20–414 Kaur v. Garland BIA Navarro, IJ A 206 564 360/361/362/363

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 STEVEN J. MENASHI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 DALJIT KAUR, SATPAL SINGH, MANVEER 14 SINGH BHAMRA, KARANVEER SINGH BHAMRA, 15 Petitioners, 16 17 v. 20–414 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONERS: Genet Getachew, Esq., Law Office 25 of Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; Anthony P. 1 Nicastro , Assistant Director; 2 Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial 3 Attorney, Office of Immigration 4 Litigation, United States 5 Department of Justice, Washington, 6 DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

10 is DENIED.

11 Petitioners Daljit Kaur, Satpal Singh, Manveer Singh

12 Bhamra, Karanveer Singh Bhamra, natives and citizens of

13 India, seek review of a January 7, 2020 decision of the BIA

14 affirming a March 30, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

15 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

16 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Daljit

17 Kaur, et al., Nos. A 206 564 360/361/362/363 (B.I.A. Jan. 7,

18 2020), aff’g Nos. A 206 564 360/361/362/363 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.

19 City Mar. 30, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with

20 the underlying facts and procedural history.

21 We review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the

22 sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

23 Security,

(2d Cir. 2006). We review adverse

24 credibility determinations for substantial evidence, see Hong

2 1 Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and we

2 treat the agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any

3 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

4 contrary,”

(b)(4)(B). “The scope of review

5 under the substantial evidence standard is exceedingly

6 narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the

7 petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so

8 compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find

9 him eligible for relief.” Singh v. Garland,

,

10 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

11 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

12 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

13 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

14 the applicant . . ., the inherent plausibility of the

15 applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between the

16 applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . ., the

17 internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency

18 of such statements with other evidence of record . . ., and

19 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without

20 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

21 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

3 1 relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer

2 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the

3 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable

4 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

5 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008);

6 accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

7 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the

8 adverse credibility determination. To begin with, Singh and

9 Kaur alleged that Singh was beaten and detained and that their

10 family was threatened because of their support for the

11 Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party. But the agency

12 reasonably relied on inconsistencies between statements from

13 Singh, Kaur, and Singh’s father, as well as omissions from

14 Singh’s own statements relating to the severity of the abuse

15 that prompted Singh to flee to Canada in 1987 and 1997, what

16 happened to his family in India while he was away, and whether

17 he was detained and tortured by the police when he returned

18 from Canada in 2003. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu

19 Xia Lin,

(“[A]n IJ may rely on any

20 inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility

21 determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’

4 1 establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.”). The

2 agency was not required to accept Singh and Kaur’s explanation

3 that Kaur did not tell Singh about threats while he was away,

4 since Kaur told Singh about less serious harm. Siewe v.

5 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are

6 two permissible views of the evidence,” we defer to the

7 factfinder’s choice “so long as the deductions are not

8 illogical or implausible.” (internal quotation marks

9 omitted)).

10 The agency also reasonably relied on a lack of

11 corroboration. See

(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the

12 trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide

13 evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such

14 evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have

15 the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”);

16 Zou v. Garland, No. 19-2003,

, at *1 (2d Cir.

17 Sept. 9, 2021) (“Even absent an adverse credibility

18 determination, a lack of corroboration may be an independent

19 basis for the denial of relief if the agency identifies

20 reasonably available evidence that should have been

21 presented.”). The agency reasonably gave little weight to

5 1 supporting affidavits because Singh’s father’s affidavit was

2 inconsistent with Singh’s own statements, and affidavits from

3 two Mann party officials include some identical language. 1

4 See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We

5 defer to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to

6 an alien’s documentary evidence.”); Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t

7 of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[S]triking

8 similarities between affidavits are an indication that the

9 statements are ‘canned.’”).

10 The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration

11 provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

12 determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia

13 Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–67. The adverse credibility

14 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

15 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on

16 the same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v.

17 Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

18

19

1 Petitioners do not acknowledge or explain why one of the affidavits pertains to an unrelated individual, S. Dilbag Singh. Certified Admin. Record at 260. 6 1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3 stays VACATED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 6 Clerk of Court

7