23-7688 Walker v. Raja

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION SUMMARY ORDER). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, DENNY CHIN, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ Michael Tracy Walker, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 23-7688

Taimur Raja (Shield No. 19639), David Vazquez (Shield No. 20393), Kyle Brown (Shield No. 16513), William Chow (Shield No. 4244), Elisa Battista (Shield No. 178), Sazedur Rahman (Shield No. 2645), * Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Michael Tracy Walker, pro se, Napanoch, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds- Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Martin Rowe, Jamison Davies, of Counsel, New York, NY.

Appeal from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Chen, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the order and judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Tracy Walker appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion for a new trial after a jury found that Defendants-Appellees, New York

Police Department (“NYPD”) officers, had not used excessive force in arresting Walker.

Walker argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that (1) the district court

made an erroneous evidentiary ruling; (2) Defendants failed to identify a witness to call;

(3) the district court did not advise Walker that he needed to subpoena a witness; and (4)

the district court erred in failing to accommodate Walker’s request to be housed in

2 custody closer to the courthouse for the duration of the trial. We affirm the denial of

Walker’s motion for a new trial and the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

Walker brought this § 1983 claim alleging the Defendants-Appellees collectively

used excessive force, or failed to correctly supervise officers using such force, in arresting

him in January 2017, after his attempted gunpoint robbery of a Brooklyn jewelry shop.

See

. The store owner had fought back, causing Walker to flee by kicking

through the store’s glass door. However, the owner and a nearby group of civilians

immediately restrained Walker outside the store. When the NYPD officers arrived, they

engaged Walker and, after a struggle, handcuffed him. The attempted robbery, the

subsequent struggle, and the arrest were all captured on surveillance video, excerpts of

which were shown at trial. Walker claimed that one or more of the officers had punched

him or otherwise used excessive force, rendering him legally blind. The officers denied

Walker’s allegations and argued that Walker could not show that the deterioration of his

vision was not attributable to a preexisting eye condition or to his struggle with the store

owner and civilians before the officers arrived. The jury returned a full verdict in the

officers’ favor.

3 Walker moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A) for a new trial.

The district court denied the motion, and Walker timely appealed. We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, which

we recount only as necessary to explain our decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Carroll v.

Cnty. of Monroe,

(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We likewise review a

district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Sheng v. M&TBank Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2017). A district court abuses its discretion when it “base[s] its ruling

on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or

render[s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”

(citation omitted). “The circumstances ordinarily recognized as supporting a new

trial are that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a

miscarriage of justice, i.e., that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence . . . or that

for stated reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.” New England Ins. Co. v.

Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co.,

(2d Cir. 2002) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted).

4 DISCUSSION

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial, we

affirm.

I. The District Court Did Not Err in Admitting Excerpts of the Surveillance Footage of the Incident

The district court did not err in admitting excerpts of the surveillance footage.

The district court excluded the portions showing the attempted armed robbery, but

permitted jurors to view excerpts of the altercation that occurred before Defendants’

arrival. See D. Ct. Dkt. 144 (Mots. Limine Chart), at 2; D. Ct. Dkt. 247 (Tr. Civil Cause

Trial), at 57–60. On Walker’s post-trial motion, the district court affirmed its decision.

We agree with the district court that the footage was relevant to the injury-

causation question, and that the footage’s probative value was not “substantially

outweighed” by its potential prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Fed. R.

Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” (emphasis added)). The footage is

clearly probative to Walker’s § 1983 claim of excessive force, which requires the

Defendants’ “personal involvement” in the “alleged constitutional deprivations.” See

Spavone v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs.,

(2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

5 Defendants raised an alternate theory of causation based on events depicted in the video.

And the district court was careful to exclude the footage of the associated attempted

armed robbery. D. Ct. Dkt. 247 (Tr. Civil Cause Trial), at 57. The district court’s ruling

was therefore well “within the range of permissible decisions,” and it did not otherwise

err. See Sheng,

(citation omitted).

II. Walker Claims Two Trial Deficiencies Contradicted by the Record

We conclude that Walker’s contentions regarding Officer Adam Osman’s and Dr.

Barry Hyman’s absent testimony lack factual merit.

First, Walker claims that Defendants did not identify Officer Osman as a potential

witness during discovery, which prevented Walker from calling the officer to testify at

trial or adding him as a defendant. But Walker’s pre-trial summary judgment motion

included, as an attached exhibit, a statement from Defendant Sergeant Sazedur Rahman

clearly identifying Officer Osman as the driver of a vehicle in which Sergeant Rahman

rode to respond to the incident. See D. Ct. Dkt. 100, at 33 (Pl.’s Br. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J., Ex. A, at 2). Walker cannot claim that Officer Osman’s identity was withheld.

Second, Walker contends that the district court failed to inform him that to ensure

that the optician who examined him after the incident, Dr. Hyman, would testify at trial,

Walker needed to subpoena Dr. Hyman as a witness. Here, again, the record proves

6 otherwise. More than two months before trial, the district court provided Walker a

document titled “Representing Yourself at Trial: A Manual for Pro Se Litigants

Appearing Before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.”

D. Ct. Dkt. 209. That manual explains that a party must subpoena a non-party witness

who refuses to testify.

at 49–51; see also D. Ct. Dkt. 192 (Minute Entry for Status

Conference) (ruling in November 2021 that pursuant to Walker’s request, Walker could

subpoena Dr. Hyman).

III. Walker Identifies No Error Affecting the Trial’s Fairness Arising from His Custodial Housing

Finally, the district court’s unsuccessful attempt to arrange for Walker’s custodial

housing in a prison closer to the courthouse for the duration of the trial does not warrant

a new trial. 1 Walker claims that he was awakened early in the morning on the four trial

days and transported by correctional officers in a van that allegedly was not outfitted to

accommodate his pre-existing injuries—and that the commute deprived him of “hot

meals [and] adequate rest.” Appellant’s Br. 25–26. Walker has not shown that his

1 The district court entered successive orders attempting to secure more proximate housing to the courthouse. See D. Ct. Dkt. 213, at 4–5 (PDF pagination) (ordering Walker’s transfer “under safe and secure conduct to officials from the New York City Department of Correction”); D. Ct. Dkt. 215, at 3–7 (PDF pagination) (same for “the Metropolitan Detention Center”). 7 commute and meals arrangement, in the particular circumstances here, diminished his

right to a fairly conducted trial.

We have considered all of Walker’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order and judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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