22-6469 Bhojak v. Garland BIA Sichel, IJ A206 223 001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of October, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, MICHAEL H. PARK, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

CHINTAN JYOTINDRA BHOJAK, Petitioner,

v. 22-6469 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Usman B. Ahmad, Esq., Long Island City, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Justin Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel; Kevin J. Conway, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Chintan Jyotindra Bhojak, a native and citizen of India, seeks

review of an August 30, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a June 17, 2019 decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chintan

Jyotindra Bhojak, No. A 206 223 001 (B.I.A. Aug. 30, 2022), aff’g No. A 206 223 001

(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 17, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the

BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2005); Yan

Chen v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005). Bhojak does not challenge the

IJ’s finding that his conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars asylum and

withholding of removal or the BIA’s finding that he waived review of this basis 2 for the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, so we consider only his CAT

claim. See Debique v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider

abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an

appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.”

(quotation marks omitted)). We review factfinding related to a CAT claim for

substantial evidence, and we review questions of law and application of law to

fact de novo. Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2021).

Bhojak alleged that U.S. newspapers reported on his arrest and conviction

in New Jersey, and people in India learned of the charges against him. He

testified that a group of “Hindu extremist[s]” confronted his father in 2012 and

threatened to harm the family if Bhojak returned to India. He argued that he

would be tortured in India and could not relocate within India because people

could learn of his conviction through the internet.

The agency did not err in denying the CAT claim as speculative. A CAT

applicant must show that he will “more likely than not” be tortured in the country

of removal.

(c)(2), 1208.17(a); see also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,

, 758–59 (2d Cir. 2022). 1 “It is the likelihood of all necessary events

1 The citations are to the regulations as written at the time of the IJ’s decision. 3 coming together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of

events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of J–F–F–,

, 918 n.4

(AG 2006)).

First, Bhojak asserts that the IJ did not properly consider evidence that he

will be placed on a sex-offender registry in India. As the Government argues,

although Bhojak broadly argued that information about his conviction will be

available on the internet, he did not argue before the IJ or the BIA that he would

be placed on a sex-offender registry. This specific claim is therefore unexhausted.

See Ud Din v. Garland,

, 419–20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2023) (confirming that

issue exhaustion is mandatory when the opposing party raises the issue).

Even if individuals could learn about Bhojak’s conviction from a general

internet search, the agency did not err in finding insufficient evidence that he

would be tortured. He relied on two articles about “honor killings” in India, but

neither article discusses whether individuals with criminal convictions (either in

India or abroad) are targeted for honor killings. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the

record . . .[an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”). Moreover, Bhojak cites no

4 country-conditions evidence that government authorities would fail to protect him

or acquiesce to his torture. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

, 157–58 (2d

Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce

evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the

agency’s challenged decision.” (citation omitted)). On this record, the IJ

reasonably determined that Bhojak’s fear of torture was speculative. See Mu

Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2005) (denying CAT claim

where country conditions evidence reflected instances of torture, but petitioner

had no “particularized evidence” that someone in his circumstances would be

tortured). Accordingly, the agency did not err in denying deferral of removal

under the CAT. See

(c)(2) (requiring applicant to show torture

is “more likely than not” to occur).

Because the agency’s determination regarding the likelihood of torture is

dispositive, we do not reach its alternative finding that Bhojak could safely relocate

in India. See INS v. Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule courts

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.” (citations omitted)).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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