Lin v. Garland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Lin v. Garland

Opinion

20-3884 Lin v. Garland BIA Brennan, IJ A206 894 908 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 9th day of September, two thousand twenty-two. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 GERARD E. LYNCH, 8 MICHAEL H. PARK, 9 BETH ROBINSON, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 BO QIU LIN, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 20-3884 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, Esq., New York, 24 NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy 27 Assistant Attorney General; 28 Jessica A. Dawgert, Senior 1 Litigation Counsel; Thanh Lieu 2 Duong, Trial Attorney, Office of 3 Immigration Litigation, United 4 States Department of Justice, 5 Washington, DC.

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Bo Qiu Lin, a native and citizen of the

11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 8,

12 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a May 23, 2018, decision

13 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

15 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bo Qiu Lin, No.

16 A 206 894 908 (B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2020), aff’g No. A 206 894 908

17 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 23, 2018). We assume the parties’

18 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

20 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

417 F.3d 268, 271

(2d

21 Cir. 2005). We review adverse credibility determinations for

22 substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

891 F.3d 23 67, 76

(2d Cir. 2018), and treat the agency’s findings of

2 1 fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

2 be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1252(b)(4)(B).

4 The IJ may base its credibility determination, under the

5 totality of the circumstances, on the applicant’s “demeanor,

6 candor, or responsiveness,” the “inherent plausibility” of

7 the applicant’s account, the consistency between and within

8 the applicant’s statements, the extent to which these

9 statements are consistent with the rest of the record, and

10 “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without

11 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

12 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

13 relevant factor.”

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer

14 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the

15 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable

16 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

17 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

534 F.3d 162, 167

(2d Cir. 2008);

18 accord Hong Fei Gao,

891 F.3d at 76

.

19 Lin alleged that the police arrested, detained,

20 interrogated, tortured, and beat him after a raid on the

21 underground Christian church he attended. Substantial

3 1 evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.

2 As an initial matter, we give “particular deference” to

3 an IJ’s demeanor finding because the IJ is “in the best

4 position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the

5 witness’s testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather,

6 can be attributed to an innocent cause such as difficulty

7 understanding the question.” Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of

8 Justice,

453 F.3d 99, 109

(2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks

9 omitted).

10 The record supports the IJ’s demeanor finding. Lin was

11 not responsive to questions concerning how he was introduced

12 to the church and his mother’s practice of Christianity. On

13 occasion, he had to be asked questions multiple times. Lin’s

14 explanation – that he had difficulty answering because of his

15 limited education – does not compel a contrary conclusion,

16 especially given that the questions were about events in his

17 own life. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

430 F.3d 77, 80

(2d Cir.

18 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

19 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

20 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be

21 compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks

4 1 omitted)).

2 Relatedly, the agency also reasonably relied on

3 implausible aspects of Lin’s claim, including his allegations

4 that his mother became a Christian in 2011 while he was living

5 with her but did not tell him about that practice until 2013,

6 when he was no longer living with her, and that the friend he

7 ran into in 2013 coincidentally introduced him to the church

8 his mother attended. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(iii). The

9 findings are sufficiently “tethered” to the record given

10 Lin’s lack of clear explanation as to why his mother would

11 attend a church and hour and a half drive from her home and

12 his confused testimony about interactions with his mother

13 concerning Christianity. Siewe v. Gonzales,

480 F.3d 160

,

14 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (deferring to agency’s inference if it is

15 “available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single

16 fact viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary

17 experience,” i.e., “[s]o long as an inferential leap is

18 tethered to the evidentiary record”).

19 Given that Lin’s credibility was in question, the IJ also

20 permissibly relied on the lack of reliable corroboration.

21 “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony

5 1 may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration

2 in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate

3 testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao

4 Yang v. Gonzales,

496 F.3d 268, 273

(2d Cir. 2007). Lin did

5 not provide a letter from the friend who introduced him to

6 the church in China, or a letter from the aunt whom he

7 allegedly stayed with after he fled following a second raid.

8 Nor did he call a witness to confirm his continued church

9 attendance in the United States. To the extent he contends

10 that he could not reach the friend in China, he did not

11 explain why, nor indeed whether he tried to do so. Moreover,

12 although an IJ must identify “reasonably” available evidence

13 to deny relief for lack of corroboration of credible

14 testimony, Wei Sun v. Sessions,

883 F.3d 23, 28

(2d Cir.

15 2018), quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1158

(b)(1)(B)(ii), where, as here,

16 credibility is already in question, the absence of

17 corroboration simply prevents the applicant from

18 rehabilitating the testimony in question, see Biao Yang, 496

19 F.3d at 273; Chuilu Liu v. Holder,

575 F.3d 193

, 198 n.5 (2d

20 Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between principles of credibility

21 and corroboration). The agency was not required to credit

6 1 Lin’s other documentary evidence. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741

2

F.3d 324, 332, 334

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the

3 agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

4 applicant’s documentary evidence.”).

5 Given Lin’s demeanor, the implausible aspects of his

6 story, and the lack of reliable corroboration, substantial

7 evidence supports the adverse credibility

8 determination. The adverse credibility determination is

9 dispositive because asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

10 relief were all based on the same factual predicate. See

11 Paul v. Gonzales,

444 F.3d 148

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

14 stays VACATED.

15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 17 Clerk of Court

7

Reference

Status
Unpublished