19-172 Bosel v. Garland BIA Christensen, IJ A205 614 579 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 25th day of March, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNY CHIN, 8 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 HOM PRASAD BOSEL, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 19-172 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent.* 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Jason Schaffer, Esq., Mungoven & 25 Associates, P.C., New York, NY. 26

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted as Respondent. 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Liza S. Murcia , Senior Litigation 2 Counsel; Raya Jarawan, Trial 3 Attorney, Office of Immigration 4 Litigation, United States 5 Department of Justice, Washington, 6 DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

10 is DENIED.

11 Petitioner Hom Prasad Bosel, a native and citizen of

12 Nepal, seeks review of a December 18, 2018 decision of the

13 BIA affirming a November 22, 2017 decision of an Immigration

14 Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

15 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16 (“CAT”). In re Hom Prasad Bosel, No. A205 614 579 (B.I.A.

17 Dec. 18, 2018), aff’g No. A 205 614 579 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.

18 Nov. 22, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

19 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

20 We review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA

21 under the substantial evidence standard, and we review

22 questions of law de novo. See

(b)(4)(B);

23 Paloka v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2014).

24

2 1 Where, as here, the agency found past persecution, an

2 asylum applicant has a rebuttable presumption of a well-

3 founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.

4 § 1208.13(b)(1). † The government may rebut that presumption

5 if it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that

6 there has been “a fundamental change in circumstances such

7 that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of

8 persecution in [his or her] country of nationality,” or that

9 the applicant could avoid future persecution “by relocating

10 to another part of [his or her] country of nationality . . .,

11 and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to

12 expect the applicant to do so.”

(b)(1)(i)–

13 (ii). Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports

14 the agency’s relocation finding, we do not reach its changed

15 circumstances determination. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429

(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies

17 are not required to make findings on issues the decision of

18 which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

19 The record supports the agency’s conclusion that Bosel

20 could reasonably relocate within Nepal to avoid future

† All citations are to the version of the regulations in effect at the time of the IJ’s decision. 3 1 persecution. See

(b)(1)(i)(B); Singh v.

2 BIA,

(2d Cir. 2006) (“Asylum in the United

3 States is not available to obviate re-location to sanctuary

4 in one’s own country.”). In determining the reasonableness

5 of relocation, the agency may consider, among other factors,

6 “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the

7 place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife

8 within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial

9 infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and

10 cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social

11 and familial ties.”

(b)(3). The agency

12 considered Bosel’s ability to relocate, noting that he had

13 relocated and remained unharmed for two extended periods in

14 different parts of Nepal. Bosel relocated to Parbat in

15 August 2005 and remained unharmed but politically active

16 until returning to his hometown in June 2007. And he lived

17 unharmed in Kathmandu for 20 months before leaving for the

18 United States despite allegations that the Maoists knew his

19 location. Given that Bosel previously successfully avoided

20 persecution by relocating within Nepal, the agency reasonably

21 concluded that the government rebutted the presumption of

4 1 future persecution. See

(b)(3); Singh, 435

2 F.3d at 219. This conclusion is dispositive of asylum,

3 withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder,

4

, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

7 stays VACATED.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court

5