20-299 Huang v. Garland BIA A077 998 197

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 14th day of December, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 HON SONG HUANG, AKA HANG SONG 14 HUANG, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 20-299 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, ACTING 20 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 1 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, Esq., New 25 York, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: John S. Hogan, Assistant 28 Director; Deitz P. Lefort, Trial 29 Attorney, Office of Immigration

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 1 Litigation, United States 2 Department of Justice, Washington, 3 DC. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

8 is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Hon Song Huang, a native and citizen of the

10 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s denial

11 of his motion to reopen. In re Hon Song Huang, No. A077 998

12 197 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2020). We assume the parties’

13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

14 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

15 abuse of discretion. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008). The BIA may deny a motion to

17 reopen if “the movant has not established a prima facie case

18 for the underlying substantive relief sought.” INS v. Abudu,

19

(1988). The BIA did not abuse its discretion

20 in denying Huang’s motion to reopen because he failed to

21 establish his prima facie eligibility for cancellation of

22 removal. See

23 Huang failed to allege that his removal would cause his 2 1 U.S. citizen wife or children any specific hardship, much

2 less the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” that is

3 required for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C.

4 § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see also In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.

5 Dec. 56, 62 (B.I.A. 2001) (requiring applicant to show

6 hardship “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that

7 would be expected when a close family member leaves this

8 country” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the

9 agency’s hardship finding is dispositive of his petition, we

10 do not reach Huang’s argument that his notice to appear was

11 ineffective to stop his accrual of physical presence. See

12 INS v. Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule

13 courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

14 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results

15 they reach.”).

16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17 DENIED. Huang’s pending motion for a stay of removal is

18 DENIED.

19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 21 Clerk of Court

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