21-6205 Singh v. Garland BIA Christensen, IJ A209 153 914

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of December, two thousand 4 twenty-three. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 BETH ROBINSON, 10 MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 SANJEEV SINGH, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 21-6205 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY. 1 2 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 3 Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior 4 Litigation Counsel; Nehal H. Kamani, Trial 5 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 6 United States Department of Justice, 7 Washington, DC.

8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

9 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

10 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

11 Petitioner Sanjeev Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

12 March 11, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a February 14, 2019, decision of an

13 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

14 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sanjeev

15 Singh, No. A 209 153 914 (B.I.A. Mar. 11, 2021), aff’g No. A 209 153 914 (Immig. Ct.

16 N.Y. City Feb. 14, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

17 facts and procedural history.

18 We have “review[ed] the IJ’s decision including the portions not explicitly

19 discussed by the BIA.” Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005).

20 We review adverse credibility determinations “under the substantial evidence

21 standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and the agency’s

2 1 fact-finding is “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled

2 to conclude to the contrary,”

(b)(4)(B).

3 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

4 trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

5 responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s or

6 witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such

7 statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

8 . . . , without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

9 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

10 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

11 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

12 make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

,

13 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

14 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

15 determination. Singh alleged that he was twice attacked by members of the

16 Shiromani Akali Dal Badal Party on account of his work for the Shiromani Akali

17 Dal Amritsar Party. Multiple inconsistencies within Singh’s testimony and

18 between his testimony and documentary evidence regarding the attacks provide

3 1 substantial evidence for the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See

2

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

3 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude [a noncitizen] from showing that

4 an IJ was compelled to find [the noncitizen] credible. Multiple inconsistencies

5 would so preclude even more forcefully.”).

6 For example, Singh's testimony was internally inconsistent and inconsistent

7 with a letter from his uncle about who was at his home when he arrived there

8 following the first attack. He testified that the only people at his home when he

9 returned following the first attack were his father, mother and sister, and he didn’t

10 see any other extended family members on his way to the police station to report

11 the assault. When confronted with a letter from his uncle indicating that the

12 uncle was present when Singh returned home, he first explained that the uncle

13 lives next door, then said his father called the uncle and talked to him, and then

14 testified that his uncle was “standing there” with his mother, sister and father

15 when he returned home. When reminded that he had previously testified that

16 only his mother, sister and father were home, he testified, “Because our walls are

17 very small over there.”

18 The agency was not required to credit Singh’s explanations for these

4 1 inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining

2 that to secure relief a petitioner must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder

3 would be compelled to credit the petitioner’s explanation for inconsistent

4 testimony). Singh’s explanation that his uncle saw him because he lived next

5 door was inconsistent with his express testimony that he saw no other extended

6 family members when he returned home after the attack.

7 Likewise, Singh’s testimony about when he went into hiding at an uncle’s

8 house following the second attack was inconsistent with the IJ’s reasonable

9 interpretation of his written statement. Singh testified that after the second attack

10 he went to the doctor and then directly to his uncle’s house where he remained

11 until he left the country. In his written statement, he wrote that after the attack

12 he was in immense pain, limped home, and “told my parents about the attack.”

13 Certified Administrative Record 289. He was taken to the village doctor. Singh

14 wrote, “My parents suggested me to decrease my activities or I might get killed.

15 After few days, my parents house. I stayed hidden for a couple of days at my

16 uncle’s house.”

Confronted with the inconsistency, he said maybe there was

17 a typing error in his written statement. Again, the IJ was not required to credit

18 this explanation. Majidi,

.

5 1 Moreover, the agency reasonably concluded that Singh’s documentary

2 evidence did not rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony

4 may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

5 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

6 question.”). The agency reasonably gave medical records little weight because

7 they were not contemporaneous and listed an incorrect date of birth. See Y.C. v.

8 Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s

9 evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).

10 And the affidavits from Singh’s family were “strikingly similar” in content and

11 formatting, and they were from interested parties who were unavailable for cross-

12 examination. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 524–25 (2d Cir.

13 2007) (holding that we have “firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that

14 striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that the statement are

15 ‘canned’”); see also Y.C.,

.

16 The multiple inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroborating evidence

17 provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See

18

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao,

n.8; Xiu Xia Lin,

6 1 167 (holding that “cumulative effect” of even minor inconsistencies may “be

2 deemed consequential” (quotation marks omitted)); Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

3 The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

4 removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief were based on the same

5 discredited factual claims. See Paul v. Gonzales,

, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

7 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court 11

7