19-2449 Singh v. Garland BIA Poczter, IJ A208 191 895 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 21st day of April, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8 DENNIS JACOBS, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 HARVINDER SINGH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 19-2449 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Richard W. Chen, Esq., New York, 24 NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 27 General; Jessica E. Burns, Senior 28 Litigation Counsel; Nelle M. 1 Seymour, Trial Attorney, Office of 2 Immigration Litigation, United 3 States Department of Justice, 4 Washington, DC.

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

8 is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Harvinder Singh, a native and citizen of

10 India, seeks review of a July 17, 2019 decision of the BIA

11 affirming a January 30, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge

12 (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and

13 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re

14 Harvinder Singh, No. A 208 191 895 (B.I.A. July 17, 2019),

15 aff’g No. A 208 191 895 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 30, 2018).

16 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

17 and procedural history.

18 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the

19 BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review

21 are well established. See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei

22 Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing

23 adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence).

2 1 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

2 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

3 determination on the . . . consistency between the

4 applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the

5 internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency

6 of such statements with other evidence of

7 record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

8 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

9 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

10 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer [] to an IJ’s credibility

11 determination unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable

12 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

13 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008);

14 accord Hong Fei Gao,

. Substantial evidence

15 supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not

16 credible as to his claim that members of rival political

17 parties attacked him because of his membership in the Akali

18 Dal Mann Party.

19 The agency reasonably relied on discrepancies between

20 Singh’s testimony, written statement, and documentary

21 evidence. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Singh

3 1 testified that he twice sought medical treatment for injuries

2 sustained in beatings by rival party members, but his

3 application and a March 2017 letter from a doctor mentioned

4 only one visit. The agency did not err in relying on this

5 omission of a second medical visit because Singh testified

6 about such a visit to explain another inconsistency about who

7 helped him get to the doctor, and his explanations for the

8 omission from the doctor’s letter were themselves

9 inconsistent. See Hong Fei Gao,

(explaining

10 that an IJ may rely on “omissions that tend to show that an

11 applicant has fabricated his or her claim”); Majidi v.

12 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

13 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

14 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

15 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

16 his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).

17 Second, Singh’s testimony was inconsistent with three

18 letters he provided to corroborate his testimony about the

19 attacks against him. One author, Quilla Singh, described

20 himself as a member of Singh’s political party, but Singh

21 testified that Quilla was his neighbor and not a party member.

4 1 Singh also submitted letters from two additional witnesses

2 who identified themselves as Singh’s neighbors and who

3 described the attacks, explicitly stating that they were

4 present for the attacks; in contrast, Singh testified that

5 these neighbors did not witness the attacks. Singh’s

6 explanation that the authors of these letters were mistaken

7 was not compelling given the detail in the letters about what

8 was witnessed. See Majidi,

.

9 Moreover, Singh’s failure to corroborate his testimony

10 with reliable documentary evidence further undermined his

11 credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

, 273

12 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his

13 . . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence

14 of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

15 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

16 question.”). Singh argues that the agency failed to

17 adequately consider his country conditions evidence, but the

18 record does not suggest that the IJ ignored material evidence,

19 given that Singh was not credible as to his political

20 involvement or his attacks. See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s

5 1 evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s

2 documentary evidence.”); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of

3 Justice,

, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume

4 that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before

5 him, unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

6 In sum, given the inconsistencies about the alleged

7 attacks, the omissions, and the lack of reliable

8 corroboration, substantial evidence supports the agency’s

9 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.

10 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,

; Biao Yang,

11

. This determination is dispositive of

12 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

13 three forms of relief are based on the same discredited

14 factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–

15 57 (2d Cir. 2006).

16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

18 stays VACATED.

19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 21 Clerk of Court

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