21-353-cv Madej v. Yale University

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3 New York, on the 10th day of March, two thousand twenty-two. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 7 MICHAEL H. PARK, 8 MYRNA PÉREZ, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 JAKUB JONASZ MADEJ, 13 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 v. 21-353 17 18 YALE UNIVERSITY, MARVIN CHUN, 19 MARK SCHENKER, PETER SALOVEY, 20 JESSIE ROYCE HILL, 21 22 Defendants-Appellees. 23 24 _____________________________________ 25 26 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jakub Madej, pro se, Milford, 27 CT. 28 29 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Patrick M. Noonan, Donahue, 30 Durham & Noonan, PC, 31 Guilford, CT. 1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

2 (Hall, J.).

3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

4 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

5 Jakub Madej, a former Yale College student proceeding pro se, sued Yale University, as

6 well as its president and various deans (together, “Defendants”), after he was involuntarily

7 withdrawn from Yale’s undergraduate program for failing a class while on Academic Warning.

8 In his suit, Madej asserted claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, breach of

9 contract, and interference with contract, all stemming from his involuntary withdrawal from Yale.

10 The district court permitted Madej to amend his complaint twice, but eventually granted

11 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Madej

12 did not ask to amend his complaint for a third time. The district court then dismissed Madej’s

13 claims with prejudice because he had already amended twice and because Defendants would be

14 prejudiced by further delay. On appeal, Madej argues that the district court (1) erred by

15 dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim, (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant

16 him leave to amend a third time, and (3) abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with

17 prejudice sua sponte. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

18 history, and the issues on appeal.

19 I. Failure to State a Claim

20 First, the district court did not err by dismissing Madej’s complaint for failure to state a

21 claim. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Darby v.

22 Greenman,

(2d Cir. 2021). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must

2 1 plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

2 Twombly,

(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)

3 (“[Although] a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,” this tenet

4 is “inapplicable to legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action

5 . . . do not suffice.”).

6 Madej’s second amended complaint contained five causes of action: (1) fraudulent

7 misrepresentation, (2) fraud, (3) breach of contract, (4) negligence, and (5) interference with

8 contract. We agree with the district court that Madej failed to plausibly allege these claims.

9 A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraud Claims

10 The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraud under Connecticut law are

11 essentially identical: “(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue

12 and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act

13 upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon the false representation to his injury.” Manzo-Ill

14 v. Schoonmaker,

, 1211 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (citation omitted) (fraudulent

15 misrepresentation); accord Longbottom v. Longbottom,

, 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020)

16 (fraud).

17 Madej alleged that Mark Schenker, Chairman of the Committee on Honors and Academic

18 Standing (the “Committee”), made the following false statements in emails and a letter informing

19 Madej that the Committee had denied his petition appealing his involuntary withdrawal: (1) “the

20 Committee on Honors and Academic Standing met on January 13, 2020 and voted without dissent

21 not to approve Madej’s petition,” App’x 36; (2) “the Committee . . . is made up of tenured and

22 non-tenured members of the Yale College Faculty, representatives of the Yale College Dean’s

23 Office, and undergraduate students,” id. at 37; and (3) “each of the members of the Committee 3 1 received requisite documents before the alleged meeting,” id. Madej also alleged that Yale made

2 the following fraudulent statements on its website: (1) “matters related . . . to withdrawals from

3 Yale College were considered and adjudicated by [the] Committee on Honors and Academic

4 Standing, a deliberative body within Yale College,” id. at 40; (2) “the Committee meets about

5 twice a month during the regular academic year,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted); and

6 (3) “the Committee is composed of representatives of the Yale College Dean’s Office, tenured and

7 non-tenured faculty members, as well as undergraduate students,” id.

8 Madej asserted that these statements “created a misleading impression that a collective

9 body existed within Yale College that was charged with adjudicating Madej’s application” and

10 that they were made to prevent Madej from discovering that Schenker was actually the only

11 Committee member. Id. at 38. According to Madej, Schenker repeated the false statements to

12 Yale’s registrar and knew that Madej would not be able to challenge the statements because he

13 had to leave the country after being withdrawn. 1 As a result, Madej suffered unspecified

14 “damages in an amount to be proven at trial.” Id. at 39.

15 The district court did not err in dismissing these claims. Even assuming that these

16 statements about the Committee’s make-up and decision process were untrue and that Defendants

17 knew they were untrue, Madej failed to plausibly allege how the statements induced him to act or

18 injured him. See Manzo-Ill,

n.5; Longbottom, 231 A.3d at 316. Although

19 Madej alleged that the statements prevented him from contesting his withdrawal earlier, that claim

20 is in tension with Madej’s own claim that he acted expediently to contest his withdrawal as soon

21 as he became aware of it and availed himself of the Committee’s processes. He did not allege

1 According to Madej’s operative complaint, he was in the United States on a student visa and he thus had to leave the country within 15 days after being withdrawn from Yale. 4 1 what other action he could have taken but for the alleged falsities. Moreover, Madej’s claim that

2 he suffered money damages was conclusory—he offered no explanation how the statements

3 caused any such injury. See Ashcroft,

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

4 cause of action . . . do not suffice” to state a claim.). Thus, Madej failed to state a claim for

5 fraudulent misrepresentation or fraud.

6 B. Breach of Contract Claim

7 Connecticut law recognizes “a cause of action for institutional breach of a contract for

8 educational services” where the plaintiff makes a showing that “the educational institution failed

9 to fulfil[l] a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable

10 program.” Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp.,

, 119–20 (Conn. 1996).

11 Madej alleged that Yale breached a contract that had purportedly been formed upon his

12 enrollment by “not implement[ing] any procedures or policies to provide procedural safeguards to

13 student[s] who have been in the process of being involuntarily withdrawn from Yale.” App’x 42.

14 Madej alleged that Yale further breached that contract by “not following or disclosing guidelines

15 for protecting [Madej’s] fundamental rights,” which breached “the implied covenant of good faith

16 and fair dealing.”

at 42–43. Finally, Madej asserted that Yale breached by “failing to provide

17 [Madej] with timely information he needed to make reasonable decisions regarding his academic

18 choices,” “creating [a] hostile atmosphere in his residential college, where he felt alienated and

19 unwelcome by his college dean,” “providing conflicting, illogical answers to all questions

20 regarding his [involuntary withdrawal] situation, and refusing to provide reasonable support,” and

21 “refusing to consider whether the Committee’s decision [wa]s arbitrary, [or] supported by the

22 evidence, and not providing any way to request such action.”

23 Even accepting these allegations as true, they fail to state a breach of contract claim under 5 1 Connecticut law because Madej did not allege that his contract with Yale included a specific

2 promise that the school would provide such information or processes. Instead, he merely alleged

3 that “[i]t is well-settled that a relationship between a student and a university in which he enrolls

4 is contractual in nature,” and “[a] material part of that contract is the conditions, procedures, and

5 policies in which a student may be involuntarily withdrawn from the university.” App’x 42.

6 Madej points to no specific contractual promise that Yale allegedly breached, so his breach of

7 contract claim fails. See, e.g., Faigel v. Fairfield Univ.,

(Conn. 2003) (holding

8 alleged promise that plaintiff “would be allowed ‘many credits’ from her prior engineering studies

9 . . . is too imprecise to qualify for consideration as a ‘specific contractual promise’”).

10 C. Negligence Claim

11 “The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are . . . duty; breach of that duty;

12 causation; and actual injury.” Osborn v. City of Waterbury,

, 6 (Conn. 2019). A

13 negligence claim against a university is cognizable “[i]f the duty alleged to have been breached is

14 the common-law duty not to cause physical injury by negligent conduct,” Doe v. Yale Univ., 748

, 847 (Conn. 2000).

16 Madej alleged that Defendants were negligent when they knowingly failed to adopt a

17 “mechanism or avenue for appeal” of his involuntary withdrawal. App’x 44. This failure

18 allegedly breached several duties of care, including: (1) the “duty to provide him with information

19 that might materially impact [his academic choices],” (2) the “duty to protect him from reasonable

20 harm,” and (3) the “duty of reasonable care.”

But none of these allegations amounts to a

21 breach of “the common-law duty not to cause physical injury by negligent conduct.” Doe, 748

22 A.2d at 847. Moreover, Madej does not allege that he suffered physical injury due to Defendants’

23 failure to implement adequate processes for contesting withdrawal. Thus, Madej failed to state a 6 1 negligence claim.

2 To the extent that Madej claims that he asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

3 distress, he also failed to state a claim. A negligent infliction of emotional distress claim requires

4 a showing that “(1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff

5 emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe

6 enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause

7 of the plaintiff’s distress.” Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

(Conn. 2003). Madej

8 alleged that “Defendants knew that [Madej] had been treated for depression, and that [he]

9 reasonably relied on their duty to protect him from harm.” App’x 44. He further alleged that

10 “[a] reasonable person would have suffered severe emotional distress under the same or similar

11 circumstances.”

Accepting these allegations as true, they are conclusory and do not

12 sufficiently address injury. The district court thus correctly determined that Madej failed to state

13 a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

14 D. Interference with Contract Claim

15 “A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to

16 establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant’s

17 knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant’s intent to interfere with the relationship; (4) that

18 the interference was tortious; and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the

19 defendant’s tortious conduct.” Bai Haiyan v. Hamden Public Schs.,

(D.

).

21 Madej alleged that he “was in an employment contract with Professor Edward A. Snyder”

22 while enrolled at Yale and that “Mark Schenker knew about [Madej’s] contract because [he]

23 specifically indicated so in his petition [to the Committee].” App’x 44. Madej also alleged that 7 1 “Mark Schenker engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation” and “acted with reckless disregard to

2 [Madej’s] employment and cause[d] its termination,” and that “[h]ad it not been for Schenker’s

3 conduct, Madej would not have suffered a loss of employment and employment authorization.”

4 Id. at 45.

5 Missing from the complaint is an allegation that any Defendant intended to interfere with

6 Madej’s employment contract, an essential element of an intentional interference with contractual

7 relations claim. See Bai Haiyan,

. Madej thus failed to state a claim for

8 interference with contract.

9 II. Leave to Amend

10 Second, Madej argues that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him leave

11 to amend his complaint for the third time. We generally review the denial of leave to amend for

12 abuse of discretion. See Pasternak v. Shrader,

(2d Cir. 2017). Although

13 courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), it “may

14 properly be denied for . . . ‘undue delay, . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

15 previously allowed, [or] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

16 amendment.’” Ruotolo v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v.

17 Davis,

(1962)).

18 The district court did not abuse its discretion because Madej never requested leave to

19 amend his complaint for a third time. Even if he had done so, the district court would have acted

20 well within its discretion by declining the request. The district court had already permitted Madej

21 to amend his complaint twice, but he still failed to state plausible claims for relief despite having

22 the benefit of some discovery, the district court’s ruling on Madej’s preliminary injunction motion,

23 and review of Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. See Ruotolo,

; Bellikoff v. 8 1 Eaton Vance Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2007) (no abuse of discretion in denying leave to

2 amend where plaintiff had “two previous opportunities” to do so). Moreover, granting leave to

3 amend would unduly prejudice Defendants by further delaying the litigation. See

4 III. Sua Sponte Dismissal with Prejudice

5 Third, Madej argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint

6 with prejudice sua sponte. We ordinarily review a district court’s decision to dismiss with

7 prejudice for abuse of discretion. See Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A.,

(2d

8 Cir. 1998). Madej argues that the district court abused its discretion because Defendants had not

9 requested dismissal with prejudice, and because he never amended in bad faith or “with the benefit

10 of a ruling.” Even if Madej never amended in bad faith, he did amend with the benefit of

11 discovery, the order resolving the preliminary injunction motion, and Defendants’ first motion to

12 dismiss, and he still failed to state a claim. Madej points to no authority suggesting that a court’s

13 dismissal with prejudice sua sponte is in itself improper, and we do not conclude that it was an

14 abuse of discretion in these circumstances.

15 * * * 16 17 We have considered Madej’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

18 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

9