19-4108 Zhang v. Garland BIA Conroy, IJ A206 569 641 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 10th day of March, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 YUJIE ZHANG, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 19-4108 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND 19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 1 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Stephen M. De Luca, Esq., Jersey 24 City, NJ. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffery B. Clark, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Jonathan

1 The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 1 Robbins, Senior Litigation 2 Counsel; Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial 3 Attorney, Office of Immigration 4 Litigation, United States 5 Department of Justice, Washington, 6 DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

10 is DENIED.

11 Petitioner Yujie Zhang, a native and citizen of the

12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 12,

13 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a March 16, 2018, decision

14 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). In re Yujie Zhang, No. A 206

15 569 641 (B.I.A. Nov. 12, 2019), aff’g No. A 206 569 641

16 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 16, 2018). We assume the parties’

17 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

18 We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

19 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

20 Homeland Security,

(2d Cir. 2006). We

21 review adverse credibility determinations under the

22 substantial evidence standard and treat the agency’s findings

23 of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

24 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

2 1 § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

,

2 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

3 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

4 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

5 determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s

6 or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

7 consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such

8 statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

9 inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard

10 to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

11 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant

12 factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer. . . to

13 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality

14 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-

15 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu

16 Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord

17 Hong Fei Gao,

. Substantial evidence supports

18 the adverse credibility determination.

19 The agency reasonably relied on Zhang’s inconsistent

20 statements regarding the location of her arrest. In her

21 written statement, Zhang stated that she planned to hide at

3 1 her sister’s house when her pregnancy became “more obvious”

2 but then stated that family planning officials came to her

3 own home, arrested her, took her to a hospital, and forced

4 her to have an abortion. Zhang later testified that she was

5 arrested at her sister’s home where she was in hiding. The

6 IJ was not required to credit Zhang’s explanation that she

7 called wherever she was living her home. See Majidi v.

8 Gonzales,

, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner

9 must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

10 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

11 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

12 his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

13 agency also reasonably relied on Zhang’s omission from her

14 written statement of the symptoms she suffered after the

15 forced abortion given her testimony regarding the severity of

16 the pain. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79 (“probative

17 value of the omission of certain facts” turns on “whether

18 those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would

19 reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant

20 circumstances”).

21 Because this inconsistency and omission call Zhang’s

4 1 credibility into question, the agency did not err in finding

2 that the lack of reliable corroboration further undermined

3 Zhang’s credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to

5 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

6 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

7 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

8 been called into question.”). A letter from Zhang’s U.S.

9 doctor did not mention her infection, pain, or irregular

10 periods. Zhang did not provide letters from her parents or

11 boyfriend. And her sister’s letter was consistent with her

12 testimony, but inconsistent with her written statement and

13 from an author not available for cross-examination. See Y.C.

14 v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (holding

15 that “[w]e generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the

16 weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence”

17 and upholding BIA’s decision not to credit letter from

18 applicant’s spouse).

19 In sum, the inconsistency, omission, and lack of reliable

20 corroboration are substantial evidence for the credibility

21 determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia

5 1 Lin,

. That determination is dispositive of

2 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

3 three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See

4 Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

7 stays VACATED.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court

6