11 an ineffective assistance claim before the agency. See Lin

12 Zhong, 480 F.3d at 122–23 (holding that our review is

13 generally limited to issues raised before the agency);

14 Arango-Aradondo v. INS,

, 614–15 (2d Cir. 1994)

15 (holding that the BIA must review an ineffective assistance

16 claim in the first instance either on appeal or through a

17 motion to reopen). If Singh is instead faulting the IJ or

18 the Government for not asking such questions, the argument is

19 meritless because Singh had the burden to establish his

20 eligibility for relief. See

(b)(1)(B)(i).

21 Finally, with respect to the denial of CAT relief, Singh

22 did not challenge the IJ’s findings and conclusions in his

23 brief to the BIA. Accordingly, he has forfeited a claim of

5 1 error in the denial of CAT relief.

2 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

3 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

4 stays VACATED.

5 FOR THE COURT: 6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 7 Clerk of Court 8

6