20-2780 Terera v. Garland BIA Christensen, IJ A209 760 199 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 12th day of January, two thousand twenty- 5 three. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 10 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 YUNUSA TERERA, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 20-2780 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Patrick Crowley, Esq., New York, 25 NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General, Civil Division; 1 Bernard A. Joseph, Senior 2 Litigation Counsel, Office of 3 Immigration Litigation; Katherine 4 S. Fischer, Trial Attorney, U.S. 5 Department of Justice, Civil 6 Division, Office of Immigration 7 Litigation, Washington, DC.

8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11 is DENIED.

12 Petitioner Yunusa Terera, a native and citizen of The

13 Gambia, seeks review of an August 6, 2020 decision of the BIA

14 affirming a May 23, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

15 (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding

16 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

17 (“CAT”). See In re Yunusa Terera, No. A 209 760 199 (B.I.A.

18 Aug. 6, 2020), aff’g No. A 209 760 199 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

19 May 23, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

20 underlying facts and procedural history.

21 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

22 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

(2d

23 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well

24 established. See

(b)(4)(B) (“administrative

25 findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 2 1 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”);

2 Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018)

3 (reviewing adverse credibility determination for substantial

4 evidence).

5 An IJ may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the

6 circumstances” base a credibility determination on

7 inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements or between his

8 statements and other evidence, “without regard to whether an

9 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

10 the applicant’s claim.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

11 defer [] to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

12 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

13 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

14 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

15 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

. In the instant

16 matter, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

17 determination.

18 Terera testified that his family and village elders tried

19 to force him to marry and then assaulted and threatened him

20 when he refused. The agency reasonably relied on

21 inconsistencies between his testimony and letters from his

3 1 brother and stepfather. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii).

2 Terera’s brother and stepfather stated that the family was

3 compelling Terera to marry his uncle’s 10-year-old daughter,

4 but Terera testified that he was being forced to marry someone

5 older than him. The agency was not required to accept his

6 explanation that there were two different individuals because

7 he mentioned that otherwise uncorroborated fact only when

8 confronted with the discrepancy. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430

, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than

10 offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements

11 to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

12 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal

13 quotation marks omitted)). In addition, the record reflects

14 inconsistencies regarding how serious his family was about

15 the marriage, whether his father died in 2010 or was alive

16 and arranged for the marriage in 2014, and when Terera left

17 The Gambia.

18 These inconsistencies constitute substantial evidence

19 for the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.

20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,

(“[E]ven

21 where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken

4 1 separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the

2 claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed

3 consequential by the fact-finder.”); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

5 inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

6 was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies

7 would so preclude even more forcefully.” (citation omitted)).

8 Contrary to Terera’s position, the adverse credibility

9 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

10 removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are

11 based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,

12

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

13 Finally, we find no merit to Terera’s remaining argument.

14 He did not ask to present expert testimony at his hearing,

15 and expert testimony would not have resolved the

16 inconsistencies in his claim. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey,

17

(2d Cir. 2008) (“Parties claiming denial of

18 due process in immigration cases must, in order to prevail,

19 allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the

20 challenged process.” (quotation marks omitted)).

21

5 1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3 stays VACATED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 6 Clerk of Court

6