23-6834 Zeeshan v. Garland

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of October, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: MICHAEL H. PARK, EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

MUHAMMAD ZEESHAN, Petitioner,

v. 23-6834

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Dilli Raj Bhatta, Bhatta Law & Associates, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Jennifer P. Williams, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Muhammad Zeeshan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks

review of a decision from the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zeeshan, No. A 212-990-009

(B.I.A. July 10, 2023), aff’g No. A 212-990-009 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Aug. 4, 2020).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

(2d Cir. 2006). Because the BIA agrees with the IJ’s conclusions,

emphasizes some of the IJ’s reasoning, and does not reject any findings, our review

includes aspects of the IJ’s decision not explicitly discussed by the BIA. See Guan 2 v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for

substantial evidence and questions of law—and the application of law to fact—de

novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

(b)(4)(B).

An asylum applicant bears the burden of proof.

(b)(1)(B)(i).

“The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden

without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the

applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts

sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”

(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Pinel-Gomez v. Garland,

, 529–30 (2d Cir. 2022)

(explaining that the agency may find testimony credible but “still decide that the

testimony falls short of satisfying the applicant’s burden of proof, either because

it is unpersuasive or because it does not include specific facts sufficient to

demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee” (cleaned up)). “Where the trier of

fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates

otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the

3 applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”

(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Smakaj v. Garland, No. 22-6180,

,

at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 2024).

Here, the agency did not err in concluding that significant inconsistencies

rendered unpersuasive Zeeshan’s testimony as to his relationship with a woman

in Pakistan and the beatings and threats he received from her family. 1 First,

Zeeshan testified that his relationship consisted of telephone calls and that he did

not spend time with her in person. His written statement noted, however, that

the woman and he spent a night together at a hotel. Zeeshan argues that any such

inconsistency was minor, that the question about whether they ever spent time

together in person was ambiguous, and that the IJ should have given him an

opportunity to clarify. But the relationship was a central element of his

persecution claim. The question was straightforward and posed by his attorney

on direct examination. And the agency can rely on obvious inconsistencies

1The IJ concluded that Zeeshan was “credible, but not persuasive.” CAR at 000084. Yet the IJ’s analysis focused on issues more properly going to credibility, not persuasiveness, such as inconsistencies between his testimony and documentary evidence and his lack of candor and responsiveness while testifying. Regardless of the terminology, the IJ’s holding sufficiently supports a conclusion that Zeeshan did not meet his burden for a grant of asylum. 4 without asking for an explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

2005) (“Nor have we ever required that an IJ, when faced with inconsistent

testimony of an asylum applicant, must always bring any apparent inconsistencies

to the applicant’s attention and actively solicit an explanation.”).

Second, Zeeshan wrote and testified that he did not report the assaults

because the woman’s father ran the local police department. But when asked

why medical records indicated that police took him to the hospital and his clothes

and medical reports from the hospital, Zeeshan claimed that officers, perhaps sent

by the woman’s father, met him outside the hospital and escorted him inside—all

without speaking and all in an effort to stop him from filing a report. Even if that

were the case, the IJ reasonably found his testimony unpersuasive. If the police

accompanied him and confiscated evidence, Zeeshan should have mentioned that

in his written statement and direct testimony. And if the officers did not talk to

him, it remains unclear how he knew that they were there to prevent him from

filing a report. See Hong Fei Gao,

(explaining that the probative

value of an omission “depends on whether [the omitted] facts are ones the witness

would reasonably have been expected to disclose”). 2

2 Zeeshan argues that the agency failed to account for his limited education and 5 Nor did the agency err in giving little weight to Zeeshan’s corroborating

evidence. See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer

to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary

evidence.” (citation omitted)). Zeeshan submitted supporting affidavits from his

father and a friend. But his father is an interested party, and neither his father

nor his friend was available for cross-examination or mentioned the alleged

assaults. See Gao v. Barr,

(2d Cir. 2020) (noting that the IJ “acted

within her discretion” in according “little weight” to letters from “interested

parties” unavailable for cross-examination). Zeeshan also submitted medical

records and documents obtained from Pakistan. But the former was inconsistent

with his testimony and the latter lacked mailing envelopes. See In re H-L-H- & Z-

Y-Z-,

, 214 n.5 (B.I.A. 2010) (noting that the “failure to attempt

to prove the authenticity of a document . . . is significant”), overruled on other

grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder,

, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012). And even

lack of sophistication. But there is no indication that such factors hindered his ability to describe his experiences. And we presume that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 when given full weight, none of Zeeshan’s documents corroborates his

persecution claim.

On this record, the agency did not err in concluding that Zeeshan failed to

provide reasonably available corroboration. And where the IJ has identified the

missing evidence, we may reverse its decision only if “a reasonable trier of fact is

compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”

(b)(4); see Yan Juan Chen v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2011). That is

not the case here.

Zeeshan argues otherwise. He claims, for instance, that he should not have

been expected to provide a statement from his mother—not because it was

unavailable, but because it would have been redundant. But the IJ explained why

that was not so: Zeeshan’s father made no mention of any assaults, and Zeeshan

testified that his mother—who took him to the hospital for medical treatment—

had told his father about the assaults. 3 Zeeshan also maintains that evidence

related to the woman’s family’s stature was not reasonably available because the

family is prominent only locally and because the people who wrote letters to

3 Zeeshan’s assertion that his mother did not witness the assaults conflicts with his written statement. And while his testimony on this point was confusing, it confirmed that his mother became aware of an assault as it was happening. 7 support his application should not have been expected to know that such

information was important. But Zeeshan fails to show that those who wrote—or

were available to write—supporting letters were unaware of the family’s position.

In fact, he testified that everyone in his area knew such information. That evidence

was important, given his claims that the family could use its power to carry out its

threats with impunity. And the burden to introduce it was his, “without

prompting from the IJ.” Wei Sun v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned

up).

In sum, Zeeshan’s testimony proves unpersuasive. Given the deficiencies

in his evidence and his failure to present reasonably available corroboration for

significant aspects of his claim, the agency did not err in concluding that he failed

to satisfy his burden for asylum. See Pinel-Gomez, 52 F.4th at 529–30; Yan Juan

Chen,

. Having failed to meet that burden, he “necessarily” failed

to satisfy the higher showings required for withholding of removal or CAT relief.

Lecaj v. Holder,

, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Hong Fei Gao,

. And because he fails to argue that the agency’s additional grounds for

denying CAT relief contained errors, he abandons any such claim. See Debique v.

Garland,

(2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not

8 adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make

legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (cleaned up)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending

motions for a stay of removal in this petition are DISMISSED as moot.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

9