Singh v. Garland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Singh v. Garland

Opinion

19-139 Singh v. Garland BIA Zagzoug, IJ A205 937 109 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 17th day of December, two thousand twenty- 5 one. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 9 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 10 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 MANJIT SINGH, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 19-139 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, 20 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 1 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Richard W. Chen, Esq., New York, 25 NY.

1Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted for Attorney General William P. Barr. 1 2 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 3 Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, 4 Assistant Director; Robert D. 5 Tennyson, Trial Attorney, Office of 6 Immigration Litigation, United 7 States Department of Justice, 8 Washington, DC.

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “agency”) decision, it

11 is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition

12 for review is DENIED.

13 Petitioner Manjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,

14 seeks review of a December 17, 2018 decision of the BIA

15 affirming a September 7, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge

16 (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of

17 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

18 (“CAT”). In re Manjit Singh, No. A 205 937 109 (B.I.A. Dec.

19 17, 2018), aff’g No. A 205 937 109 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept.

20 7, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

21 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

22 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

23 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

417 F.3d 268, 271

(2d

24 Cir. 2005). The standards of review are well established.

25 See

8 U.S.C. § 1252

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

26 F.3d 67, 76

(2d Cir. 2018). The agency may, “[c]onsidering 2 1 the totality of the circumstances . . . base a credibility

2 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

3 the applicant,” the plausibility of his account, and

4 inconsistencies in his statements or between his statements

5 and other evidence, without regard to whether those

6 inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”

7

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

8 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

9 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

10 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin

11 v. Mukasey,

534 F.3d 162, 167

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

12 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

13 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion

14 that Singh was not credible. First, the agency identified

15 multiple inconsistencies between Singh’s credible fear

16 interview, testimony, and other record evidence regarding

17 aspects of his military service in India, specifically his

18 weapons training and awards, as well as inconsistent

19 testimony pertaining to his previous travel outside of India.

20 These inconsistencies are reflected in the record, and

21 Singh’s explanations for them do not compel a different

3 1 result. Majidi v. Gonzales,

430 F.3d 77, 80-81

(2d Cir.

2 2005).

3 The agency’s reliance on Singh’s demeanor was also

4 reasonable, particularly given Singh’s nonresponsive answers

5 on cross examination.

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(iii). We

6 give particular deference to an IJ’s demeanor finding.

7 Majidi,

430 F.3d at 81

n.1; see also Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446

8 F.3d 395, 401

(2d Cir. 2006).

9 Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the IJ reasonably

10 concluded that Singh failed to rehabilitate his testimony

11 with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v.

12 Gonzales,

496 F.3d 268, 273

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s

13 failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

14 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general

15 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has

16 already been called into question.”). The agency did not err

17 in declining to afford significant weight to letters authored

18 by interested individuals not available for cross-

19 examination. See Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-,

25 I. & N. Dec. 20

209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that unsworn letters from the

21 applicant’s friends and family did not provide substantial

22 support for the applicant’s claims because they were from

4 1 interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination),

2 overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677

3 F.3d 130

, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741

4 F.3d 324

, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision

5 to give little weight to letter from applicant’s spouse in

6 China). Nor did the agency err in declining to credit medical

7 documentation prepared five years after the alleged

8 treatment. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332; Shunfu Li v. Mukasey,

9

529 F.3d 141, 149

(2d Cir. 2008).

10 Given the inconsistencies, the demeanor finding to which

11 we defer, and the lack of reliable corroboration, the totality

12 of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse

13 credibility ruling. See Xiu Xia Lin,

534 F.3d at 167

. This

14 adverse credibility determination is dispositive because all

15 of Singh’s claims relied on his credibility. See Paul v.

16 Gonzales,

444 F.3d 148, 156-57

(2d Cir. 2006).

17 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

18 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

19 stays VACATED.

20 FOR THE COURT: 21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 22 Clerk of Court

5

Reference

Status
Unpublished