23-8032 Guzman v. Bldg. Serv. 32BJ Pension Fund

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of October, two thousand twenty- four.

PRESENT: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges, ______________________________________

CARLOS J. GUZMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-8032

BUILDING SERVICE 32BJ PENSION FUND, PETER GOLDBERGER, Executive Director of the Fund, KYLE BRAGG, as Union Trustee, HOWARD I. ROTHSCHILD, as Employee Trustee of the Fund, Defendants-Appellees,

RONALD RAAB, Legal Counsel of the Fund,

Defendant. * _______________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: CARLOS J. GUZMAN, pro se, New York, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees: ELISABETH OPPENHEIMER (Ramya Ravindran, on the brief), Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Lewis J. Liman, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the November 20, 2023 judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.

Carlos Guzman, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his claims against the Building Service 32BJ Pension Fund

(the “Fund”) and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 (“ERISA”). Guzman alleged that he was entitled to an actuarial increase

in his pension payments because he deferred claiming his pension benefits for

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. 2 several years after reaching normal retirement age. The district court dismissed

his complaint after concluding that Guzman’s claims were foreclosed by the

plain language of the pension plan. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo,” assessing

whether the facts pleaded in the complaint, “taken as true and with all reasonable

inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor, state a plausible claim to relief.”

Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2024). Since

Guzman has been pro se throughout these proceedings, we construe his filings to

raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See

In interpreting an ERISA pension plan, we apply the “federal common law

of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans,” which means that “we

interpret and enforce unambiguous language in an ERISA plan according to its

plain meaning.” Aramony v. United Way of Am.,

, 411–12 (2d Cir.

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). We assess whether plan language is

ambiguous using an objective standard, against the backdrop of “the entire

integrated agreement.” Id. at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Under the unambiguous terms of the 2018 Summary Plan Description (the

“SPD”), which Guzman referenced in his complaint and concedes is the

operative plan document, Guzman was not eligible for an actuarial increase to

his pension benefits. The SPD section titled “When Pension Benefits Begin”

makes clear that an employee is entitled to an actuarial increase only “[i]f after

terminating Covered Employment, [he] wait[s] to begin [his] pension until after

Normal Retirement Age.” Fund App’x at 30 (emphasis added). As Guzman

admits, he did not terminate his covered employment but rather remained

employed in the building service industry after reaching the normal retirement

age. This alone establishes that Guzman is not entitled to an actuarial increase

under the SPD.

In response, Guzman points to the SPD’s suspension rules, which prohibit

employees whose benefits are suspended from collecting an actuarial increase.

Suspension occurs when an employee retires and then returns to employment in

the building service industry in Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, or Staten Island

(“Disqualifying Employment”) for more than forty hours a month after the age

of sixty-five. See id. (“No [actuarial] increase will apply to months for which

your benefit was suspended.”); id. at 28 (“Pension payments will be suspended

4 for each month in which you work 40 or more hours in Disqualifying

Employment.”); id. at 43 (defining “Disqualifying Employment”). Guzman

argues that because the SPD’s suspension rules only apply to individuals who

retire, begin receiving benefits, and then return to work, individuals like him, who

simply continue working past age sixty-five without beginning to receive

benefits, are entitled to an actuarial increase regardless of whether they engage

in Disqualifying Employment. But this ignores the point made earlier that

Guzman is not entitled to an actuarial increase precisely because he never

terminated his Covered Employment in the first place. The suspension-of-

benefits provision simply ensures identical treatment for those (like Guzman)

who do not retire but continue working in the building service industry, and

those who retire but then return to Disqualifying Employment. Construing the

plan document as an integrated whole, we therefore conclude that the

unambiguous language of the SPD does not permit an individual like Guzman,

who continues working in the building service industry past retirement age, to

receive an actuarial increase. See Aramony, 254 F.3d at 412.

Guzman raises two additional benefits-related arguments on appeal.

First, he asserts that the Fund should return money he paid into the pension fund

5 after surpassing the maximum number of service credits needed to receive full

monthly pension benefits. Second, he contends that the Fund miscalculated his

pension benefits. But these arguments are barred because Guzman failed to

raise them in his administrative appeal. See Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island

Term Disability Plan,

(2d Cir. 2002) (requiring “exhaustion of

benefit claims brought under ERISA” whereby “claimants must pursue all

administrative remedies provided by their plan pursuant to statute”).

We have considered Guzman’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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