20-2680 Singh v. Garland BIA Verrillo, IJ A202 038 769 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 15th day of December, two thousand twenty- 5 two. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 DENNIS JACOBS, 9 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 MANJIT SINGH, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 20-2680 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Esq., New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Anthony C. 28 Payne, Assistant Director; 29 Kathleen Kelly Volkert, Trial 30 Attorney, Office of Immigration 1 Litigation, United States 2 Department of Justice, Washington, 3 DC.

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

7 is DENIED.

8 Petitioner Manjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,

9 seeks review of a July 21, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming

10 an April 17, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

11 denying his application for withholding of removal, and

12 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 In re

13 Manjit Singh, No. A 202 038 769 (B.I.A. July 21, 2020), aff’g

14 No. A 202 038 769 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Apr. 17, 2018). We

15 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

16 procedural history.

17 We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

18 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

(2d

19 Cir. 2005). We review adverse credibility determinations for

20 substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and treat the agency’s findings of

1 Singh did not exhaust a challenge to the denial of his asylum claim as time barred. See Karaj v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006). 2 1 fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

2 be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Considering the totality of the

4 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

5 base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency

6 between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral

7 statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such

8 statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with

9 other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an

10 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

11 the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”

12

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

13 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

14 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

15 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin

16 v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

17 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the

18 agency’s adverse credibility determination.

19 Singh alleged that members of the Congress Party attacked

20 and threatened him on account of his membership in the

21 Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA Party”). The

22 agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies within Singh’s

3 1 statements and between his statements and documentary

2 evidence. As the agency found, the record was inconsistent

3 about whether Congress Party members contacted Singh’s

4 sisters, and whether Singh received medical treatment for an

5 attack in 2012 or 2015. The agency was not required to credit

6 Singh’s explanations of typographical error. See Majidi v.

7 Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

8 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

9 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

10 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

11 his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). The agency did

12 not err in relying on Singh’s father’s omission of his own

13 beating, as that beating was allegedly perpetrated by

14 Congress Party members looking for Singh. See Hong Fei Gao,

15 891 F.3d at 78 (“the probative value of a witness’s prior

16 silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts

17 are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to

18 disclose”). And Singh’s supporting affidavits further

19 undermined his credibility because they contained “nearly

20 identical language.” Singh v. BIA,

(2d

21 Cir. 2006); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

22

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court . . . has

4 1 firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that striking

2 similarities between affidavits are an indication that the

3 statements are ‘canned.’”).

4 In sum, the inconsistencies, omission, and canned

5 affidavits provide substantial evidence for the agency’s

6 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.

7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78; Mei

8 Chai Ye,

. The adverse credibility

9 determination is dispositive of withholding of removal and

10 CAT relief because both claims are based on the same factual

11 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d

12 Cir. 2006).

13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

14 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

15 stays VACATED.

16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 18 Clerk of Court 19

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