20-977 Jiang v. Garland BIA Loprest, IJ A205 436 949 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 30th day of August, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 8 EUNICE C. LEE, 9 MYRNA PÉREZ, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 LING JIANG, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 20-977 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Vlad Kuzmin, Kuzmin & Assocs., 24 P.C., New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: John V. Coghlan, Deputy Assistant 27 Attorney General; Jessica A. 28 Dawgert, Senior Litigation 29 Counsel; Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial 30 Attorney, Office of Immigration 1 Litigation, United States 2 Department of Justice, Washington,

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

7 is GRANTED.*

8 Petitioner Ling Jiang, a native and citizen of the

9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 5, 2020,

10 decision of the BIA affirming an April 25, 2018, decision of

11 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s application for

12 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

13 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ling Jiang, No.

14 A205-436-949 (B.I.A. Mar. 5, 2020), aff’g No. A 205-436-949

15 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 25, 2018). We assume the parties’

16 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s

* Judge Sullivan would deny the petition for review in light of the “particular deference” owed to the credibility findings made by an Immigration Judge, who “has the unique advantage among all officials involved in the process of having heard directly from the applicant.” Li v. INS,

, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Majidi v. Gonzales,

, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the “particular weight” we afford to “the IJ’s assessment of [a] petitioner’s demeanor,” and “underscor[ing] the general significance of such assessments to credibility findings” (emphasis added)). He therefore respectfully dissents. 2 1 decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the IJ’s

2 timeliness finding that the BIA did not reach. See Xue Hong

3 Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir.

4 2005). The applicable standards of review are well

5 established. See

(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.

6 Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse

7 credibility determination under substantial evidence

8 standard).

9 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

10 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

11 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

12 the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the

13 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

14 the internal consistency of each such statement . . . without

15 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

16 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

17 relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). Although

18 “[w]e defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,

19 . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make

20 such an adverse credibility ruling,” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

21

(2d Cir. 2008), we remand when, as here,

3 1 there are errors in the findings underlying the adverse

2 credibility determination and we are not “confident that the

3 agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration

4 cleansed of errors,” Gurung v. Barr,

(2d Cir.

5 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

6 The IJ found that Jiang was not credible as to his claim

7 that he was detained and beaten for practicing Christianity

8 in China. The IJ found that Jiang gave the impression that

9 his testimony was memorized because (1) he became

10 unresponsive on cross-examination when asked questions

11 similar to those he had answered concisely on direct

12 examination, and (2) he lacked candor by failing to testify

13 to details provided in his written application. Although we

14 defer to an IJ’s assessment of demeanor, see Majidi v.

15 Gonzales,

, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005), these findings

16 are not supported by the record.

17 The IJ found Jiang unresponsive when he could not

18 remember the name on the false passport a smuggler gave him

19 to travel to the United States, but he testified consistently

20 on direct and cross that he could not remember the full name.

21 His inability to remember a fact does not amount to

4 1 unresponsiveness. The IJ further cited Jiang’s testimony

2 regarding his stay at a hotel with his smuggler, but that

3 testimony was confusing, not unresponsive, and thus did not

4 support the IJ’s conclusion that Jiang’s testimony was

5 memorized. The IJ also found that Jiang’s testimony

6 regarding his beating and the food he ate in detention lacked

7 detail when compared to his application and thus showed a

8 lack of candor, but Jiang responded candidly to the questions

9 his attorney asked and neither the IJ nor the Government’s

10 attorney asked him any questions about those aspects of his

11 claim, much less asked for more details. See Jin Shui Qiu

12 v. Ashcroft,

, 152 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]f

13 the [DHS] or IJ has nagging doubts about an applicant’s

14 credibility due to the spareness of h[is] testimony . . . it

15 would seem prudent for the [DHS] or IJ to pose questions aimed

16 at eliciting inconsistent or inherently implausible

17 statements.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang

18 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2007).

19 Accordingly, the agency’s demeanor findings are not supported

20 by the record, and we do not defer to them.

21 The only other basis for the adverse credibility

5 1 determination that the BIA affirmed was the IJ’s finding that

2 Jiang made inconsistent statements regarding how long he was

3 detained. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e may consider only those issues

5 that formed the basis for that decision.”). That finding was

6 erroneous because Jiang’s statements were not inconsistent:

7 he stated in his application that he was detained for “over

8 half a month,” and he testified that he was detained for “more

9 than 10 days.” See Gurung,

(“Credibility should

10 not be questioned based on trivial differences in word choices

11 alone.”).

12 We remand because the agency’s adverse credibility

13 determination is not supported by any error-free findings.

14

. The agency’s remaining findings do not render

15 remand futile: if, on remand, the agency concludes that Jiang

16 stated a credible claim of past persecution, then he will be

17 entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.

18 See

(b)(1) (presumption of well-founded

19 fear of persecution arising from past persecution is rebutted

20 by fundamental change in circumstances or ability to safely

21 relocate in country of nationality).

6 1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is

3 REMANDED for further proceedings. All pending motions and

4 applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

5 FOR THE COURT: 6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 7 Clerk of Court

7