20-1792 Singh-Khashre v. Garland BIA Thompson, IJ A206 899 415

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 18th day of February, two thousand twenty- 5 two. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 DENNIS JACOBS, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 MANJEET SINGH-KHASHRE, AKA 15 MANJEET SINGH KHASHRE, 16 Petitioner, 17 18 v. 20-1792 19 NAC 20 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 21 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 22 Respondent. 23 _____________________________________ 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Nataliya I. Gavlin, Esq., Gavlin 26 & Associates, P.C., New York, NY. 27 28 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant 1 Attorney General; Anthony P. 2 Nicastro, Assistant Director; 3 Andrew B. Insenga, Trial Attorney, 4 Office of Immigration Litigation, 5 United States Department of 6 Justice, Washington, DC. 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11 is DENIED.

12 Petitioner Manjeet Singh-Khashre, a native and citizen

13 of India, seeks review of a May 14, 2020, decision of the BIA

14 affirming a July 25, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge

15 (“IJ”) denying Singh-Khashre’s application for asylum,

16 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

17 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Manjeet Singh-Khashre, No.

18 A206 899 415 (B.I.A. May 14, 2020), aff’g No. A206 899 415

19 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 25, 2018). We assume the parties’

20 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21 Under the circumstances, we have considered the decision

22 of the IJ as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.

23 Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2005). We review

24 the agency’s adverse credibility determination for

25 substantial evidence. See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei

26 Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018).

2 1 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

2 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

3 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

4 the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the

5 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

6 [and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . .

7 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

8 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

9 other relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

10 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

11 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

12 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

13 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

14 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

. Substantial

15 evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh-

16 Khashre was not credible as to his claim that members of the

17 Congress Party attacked and threatened him in India on account

18 of his membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) Party,

19 or Mann Party.

20 The IJ reasonably found that Singh-Khashre was not

21 responsive when questioned about whether he was physically

22 attacked or harmed in August 2014. See 8 U.S.C.

3 1 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales,

, 81 n.1

2 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that particular deference is

3 given to the trier of fact’s assessment of demeanor). That

4 finding and the adverse credibility determination as a whole

5 are further supported by inconsistencies in the record

6 regarding what transpired during the three alleged incidents

7 when Singh-Khashre was attacked or threatened, who attacked

8 him, who accompanied him to report an attack to police, and

9 how he obtained the evidence he submitted to corroborate his

10 claim. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Li Hua

11 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2006)

12 (“We can be still more confident in our review of observations

13 about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here, they are

14 supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.”);

15 Likai Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

16 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from

17 showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.

18 Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more

19 forcefully.”). Singh-Khashre did not compellingly explain

20 these inconsistencies. See Majidi,

(“A

21 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

22 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

4 1 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

2 to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

3 omitted)). The agency also reasonably found Singh-Khashre’s

4 credibility impugned by his submission of affidavits

5 allegedly prepared by his wife, relative, village official,

6 and neighbor that contained strikingly similar language. See

7 Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d

8 Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has . . . firmly embraced the

9 commonsensical notion that striking similarities between

10 affidavits are an indication that the statements are canned.”

11 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

12 Having questioned Singh-Khashre’s credibility, the

13 agency reasonably relied further on his failure to

14 rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating

15 evidence despite a continuance to obtain such evidence. See

16 Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An

17 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

18 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

19 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

20 that has already been called into question.”). The agency

21 did not err in declining to credit new affidavits that either

22 contradicted earlier affidavits submitted by the affiants or

5 1 conflicted with Singh-Khashre’s testimony, and a medical

2 certificate that contained internal inconsistencies. See

3 Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer

4 to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an

5 [applicant’s] documentary evidence.”).

6 Given the demeanor, inconsistency, and corroboration

7 findings, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is

8 supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.

9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of

10 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

11 three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See

12 Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

14 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

15 stays VACATED.

16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 18 Clerk of Court

6