20-3442 Chhetri v. Garland BIA Schoppert, IJ A202 088 106 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 STEVEN J. MENASHI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 DIL BAHADUR CHHETRI, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 20-3442 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Dilli Raj Bhatta, Esq., Bhatta 24 Law & Associates, New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Brianne Whelan 28 Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; 1 Christina R. Zeidan, Trial 2 Attorney, Office of Immigration 3 Litigation, United States 4 Department of Justice, Washington, 5 DC.

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Dil Bahadur Chhetri, a native and citizen of

11 Nepal, seeks review of a September 14, 2020 decision of the

12 BIA affirming an August 21, 2018 decision of an Immigration

13 Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and

14 protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In

15 re Dil Bahadur Chhetri, No. A 202 088 106 (B.I.A. Sept. 14,

16 2020), aff’g No. A 202 088 106 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 21,

17 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

18 underlying facts and procedural history.

19 We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

20 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

21 Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). We review

22 the agency’s adverse credibility determination for

23 substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and treat the agency’s findings of 2 1 fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

2 be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1252(b)(4)(B). “The scope of review under the substantial

4 evidence standard is exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold

5 the BIA’s decision unless the petitioner demonstrates that

6 the record evidence was so compelling that no reasonable

7 factfinder could fail to find him eligible for relief.”

8 Singh v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2021) (internal

9 quotation marks omitted).

10 The agency denied relief on the basis of an adverse

11 credibility determination. “Considering the totality of the

12 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

13 base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

14 responsiveness of the applicant . . ., the inherent

15 plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the

16 consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and oral

17 statements . . ., the internal consistency of each such

18 statement, the consistency of such statements with other

19 evidence of record . . ., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods

20 in such statements, without regard to whether an

21 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

3 1 the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

3 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

4 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

5 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin

6 v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

7 Gao,

.

8 In this case, substantial evidence supports the adverse

9 credibility determination. Chhetri alleged that he was

10 attacked by Maoists because of his support for the Nepali

11 Congress Party. The agency reasonably relied on

12 inconsistencies within and between Chhetri’s statements and

13 explanations for the motivation and timing of the attacks.

14 For example, he alleged attacks in 2013 because the Maoists

15 were angry about election losses, but he identified some of

16 the attacks as occurring before the election. When asked to

17 explain, he introduced an additional inconsistency, first

18 alleging that the attacks were prompted by losses in the 2008

19 election and then alleging that he had been in hiding to

20 explain the lag between the 2008 election and the 2013

21 attacks. The agency was not required to accept this

4 1 explanation because it added a further inconsistency and was

2 uncorroborated. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d

3 Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

4 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

5 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be

6 compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

7 omitted)).

8 The agency also reasonably concluded that Chhetri failed

9 to produce reliable corroboration. An applicant’s testimony

10 may be sufficient without corroboration, “but only if the

11 applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s

12 testimony is credible . . . [and] persuasive.” 8 U.S.C.

13 § 1158(b)(B)(ii). “In determining whether the applicant has

14 met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the

15 credible testimony along with other evidence of record.” Id.

16 The agency did not err in declining to credit affidavits with

17 identical language. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

18

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur case law on intra-

19 proceeding similarities has firmly embraced the

20 commonsensical notion that striking similarities between

21 affidavits are an indication that the statements are

5 1 ‘canned.’”); Singh v. BIA,

(2d Cir. 2006).

2 Given the inconsistencies about the attacks, Chhetri’s

3 late and unsupported allegation that he had been in hiding,

4 and the similarity of the supporting affidavits, substantial

5 evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

6 determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia

7 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167–68; see also Likai Gao v. Barr,

137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency

9 might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled

10 to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so

11 preclude even more forcefully.”). That determination is

12 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

13 because all three claims were based on the same factual

14 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d

15 Cir. 2006).

16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

18 stays VACATED.

19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 21 Clerk of Court

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