19-2624 Ye v. Garland BIA Poczter, IJ A208 921 347 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 16th day of August, two thousand twenty- 5 one. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 MICHAEL H. PARK, 10 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 JIN HUI YE, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 19-2624 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, 25 NY. 26 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 2 Attorney General; Melissa Neiman 3 Kelting, Assistant Director; 4 Christopher Buchanan, Trial 5 Attorney, Office of Immigration 6 Litigation, United States 7 Department of Justice, Washington, 8 DC. 9 10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

11 AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of

12 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.

13 Petitioner Jin Hui Ye, a native and citizen of the

14 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 1, 2019

15 decision of the BIA affirming a January 16, 2018 decision of

16 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

17 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

18 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin Hui Ye, No.

19 A208 921 347 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2019), aff’g No. A208 921 347

20 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 16, 2018). We assume the parties’

21 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.

23 See Wala v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2007). The

24 applicable standards of review are well established. See

25

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018).

27 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

2 1 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

2 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

3 the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s

4 . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal

5 consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of

6 such statements with other evidence of record . . . without

7 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

8 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

9 relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer

10 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the

11 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable

12 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

13 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008);

14 accord Hong Fei Gao,

. Substantial evidence

15 supports the agency’s determination that Ye was not credible

16 as to his claim that police detained and beat him for

17 practicing Christianity in an unregistered church in China.

18 The agency reasonably relied on Ye’s unresponsive and

19 scripted demeanor. On direct examination, Ye’s attorney

20 frequently had to ask repetitive or leading questions to

21 elicit responsive answers about Ye’s Christian practice.

22 This supports the IJ’s demeanor finding, which we afford

3 1 particular deference. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

,

2 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

3 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistent

4 statements about who introduced Ye to Christianity and paid

5 a fine for his release. See Likai Gao v. Barr,

,

6 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might

7 preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to

8 find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude

9 even more forcefully.”). First, Ye’s application identified

10 one coworker who invited him to attend church, but he

11 testified about two. The IJ was not required to credit Ye’s

12 explanation that he was in a fight with the second because Ye

13 submitted an affidavit from that second individual. See

14 Majidi,

(“A petitioner must do more than offer

15 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

16 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

17 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal

18 quotation marks omitted)). Second, Ye testified that his

19 brother paid the fine to secure his release from jail; but

20 his brother’s affidavit stated that Ye paid the fine. Ye had

21 no explanation for this inconsistency. The lack of reliable

22 corroboration further undermined Ye’s credibility. See Y.C.

4 1 v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally

2 defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded

3 an applicant’s documentary evidence.”); Biao Yang v.

4 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s

5 failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

6 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general

7 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has

8 already been called into question.”).

9 Given these inconsistencies and the demeanor finding,

10 substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

11 determination, which is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

12 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on

13 the same factual predicate of Ye’s alleged beating and

14 detention for attending an unregistered church. See Paul v.

15 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006).

16 Nevertheless, the IJ assumed in the alternative that Ye

17 was seeking relief based on a well-founded fear of future

18 persecution on account of his practice of Christianity in the

19 United States. The IJ reasonably rejected such a claim

20 because Ye did not provide evidence that Chinese authorities

21 were aware of, or were likely to become aware of, his

22 Christian practice in the United States. See Hongsheng Leng

5 1 v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008). And the IJ

2 reasonably rejected a claim of a pattern or practice of

3 persecution of Christians because Ye’s supporting evidence—a

4 State Department report and six news articles—did not

5 establish heightened restrictions for Christians in his home

6 province. See Santoso v. Holder,

, 112 & n.1 (2d

7 Cir. 2009); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

, 149–50,

8 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008).

9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

11 stays VACATED.

12 FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 14 Clerk of Court 15

6