19-2208 Singh v. Garland BIA Laforest, IJ A206 468 833 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of January, two thousand twenty- three.

PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

KULDEEP SINGH, Petitioner,

v. 19-2208

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Carl McIntyre , Assistant Director; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Kuldeep Singh, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a June 27, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming

a February 5, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Kuldeep Singh, No. A 206 468 833 (B.I.A. Jun.

27, 2019), aff’g No. A 206 468 833 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb.

5, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and

supplemented by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice,

(2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v.

Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005). The applicable

standards of review are well established. See

(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

(2d

2 Cir. 2009); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d

Cir. 2018).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

the applicant or witness” and on inconsistencies within and

between an applicant’s statements and other evidence,

“without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

other relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

. In this case,

substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

determination reached by the agency given the omissions and

inconsistencies in the record and the IJ’s demeanor findings.

Singh alleged that he was attacked by members of a rival

political party when he was returning from a conference of

his own party, the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”)

3 party, in December 2010. Singh also alleged that in February

2014, after returning from abroad, two men physically

threatened him, telling him to leave his political party or

they would return for him. However, as the agency found,

Singh gave inconsistent testimony regarding the 2010 attack,

thus undermining his credibility.

Specifically, although Singh alleged in his application

that his face was covered during the attack, Singh’s direct

testimony omitted any reference to his face or head being

covered. On cross-examination, Singh failed to mention that

either his face or head was covered despite repeated

questioning regarding what he was able to see during the

attack, only eventually referencing his face or head being

covered in response to a question about whether he said

anything to his attackers. The agency reasonably determined

that the manner in which Singh responded on cross-examination

supported the conclusion that he was “embellishing his

story,” rather than offering “honest response[s] to the

government’s . . . question[s].” Liang v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2021).

The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistencies

4 between Singh’s testimony and a letter from the SADA party

regarding Singh’s role within that group. The letter stated

that Singh “used to attend rallies, serve food and water to

the participants, set up tents, past[e] posters etc.” App’x

158. On direct examination, Singh testified generally about

his role in the party, without mentioning any of these

specific activities. And on cross-examination, when asked

pointedly about the activities listed in the letter, Singh

testified in a matter that the IJ characterized as

deliberately evasive and as though he was trying to avoid

contradicting the letter. When the IJ gave Singh the

opportunity to explain the differences between Singh’s

testimony and the letter, Singh appeared, in the IJ’s

determination, “quite testy” and “annoyed,” further

undermining his credibility. App’x 43. Such vague

testimony, particularly when viewed in light of the IJ’s

observations regarding demeanor, fairly support the inference

that Singh’s account was fabricated. See Jin Shui Qiu v.

Ashcroft,

(2d. Cir. 2003) (holding that

where an applicant gives “very spare” testimony, the fact-

finder may “fairly wonder whether the testimony is

5 fabricated”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang

Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(2d Cir. 2007).

Finally, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s failure

to provide specific information related to his alleged stay

in Cyprus. Though Singh testified to having lived and worked

in Cyprus for two years before returning to India in 2014,

his application for asylum did not list any residences or

employment in Cyprus. When Singh sought to explain these

omissions, his explanations were — like much of his testimony

— vague and, accordingly, the agency was not obligated to

credit them. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d.

Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure

relief.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Viewed cumulatively with the other discrepancies the agency

noted, these omissions provided proper support for the

agency’s adverse credibility determination.

In sum, these inconsistencies, omissions and demeanor

findings provide substantial evidence for the agency’s

adverse credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,

. The

6 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,

withholding of removal and CAT relief because all three forms

of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul

v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, we need not address the BIA’s alternative

grounds for denying Singh relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

7