Crisostomo-Temaj v. Garland
Crisostomo-Temaj v. Garland
Opinion
20-3781 Crisostomo-Temaj v. Garland BIA Hochul, IJ A 208 908 012 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of October, two thousand twenty- two.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
BELISARIO CRISOSTOMO-TEMAJ, Petitioner,
v. 20-3781 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jose Perez, Law Offices of Jose Perez, P.C., Syracuse, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, Assistant Director; Nehal H. Kamani, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Belisario Crisostomo-Temaj, a native and
citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of an October 5, 2020
decision of the BIA summarily affirming a May 15, 2020
decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”), which denied his
motion to rescind his order of removal entered in absentia.
In re Crisostomo-Temaj, No. A 208 908 012 (B.I.A. Oct. 5,
2020), aff’g No. A 208 908 012 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo May 15,
2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
Because the BIA issued a summary affirmance, we review
the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. See Shunfu
Li v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 141, 146(2d Cir. 2008). We review
the agency’s denial of a motion to rescind for abuse of
discretion. Alrefae v. Chertoff,
471 F.3d 353, 357(2d Cir.
2006). “An abuse of discretion may be found in those 2 circumstances where the [agency]’s decision provides no
rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established
policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary
or conclusory statements; that is to say, where the [agency]
has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Kaur v.
BIA,
413 F.3d 232, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
If a noncitizen fails to appear at his removal
proceedings after being provided with written notice, the
noncitizen “shall be ordered removed in absentia if [DHS]
establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that the written notice was so provided and that the alien is
removable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). However, an order
of removal entered in absentia “may be rescinded . . . upon
a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of
the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the
failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances
(as defined in subsection (e)(1)).” Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
“The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ refers to exceptional
circumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the alien
or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the
3 alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or
parent of the alien, but not including less compelling
circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.” Id.
§ 1229a(e)(1).
Crisostomo-Temaj alleged that he failed to appear at his
hearing because his uncle who had planned to drive him
unexpectedly had to pick up his own son, and the alternate
driver he arranged had car trouble on the morning of the
hearing. “[T]he alien bears the ultimate burden of
introducing [corroborating] evidence without prompting from
the IJ.” Chuilu Liu v. Holder,
575 F.3d 193, 198(2d Cir.
2009). Here, Crisotomo-Temaj failed to submit any affidavits
or statements to corroborate his claim regarding the
circumstances surrounding his failure to appear. Therefore,
the IJ did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, given
the absence of “specific, detailed evidence to corroborate
his claim,” Crisotomo-Temaj had failed to demonstrate
“exceptional circumstances” warranting rescission of the
removal order. Certified Administrative Record at 58
(quoting 8 § 1229a(e)(1)).
Furthermore, the IJ did not deprive Crisostomo-Temaj of
4 due process. Crisostomo-Temaj did not dispute receiving
notice, nor did he challenge the “exceptional circumstances”
standard, and the IJ is authorized to enter an in absentia
removal order when the noncitizen does not appear. See Jean
Louis v. Att’y Gen. U.S.,
914 F.3d 189, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“If we held that in absentia hearings violated due process,
we would effectively invalidate 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A),
which specifically permits in absentia hearings. And we would
perversely let aliens avoid removal by not attending their
hearings. So in absentia removal orders do not categorically
violate due process.”).
Crisostomo-Temaj’s remaining arguments fail. He argues
that the IJ improperly declined to waive the filing fee for
his motion to reopen, but the record reflects that the IJ
waived the fee. He also asserts that the agency did not
consider the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on his failure
to appear in January 2020, but New York State and federal
restrictions did not begin until March 2020, see Melendez v.
City of New York,
16 F.4th 992, 997–1001 (2d Cir. 2021), and
Crisostomo-Temaj did not exhaust this issue by raising it in
his motion to rescind or on appeal to the BIA, see Lin Zhong
5 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
480 F.3d 104, 123(2d Cir. 2007)
(“usually . . . issues not raised to the BIA will not be
examined by the reviewing court”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
6
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished