22-6251 Ruiz Garcia v. Garland BIA Christensen, IJ A210 212 584

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of September, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

MARTIN RUIZ GARCIA, Petitioner,

v. 22-6251 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Cory Forman, Cohen Forman Barone, LLP, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Jessica E. Burns, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Martin Ruiz Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review

of an April 29, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a May 13, 2019 decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Martin

Ruiz Garcia, No. A210 212 584 (B.I.A. Apr. 29, 2022), aff’g No. A210 212 584 (Immigr.

Ct. N.Y. City May 13, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.

See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). “We

review the agency’s factual findings . . . for substantial evidence” and “[w]e review

the agency’s legal conclusions de novo.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

2 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

(b)(4)(B).

The agency did not err in finding that Ruiz Garcia failed to establish his

eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief based on his fear that

members of his community in Mexico will harm him based on his child-

endangerment conviction in the United States and that cartels will kidnap him for

ransom as a returnee who lived in the United States.

Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum

by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, see

(b)(2), “which requires that the alien present credible testimony that he

subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is objectively reasonable,”

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft,

(2d Cir. 2004). The agency did not err

in finding speculative Ruiz Garcia’s fear that his community in Mexico would kill

him on account of a New York conviction for child endangerment because the

evidence did not establish that he is at risk of such harm. See Jian Xing Huang v.

U.S. INS,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the

record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”). Ruiz Garcia primarily

testified that his conviction would politically hurt his brother, who is mayor of a

3 small town, and asserted only a generalized fear that his community would kill

him when asked to specify what fear he had for himself. His evidence states that

vigilante groups have emerged in certain areas of Mexico to protect against

organized criminal groups suspected of criminal activity and kidnappings within

communities, but it does not discuss vigilante violence directed at those, like Ruiz

Garcia, who have been convicted of crimes outside of Mexico.

The agency also did not err in finding that Ruiz Garcia failed to establish a

well-founded fear that criminal cartels would kidnap him on account of his status

as a returnee from the United States. See id.; Ramsameachire,

. Ruiz

Garcia’s evidence states that returnees face institutional discrimination and can be

stigmatized as criminals, but the agency reasonably noted that the evidence does

not indicate that returnees are kidnapped at a greater rate than the general

population and that the general rate of “2.4 kidnapping cases per 100,000

inhabitants,” Certified Administrative Record at 644, is insufficient to establish a

reasonable possibility that Ruiz Garcia will face kidnapping. See Jian Hui Shao v.

Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a “reasonable possibility

of persecution c[an] be sufficient to support a well-founded fear” and noting that

the Supreme Court has “cited approvingly to a one-in-ten example of persecution

4 to illustrate the sort of reasonable possibility that would demonstrate a well-

founded fear” (quotation marks omitted)); Melgar de Torres v. Reno,

,

314 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute

persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s well-founded fear of

persecution.”).

Ruiz Garcia’s failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution was

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder,

, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that when an applicant “fails to

demonstrate the . . . chance of persecution required for the grant of asylum, he

necessarily fails to demonstrate the clear probability of future persecution

required for withholding of removal, and the more likely than not to be tortured

standard required for CAT relief”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Therefore, we do not reach the agency’s alternative bases for denying relief. See

INS v. Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies

are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary

to the results they reach.”).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

6